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Abstract 
My project involves looking at the metaphysics of possibility. There are two 
questions that are central to the metaphysics of possibility: firstly, what are 
possible worlds and secondly, is there an empty possible world. Possibilist and 
actualist accounts of worlds attempt to answer the first question while discussions 
of metaphysical nihilism, the empty world and the modal ontological arguments 
deal with the second. However no one has systematically considered how the 
answers given to one of these questions affect the answers available to the other -
this is my project. I develop a new way of categorising theories of possible 
worlds. I argue that metaphysical nihilism (the claim that there could have been 
nothing), in all its published forms, is incompatible with each of the fully worked 
out, robust accounts of possible worlds available. I point out the importance of 
using the correct criterion of concreteness in discussions of metaphysical nihilism. 
I argue that if we modify the account of abstract objects used by the metaphysical 
nihilists, then nihilism can be shown to be compatible with the ersatz account of 
possible worlds. Finally, I argue that given these considerations, Lowe's 
arguments against the nihilist are more plausible than nihilism itself. 
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Introduction 
1 I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Most true statements are true in virtue of how things are. There is some aspect of 
the world, which they give an accurate representation of and this is what makes 
them true. For example, 'it is now raining' is true because it is now raining. This 
much is widely accepted, even assumed in both philosophical and non-
philosophical discourse. However, there are some statements which we believe to 
be true but which do not correspond is this simple way to how things are. 
Statements of possibility are an example e.g. 'it could have been sunny now'. This 
is true but its truth cannot be explained by the way the weather is. If some aspect 
of how things are can account for the truth of this proposition then it is not in the 
straightforward way that the truth of 'it is now raining' is explained by its now 
raining. The problem that philosophers of modality face is how we can explain the 
truth of these statements of possibility. 
1.1 The structure of the thesis 
My thesis deals with the metaphysics of possibility and necessity. I consider two 
key questions: 
(i) What is it for something to be necessary or possible? What are 
possible worlds? In answering this question I look at the competing 
accounts of possible worlds. 
(ii) Is it necessary that something exists? Is there an empty possible 
world? In answering this question I will look at the arguments for and 
against metaphysical nihilism. 
Introduction 
This introductory chapter will deal with the background and framework for the 
debate. 
The body of the thesis breaks down into two main parts. In the first part (chapters 
two and three) I will consider the first question of what it is that makes statements 
of possibility, necessity and contingency true. According to the standard possible-
world analysis of modal claims, a proposition P is possible if and only if there is a 
world at which P is the case. However it is far from clear what these worlds are. 
In this first part I will be looking at the metaphysics of these possible worlds. In 
chapter two (Possibilism) I will be looking at arguments for and against believing 
in possibilism and raising some problems for both. In chapter three (Actualism) I 
will be looking at the nature of actualism and how it deals with some of the 
philosophical challenges facing it. I will also look at two specific forms of 
actualism - linguistic ersatzism and modal fictionalism - and consider how they 
deal with modal claims, especially how they deal with my question (ii). In both 
these chapters I will not be arguing for any specific account of possible worlds 
(although I will be arguing against some specific accounts), I will be laying out 
some of the main issues in order to give some background to the later chapters. 
In the second part of the thesis (chapters four, five, six and seven), I deal with the 
second question. I will look at whether or not one particular modal claim is true. 
This is the claim that there could have been nothing. On the standard analysis of 
modal statements we can translate this claim into: there is an empty possible 
world. In chapter four (The Subtraction Argument) I will outline the subtraction 
argument (the main argument for metaphysical nihilism) as it stands and will 
make some criticisms that will be used later. In chapter five (World and Object) I 
will suggest a new way of categorising theories of possible worlds and will argue 
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that none of the published versions of the subtraction argument are compatible 
with a fully worked out, robust account of possible worlds. In chapter six 
(Metaphysical Nihilism) I will argue that the proponents of metaphysical nihilism 
have been using an inappropriate criterion of concreteness in their arguments and 
develop an appropriate criterion. In chapter seven (Can We Save the Subtraction 
Argument?) I reconstruct an argument for metaphysical nihilism using the 
appropriate criterion of concreteness. I conclude that Lowe's anti-nihilist 
arguments are more persuasive than those of the nihilists. 
1.2 The themes of the thesis 
My main claim is that the proponents of metaphysical nihilism have not given 
sufficient support to their position. The reason for this is that they sought to 
consider the second of my two questions (is there an empty possible world?) 
largely in isolation from my first question (what are possible worlds?) This led 
them to write an argument for nihilism (the subtraction argument - an answer to 
question (ii)), which is not compatible with the fully worked-out, more robust 
accounts of possible worlds (the answer to question (i)). 
As well as these specific claims I will offer two more general arguments. These 
will be implicit in the arguments that follow and will also be made explicit here 
and in some other sections of the text. 
The first of these is that these two questions need to be considered not singly but 
as two inter-related issues. In chapter six I discuss which if either of them should 
be considered to be primary or foundational and conclude that finding some sort 
of reflective equilibrium between them is desirable. This is illustrated (a) in 
chapter five where I argue that the current versions of the subtraction argument 
12 
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incur problems by considering the nihilist's question without reference to the 
possible worlds question and (b) in chapter three where I argue against 
reductionist versions of linguistic ersatzism on the ground that they are not robust 
enough to be able to deal with the question of nihilism. 
My second theme is about ontological parsimony. I argue against the unreflective 
use of principles of ontological economy in the study of ontology itself. This is 
argued for in chapter two where I defend Lewis from what I show to be 
inappropriate uses of Ockham's razor. We should also look out for other types of 
problematic ontological commitment. For example, I have shown elsewhere that 
Baldwin's and Rodriguez-Pereyra's criteria of concreteness rule out the existence 
of haecceities.1 There is no direct connection between the issues they are 
discussing and the existence of haecceities except that they are incompatible. This 
means they have no reasons for denying the existence of haecceities that are 
explicitly about haecceities. So this is another type of ontological commitment we 
have to be aware of and approach with a critical mind. Ontological commitment is 
controversial not just when it involves commitment to the existence of many 
objects or kinds of objects but also when a theory commits us to the non-existence 
of an object but without arguments that are about that type of object. 
I will point out these themes again when they occur in the main text of the thesis. 
These are not mere assertions or background suppositions of my arguments. 
Rather I think they are the conclusions of arguments that are implicit and in places 
explicit in what follows. 
1 Coggins, G., "World and Object: Metaphysical Nihilism and Three Accounts of Worlds," 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (2003 forthcoming). 
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1.2.1 Issues which are not discussed in the thesis 
There are several other philosophical debates that have consequences for the 
issues I am discussing. In order to stay focused on what is most relevant to my 
arguments I cannot engage in these debates. However, they may be relevant in a 
broader sense and so I should at least acknowledge that here. 
The first of these is the question of the correct modal logic. Baldwin's arguments 
require a modal logic at least as strong as S4. If something weaker than S4 is the 
correct modal logic then the reconstruction of the subtraction argument that I give 
in chapter 7 may be more problematic than we thought. However it would be no 
more problematic than the versions given by Baldwin and Rodriguez-Pereyra. 
Also many or even most philosophers are happy to accept S4 or an equivalent or 
stronger modal logic. This means I am not attaching my arguments to any 
particularly radical or implausible view. 
Secondly there are the questions about the nature of metaphysical necessity and 
possibility as opposed to logical possibility or necessity. If anything that I say is 
not agnostic about this distinction then it is metaphysical necessity that I am 
referring to. I am not going to give arguments to show that metaphysical necessity 
is a distinct modality from logical. Plenty of arguments for (and against) this view 
are already available.2 I mean what Kripke means when he discusses 
metaphysical necessity and possibility. 
A third debate that I touch on but don't give arguments for either side, is the 
relationist versus absolutist accounts of space and time. I do take into account 
2 See Hale, B. , "Absolute Necessities," in Philosophical Perspectives 10, ed. Tomberlin, J. E . 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), Kripkie, S., Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), Lowe, 
E . J. , The Possibility of Metaphysics Substance, Identity, and Time (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998) 13ff, Plantinga, A., The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974) 1-9. 
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Rodriguez-Pereyra's criticism of Baldwin for assuming an absolutist account. I 
think it is reasonable to criticise a view that turns on such a controversial 
assumption. Where the issue is relevant I consider both views so that none of my 
arguments are dependent on either one or the other being right. My criticisms of 
the container view of worlds for assuming absolutism do not entail that 
absolutism is wrong. Rather I want to point out exactly how far reaching and 
philosophically controversial the ontology of the container view is. I am not 
saying that absolutism is wrong but merely pointing out that the container view 
relies on absolutism being right. 
Fourthly, Rodriguez-Pereyra and Lowe disagree over the question of the infinite 
divisibility of material objects. As in the case of relationism and absolutism, I 
give parallel arguments based on each assumption, rather than giving an argument 
for one side or the other. The question is not central to any of the issues I am 
discussing and to make an assumption on either side would be a concession to 
those philosophers on the other side and a reason for them to reject my arguments. 
I believe that my arguments are stronger because of this agnosticism rather than 
weaker. 
The argument between mathematical fictionalists and their opponents is touched 
on in chapter 7 but I do not give arguments on either side. A mathematical 
fictionalist would object to Lowe's argument. But if I objected to Lowe on this 
basis it would neither be original (as Field already holds this position) nor 
convincing (as few others share Field's philosophy of mathematics). 
15 
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1.3 The framework for the debate 
Modal claims are claims about possibility and necessity. In philosophy we talk a 
lot about whether something is necessarily the case and whether or not something 
is possible. But like all the distinctions we use in philosophy, at some stage we 
have to look at philosophical problems associated with these phenomena 
themselves. The introduction to a thesis about the metaphysics of modality seems 
like a good place to do this. If our notions of modality are confused or misleading 
we can, at worst, give up now or at best, clarify which issues need to be 
concentrated on and sort out the pseudo problems from the serious philosophical 
worries. 
1.3.1 Could things have been different? 
In what I have said so far I have assumed that things might have been different. 
But we can't uncritically assume that this is true. On the face of it you might 
want to say that the world could not have been different at all. (This view is 
sometimes called Spinozism after Spinoza3 who believed that this world is the 
only world that is possible.) 
This line of reasoning might for instance be motivated by determinism. I f 
everything is determined by the laws of physics then surely nothing could have 
been different. The way things are is the only way things could be. But is this 
really a sensible view? I think not. It seems to me that there are at least two ways 
in which the universe could have been different. Firstly the laws of physics could 
have been different. Perhaps there could have been no gravity or causation could 
have run backwards. Causation could have not been there at all; there could have 
3 Spinoza, B., Ethics, trans. Hale White, W. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1927) 9-13. 
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been pure 'anarchy' with 'spontaneous' events occurring for no reason. Of 
course we know that the universe is not like this but the only reason it is not is 
because of the laws of physics that we actually have. We are considering the 
possibility that these laws could have been otherwise. Naturally a universe with 
such radically different laws from our own might not be able to support human 
life or even to exist for very long but it might be possible. So one way in which 
things could have been different is that there could have been different laws of 
physics. We cannot argue against this claim by citing determinism because 
determinism, i f it is true, is part and parcel of the actual laws of physics and we 
are considering the claim that these laws are not necessary. 
The second way that things could have been different is that it could have been 
the case that the actual laws of physics held but the universe could have had 
different initial conditions. At or immediately after the time of the big bang the 
universe was in a certain state. It occupied a certain amount of space; the 
occupants of this space were at different temperatures and so on. But surely these 
conditions could have been different. The big bang could have been a bit smaller 
or larger meaning the resultant universe could have contained more or less 
energy than it actually does. So even i f the laws of physics were the same as 
those in the actual world, the initial conditions of the universe could have been 
different meaning that the resultant universe would be different. Even i f our laws 
of physics are necessary, i f the initial conditions of the early universe were 
different then the later stages would surely be different too. This possibility is 
described clearly in the following: 
The divine tape player holds a million scenarios, each perfectly sensible. 
Little quirks at the onset, occurring for no particular reason, unleash 
cascades of consequences ... But the slightest early nudge contacts a 
17 
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different groove, and history veers into another plausible channel, diverging 
continually from its original pathway. The end results are so different, the 
initial perturbation so apparently trivial. 4 
So it seems like we have good reason to reject Spinozism and accept that things 
could have been different. 
1.3.2 What do these questions mean? 
To a non-philosopher or even some philosophers, the two questions I am 
discussing might sound meaningless, unanswerable or just confused. So those of 
us who think that these questions are worth answering need to justify that belief 
and explain exactly what those questions mean. 
Question (ii) in particular needs clarifying. It is sometimes rendered as 'why is 
there something rather than nothing?' 'Could there have been nothing?' or 'why 
is there anything at all?' I think that the version I have used is less open to 
misinterpretation and confusion than these other versions. One way to work out 
exactly what the question is, is to specify what the question is not. Question (ii) 
is not any of the following questions: 
Why do humans exist? Where did humanity come from? How come the universe 
evolved in such a way as to allow life? This group of questions are about us as a 
species or living things in general. It is a much more specific question than the 
one at hand. This question might be answered by a version of the design 
argument. This takes as premise the fact that life exists and asks why. M y 
question in contrast, accepts that something exists and asks why. 
4 Gould, S. J. Wonderful Life quoted in Simons, P., "Whose Fault? The Origins and Evitability of 
the Analytic-Continental Rift," International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (2001): 295. 
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Is there a God? Was the universe deliberately created? A creator of the universe, 
i f there is one, would be a very good candidate for being a necessary being. I f 
there was a necessary being it would give a (positive) answer to question (ii). 
However, there are also other candidates for necessary existence. For example, we 
could claim that the universe itself is a necessary object. Hence, i f this question 
were to be satisfactorily answered in the positive it would probably provide an 
answer to my question (ii). But there may be other objects, rather than a God who 
could also fu l f i l this function and to concentrate on any one would be to unduly 
limit the prospects of an answer. Also, i f we give a negative answer to question 
(ii) we would be forced to give a negative answer to the God question (or else 
deny that God is necessary). 
Now that we've established what we're not talking about it should be easier to 
work out what we are talking about. The question I am addressing is whether 
there could have been no concrete objects. In possible-world-speak this becomes 
'is there a possible world with no concrete objects?' In chapter six I discuss in 
detail what this means but now we at least have a rough outline to work with. 
1.3.3 Technical terms. 
Many of the terms used in these debates have slightly overlapping meanings. A 
prime example is the phrase 'modal realism' which can mean anything from the 
radical Lewisian view to views almost completely opposed to Lewis'. Lewis even 
accepts that calling his position 'modal realism' was not a good idea. 
Conversely, many of the philosophical positions I discuss are called by more than 
one name. The classic example is Lewis's position which is sometimes called 
'genuine modal realism' (usually by its friends) and sometimes called 'extreme 
19 
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modal realism' (not usually by its friends).5 In turn non-Lewisian accounts are 
sometimes called 'moderate modal realism'. I have tried to be consistent but 
unbiased in my use of these terms. I have used the phrases 'genuine modal 
realism' or 'Lewisian modal realism' to refer to Lewis' position and to distinguish 
it from the other broadly modal realist positions available. The choice of this 
phrase rather than the more unsympathetic 'extreme modal realism' is not 
intended to indicate any pre-philosophical preference for Lewis's view. 
5 'Mad-dog modal realism', 'rape-and-loot modal realism' and 'nuclear-holocaust modal realism' 
are other titles suggested for Lewis' position in Lycan, W. G. Review of On the Plurality of 




This chapter and the next form the first part of the thesis and wil l look at the 
competing answers to my question (i) what are possible worlds? What is it for 
something to be necessary or possible? Most philosophers are happy to say that 
for something to be possible is for it to be the case in some possible world, whilst 
for something to be necessary is for it to be the case in all possible worlds. The 
question we now address is 'what are these possible worlds?' 
The answers to this question can be divided into possibilist and actualist accounts 
of worlds. Possibilism is the claim that there are 'merely possible' objects (and 
worlds).1 This is in contrast to actualism which claims that all that exists is the 
actual universe or world and its contents, everything is actual. The aim of this 
chapter is to investigate possibilism. Chapter 3 wi l l be an investigation into 
actualism. 
The main proponent of possibilism is Lewis. There are numerous expositions, 
critiques, attacks on and defences of Lewis' position available. It would be 
impossible for me to give a comprehensive account of this position and the 
discussions of it in a chapter - that would be a job for a whole other thesis. 
Instead I wi l l give a few focused arguments about certain parts of Lewis' 
account. I wil l specifically look at the sorts of reasons that one could have for 
believing in or rejecting Lewis' account. I wi l l look at the discussions of 
ontological economy, which stem from Lewis' account, and wil l use the 
1 McMichael (McMichael, A., "A Problem for Actualism About Possible Worlds," Philosophical 
Review 92 (1983): 49n.) points out the term 'possibilism' is also used to refer to the claim that 
necessity and possibility can be analysed in terms of quantification over possible worlds. In this 
sense its opposite is modalism, which disagrees. This is a completely separate disagreement which 
I am not considering. 
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conclusions I come to here in later discussions of metaphysical nihilism. I wi l l 
also consider some claims about the sort of evidence we would need to believe in 
Lewis' plurality of worlds. 
2.1 Lewisian realism 
I believe that there are possible worlds other than the one we happen to 
inhabit. I f an argument is wanted, it is this. It is uncontroversially true that 
things might have been otherwise than they are... On the face of it, this 
sentence is an existential quantification. It says that there exist many 
entities of a certain description to wit 'ways things could have been'... I 
therefore believe in the existence of entities that might be called 'ways 
things could have been.' I prefer to call them possible worlds 2 
. . . I must insist that my modal realism is simply the thesis that there are 
other worlds and individuals inhabiting these worlds; ... It is an existential 
claim, not unlike the claim I would be making i f I said that there were Loch 
Ness monsters.3 
These two quotes sum up the basics of Lewis' account of worlds.4 Lewis' answer 
to the question 'what are worlds?' is that they are sums of spatio-temporally 
related objects (just like the world we live in). The other worlds are causally 
isolated from this world and from each other, and any two objects are in the same 
world i f and only i f they are at any spatial or temporal distance from each other. 
Within these other worlds there are people quite like us, in fact probably some 
very like us. They are not 'potential people' or abstract versions of ways we are 
not. They are flesh and blood and 'just as real' and autonomous as we are. They 
are not there to represent ways we could have been anymore than we are to 
represent ways they could have been. 
2 Lewis, D., Counlerfactuals (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973) 84. 
3 Lewis, D., On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) viii. 
4 Lewis, Counter/actuals 84-96, Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds. 
22 
Possibilism 
A consequence of Lewis' plurality of worlds is Lewis' indexical account of 
actuality. According to Lewis, this world is not ontologically privileged over the 
others, it is just one among many. Lewis claims that the phrase 'the actual world' 
does not uniquely refer to this world. It refers to whatever world it is said in. 
According to Lewis, the term 'actual' is indexical. That is, it is to be understood 
like 'here' or 'now' or 'today'. Its interpretation depends on the context in which 
it is uttered. So, in any world, w, in which the phrase 'the actual world' is 
uttered, the phrase 'the actual world' refers to w. He says: 
I say that ours is one of many worlds. Ours is the actual world; the rest are 
not actual. Why so? - I take it to be a trivial matter of meaning. I use the 
word 'actual' to mean the same as 'this-worldly'. When I use it, it applies 
to my world and my worldmates to this world we are part of, and to all 
parts of this world. And i f someone else uses it, whether he be a worldmate 
of ours or whether he be unactualised, then (provided he means by it what 
we do) it applies likewise to his world and his worldmates.5 
The motivation for Lewis' account of possible worlds is his desire to reduce the 
modal to the non-modal. The Lewisian realist says that modality can be 
explained away, that by invoking worlds we can get rid of all reference to 
modality. The worlds themselves, it is claimed, do not need modal notions to 
explain them, they are explained in terms of spatio-temporal relatedness. 
2.2 Ontological economy and genuine modal realism 
The actualist, on the other hand, thinks that this (accepting the existence of a 
plurality of worlds) is too great a price to pay. Primitive modality, they claim, is 
not as big a problem as an infinite number of concrete physical worlds. 
Explaining something in terms of something even more problematic is no 
explanation at all. 
5 Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds 92. 
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Lewis makes much use of the 'economic metaphor' in his discussions of genuine 
modal realism and against ersatzism.6 Now I want to look at how Lewis is using 
ontological economy to defend his plurality of worlds. In this section I wi l l 
examine what Lewis' understanding of ontological economy is and Melia's 
attacks on that notion. 
I wi l l argue: 
(i) that Lewis has two arguments based on ontological economy and 
Melia's argument is only effective against the argument from the 
quantitative / qualitative distinction, not against the argument that the 
price is right, 
(ii) that Lewis may be able to deflect Melia's arguments using an 
explanation of what 'of a kind' means that is implicit in Lewis' 
ontology, 
(iii) that any cashing out of ontological economy wil l require making 
ontological assumptions and so principles of parsimony may be more 
problematic when used in basic metaphysics than in science or other 
branches of philosophy. 
2.2.1 The economic metaphor 
What I 'm referring to as the economic metaphor is a version of Ockham's razor. 
It says that we can legitimately claim the existence of certain objects or certain 
kinds of objects i f and only if they bring theoretical or philosophical rewards. 
That is, we can claim the existence of exactly as many objects or kinds of objects 
6 Ersatzism is the term he uses to refer to nearly all theories that are not his own. All ersatz 
theories are actualist. In 5.1.3.31 develop a stricter definition of ersatzism. 
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as we need in order to explain the issue in hand. This notion is sometimes 
referred to as the thesis of ontological parsimony. Lewis states his own version of 
this thesis (he maintains that the plurality of worlds is a philosopher's paradise): 
What price paradise? I f we want the theoretical benefits that talk of 
possibilia bring, the most straightforward way to gain honest title to them is 
to accept such talk as the literal truth. It is my view that the price is r ight . . . 
The benefits are worth their ontological cost. Modal realism is fruitful; that 
gives us good reason to believe that it is true.7 
On the other hand, the ersatzer claims: 
...genuine modal realism may safely be rejected, since we have a way to 
match its theoretical benefits and leave its 'crazy' ontology behind. Why 
pay? You can enter philosophers' paradise on the cheap.8 
Lewis uses the metaphor for two related purposes. He uses it to argue for his own 
account (genuine modal realism) and also to argue against that of his rivals - the 
ersatz theorists. He claims his own account is right because it is the only one 
ontologically robust enough to explain the nature of modality without recourse to 
a primitive notion or some sort of magical representation - the extravagant 
ontology is worth it. He argues against the ersatzer on the grounds that any ersatz 
account cannot be robust enough. The ersatz ontology is inexpensive but as a 
result it can't do the work it is needed to do. Lewis thinks that he and only he has 
got the balance right between ontological extravagance and explanatory 
usefulness. 
It may seem strange that Lewis' argues for his ontology on the grounds that it is 
economical. On first inspection, the reaction of many people is to claim it is too 
extravagant. Most people tend to think that postulating an infinite number of 
7 Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds 4. 
8 Ibid. 140. 
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concrete spatio-temporal universes just like the one we live in and their concrete 
spatio-temporal parts is about as uneconomical as an ontology can get. Lewis has 
two replies to this, one of which may be successful but the other has been 
attacked by Melia. 
Firstly, he argues, as we have seen above, that while it may appear 'expensive' it 
is well worth the price. Lets call this the 'price is right' argument. He maintains 
that it is a very powerful theory and we shouldn't be surprised i f its acceptance 
requires us to accept a larger metaphysics than we ordinarily might. 
Secondly, he argues from a distinction between quantitative and qualitative 
economy. Lets call this the argument from the quantitative / qualitative 
distinction. 
A doctrine is qualitatively parsimonious i f it keeps down the number of 
fundamentally different kinds of entity; i f it posits sets alone rather than 
sets and unreduced numbers, or particles alone rather than both bodies and 
spirits. A doctrine is quantitatively parsimonious i f it keeps down the 
number of instances of the kinds it posits; i f it posits 10 2 9 electrons rather 
•5-7 Q 
than 10 , or spirits only for people rather than spirits for all animals. 
He maintains that qualitative parsimony is an advantage for a philosophical 
theory but quantitative parsimony is not something we need to seek in a theory. 
This distinction, he claims, spreads new and positive light on his metaphysics. 
Although Lewis is postulating an infinite number of concrete spatio-temporal 
worlds, they are not qualitatively different from our own world. We all accept 
that the world we live in exists - he is asking us to believe in many other things 
like it - not a whole new kind of thing. The ersatzer on the other hand is asking 
9 Lewis, Counterfactuals 87. 
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us to believe that as well as the world and spatio-temporal objects there are also 
abstract representations of ways this world could have been.10 
You believe in our actual world already. I ask you to believe in more things 
of that kind, not in things of some new kind. 1 1 
So Lewis claims (i) to the extent that his ontology is extravagant, it is worth the 
price and (ii) it is not as extravagant as it may appear as the extravagance that 
matters is qualitative whereas his is quantitative. 
2.2.2 From one to infinity 
Should we believe Lewis about this? He is asking us to believe that the move 
from the common sense view that there is one world to the genuine modal realist 
claim that there is an infinite plurality of worlds is not a qualitative difference 
and not something which we should worry about admitting to our ontology. 
There are two objections we might raise to the idea of an infinite number of 
worlds. Firstly, could there be more than one world? Our common sense 
understanding of the actual world says that it is unique and all encompassing. 
Lewis wants us to believe that not everything is in the world and that there is 
more than one world. Of all the objects to claim it is ontologically innocent to 
multiply it seems that the world would be the most objectionable. Secondly, even 
if there is more than one world, could there be an infinite number of worlds? 
It must be pointed out on behalf of the ersatzist that when we look at the makeup of ersatz 
worlds, they are the kinds of objects that most philosophers believe in anyway. Granted they are 
doing different work - explaining modality - but they are merely states of affairs or propositions 
which most of us are willing to admit into our ontology. So it is not clear that the ersatzer is being 
any less qualitatively parsimonious than the genuine modal realist. However, at this point, Lewis 
is mainly defending his own thesis rather than arguing against that of the ersatzer. 
" Lewis, Counterfactuals 87. 
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Neither of these are very serious objections. I can't offer an explanation of why it 
might be legitimate to multiply worlds to a finite degree but not infinitely. 
Likewise, anyone who accepts that metaphysics can and should require us to 
revise our ordinary-language understanding of words will not find it hard to 
accept that there can be many worlds, not just one. 
2.2.3 Melia'sproblem 
Joseph Melia 1 2 attacks Lewis' claim of ontological economy. He argues that far 
from being ontologically parsimonious, Lewis is committed to the largest 
possible variety of kinds of entities. In Melia's words 
Lewis's theory is as qualitatively unparsimonious as any consistent theory 
could be. 1 3 
The reasoning behind this claim is as follows: Lewis is arguing for the existence 
not only of an infinite number of possible worlds but also for their contents. In 
the plurality of worlds, any kind of object, which is metaphysically possible, 
exists in at least one world. However, many of these objects are qualitatively 
different from the objects that exist in the actual world. For example, there are 
worlds with flying donkeys, unicorns, disembodied souls and gods (assuming 
these are metaphysically possible entities). As Lewis claims that worlds are no 
more than the mereological sum of their parts, he must believe that each of these 
objects exists in some possible world or other. Everything that can exist does 
exist in some possible world. Lewis must accept the existence of every kind of 
object that could exist. 
1 2 Melia, J., "A Note on Lewis' Ontology," Analysis 52 (1992). 
1 3 Ibid.: 192. 
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Although Melia's objection is certainly a problem for Lewis' argument from the 
quantitative / qualitative distinction, I think that it is not a problem for his 
argument that the price is right. I f Melia is right, then he has shown that Lewis is 
wrong to think his metaphysics is qualitatively parsimonious - in fact it's as 
unparsimonious as is logically possible. However, Lewis' broader claim is that, 
despite the cost of genuine modal realism, the theoretical benefits outweigh the 
ontological price. Melia's objection would not have had the result of making 
Lewis realise that he was actually committed to all these entities that he wasn't 
aware of being committed to. Rather it pointed out that this commitment is in 
violation of the principle of qualitative parsimony. It is the fact that this principle 
is violated, not the nature of the entities or ontological price which Melia has 
pointed out. Lewis seems to be forced to admit he is not being qualitatively 
parsimonious but he can still maintain that the price is right. The price hasn't 
changed. 
So Melia has shown us that Lewis' argument from the qualitative / quantitative 
distinction may be in trouble. However, Lewis can still use the price is right 
argument to defend the parsimony of his plurality of worlds. 
There is one way that Lewis could escape the problems identified by Melia's 
argument. That is i f Lewis claimed that every kind of entity is instantiated in this 
world. Then he would not be committed to any more kinds of things than 
philosophers who only believe in the actual world are committed to. I f Lewis can 
show that all the kinds of things that there could be are exemplified in this world, 
then he can again claim ontological parsimony. In order to discover whether this 
is feasible, we wil l have to look more closely at what a 'kind of thing' is. 
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2.2.4 Quantitative I qualitative - what's the difference? 
Lets look again at the definition of qualitative parsimony. 
A doctrine is qualitatively parsimonious i f it keeps down the number of 
fundamentally different kinds of entity; i f it posits sets alone rather than 
sets and unreduced numbers, or particles alone rather than both bodies and 
spirits. 1 4 
How do we know what 'fundamentally different kinds of entity' are? For 
example, is it qualitatively parsimonious, given that most of us believe in large, 
hirsute quadrupeds to allow unicorns into our ontology as well as cattle and 
donkeys? Do animals form a kind or do living things form a kind? This makes 
quite a difference to the number of kinds of entities Lewis must accept. 
One might suggest that concrete and abstract objects are two different kinds. But 
Lewis himself has problems with accepting the concrete / abstract distinction and 
it would only leave us with two kinds of entity both of which most philosophers 
accept. 
More interestingly, perhaps 'all objects that could exist' could form one kind -
possibilia. I f this is the case then Lewis has a reply to Melia. Lewis may only be 
committed to one kind of object - things that could exist. I f this is right, he would 
be qualitatively parsimonious contrary to Melia's claims. However, such 
parsimony would be trivial as all other philosophers would be committed to a 
similar position (with the possible exception of those who discuss impossible 
objects.) 
Lewis, Counter/actuals 185. 
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Alternatively, it may be that only I and my indiscernible counterparts have 
enough in common to be a kind. In which case Lewis is being wildly 
uneconomical and Melia's criticisms hold. 
So what does Lewis mean by 'of a kind'? Looking back at Lewis' account of the 
quantitative / qualitative distinction, he cites sets, numbers, particles and spirits 
as examples of kinds. He also seems to think that 'world' is a kind because he 
says that by asking us to believe in other worlds he is not asking us to believe in 
another kind of thing. This sounds like he is referring to some philosophical 
category theory - an account of the kinds of things an ontology includes. 
However, Lewis himself offers no such theory. In fact, when Lewis discusses 
this issue in a different context (discussing the ersatz account of properties) he 
says: (emphasis is Lewis') 
Is it that, although the uninstantiated ones among his properties do not 
technically qualify as universals or tropes, at any rate they are of a kind 
with the instantiated universals or tropes that really are present in things? 
But what does 'of a kind' mean here? I don't suppose it is to be explained 
in terms of the sharing of second-order universals, or the exact duplication 
of second-order tropes! I might perhaps take 'of a kind' as primitive, as an 
alternative to believing in universals or tropes. But i f you take it as 
primitive on top of your universals or tropes, you're buying a dog and 
doing the barking yourself.15 
In this passage, written thirteen years after the publication of the quantitative / 
qualitative distinction, Lewis remains unclear as to what 'of a kind' means albeit 
in a different context. 
Perhaps while not having an explicit category theory, we can look at Lewis' 
metaphysics and discover that implicitly he has given accounts of what he 
considers to be the basic categories of entity. Lewis' account of the makeup of 
1 5 Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds 161. 
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the world centres around Humean supervenience. Humean supervenience is the 
claim that the world can be completely explained with reference only to local 
physical matters of fact. He describes the position as: 
.. .the thesis that the whole truth about a world like ours supervenes on the 
spatiotemporal distribution of local qualities.16 
Humean supervenience means that the only basic kind of thing is local, four-
dimensional, spatio-temporal qualities. Everything else supervenes on these. This 
would make Lewis' ontology very parsimonious. 
Would Melia's argument work then? According to Melia Lewis is committed to 
every kind of thing there could be. According to Lewis, everything there is 
supervenes on one kind of thing: four-dimensional, local qualities. So yes, Lewis 
is committed to every kind of thing there could be but there only is one kind and 
that kind exists in this world. This makes Lewis' theory ontologically 
parsimonious. 
But this explanation is not satisfactory. Lewis says that Humean Supervenience 
is contingent.17 He claims that Humean Supervenience can be used to explain 
why this world is the way it is but cannot be used to explain why all the other 
worlds are they way that they are. 
Is there another way out? Is there any fundamental ontology which is common to 
all of Lewis' worlds? Well we do know one thing for certain about the make up 
of the Lewis worlds - they are all sums of spatio-temporally related objects. 
Lewis doesn't admit any abstract objects into his metaphysics. So Lewis can 
claim that he is committed to numerous worlds but each world is 'of a kind' with 
1 6 Lewis, D., "Humean Supervenience Debugged," Mind 103 (1994): 473. 
1 7 Ibid.: 474. 
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this world, i.e. it is a sum of spatio-temporally related objects, and the contents of 
each world are of a kind with the contents of this world, i.e. they are spatio-
temporal objects. 
So Lewis may be able to avoid Melia's problem by claiming that all objects are 
'of a kind' i.e. spatio-temporal. However as qualitative economy has been only 
loosely defined using this ambiguous phrase 'of a kind' there are also numerous 
other interpretations available, as I have shown. I f talking donkeys are a kind 
then Melia is right and Lewis is being extravagant. 
2.2.5 Ontological economy 
There are some bigger issues behind this discussion. Any time we use a principle 
of ontological economy in scientific or philosophical dispute, we are making an 
assumption that the world is, in some sense, as simple as possible. Whilst these 
sorts of considerations are relevant in scientific situations, it is not clear that 
these considerations enlighten us in metaphysical discussions. Given that the 
fundamental nature of things is the subject matter of metaphysics, its not obvious 
that simplicity assumptions are appropriate. They may be warranted - if we can 
make no progress without them - but we must not forget that they are 
assumptions and so may be mistaken and misleading. Simplicity is an important 
feature of explanations but it is not necessarily a feature of reality. I have 
attempted to give an account of what Lewis could mean by a 'kind of entity' but 
in order to do this I had to delve deep into the rest of Lewis' metaphysics. 
Without delving into Lewis' metaphysics it is impossible to unproblematically 
characterise qualitative parsimony. But by delving in the notion itself becomes 
heavily metaphysically weighted. I f the job of analytic metaphysics is to work 
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out what kinds of things there could be, then assuming a principle which requires 
an understanding of what a 'kind of thing' is, and assumes there are very few of 
them, is metaphysically-laden. I f principles of economy cannot be explained 
without reference to 'kinds of entities', then economy principles themselves are 
heavily metaphysically weighted and far from basic. 
We've looked at some reasons for denying possibilism. I f merely possible 
objects exist, as well as actual objects, then it seems like we have an 
ontologically extravagant ontology. It may be possible to avoid this conclusion as 
I have shown but there is a danger in using ontological assumptions in ontology. 
2.3 What sort of argument would make us believe in 
possibilism? 
Now its time to look at some reasons for accepting possibilism. Brian Skyrms 1 8 
argues that the problem with Lewis' plurality of worlds is not the account itself 
but the kind of argument Lewis gives for it. Lewis claims that in order to 
understand modal and counterfactual talk, we must accept his plurality of worlds. 
This is an argument from the nature of language to the nature of reality. Skyrms 
summarises it: 
What this argument comes to, I think, is the contention that the most viable 
semantical theory for our ordinary counterfactual and modal discourse is 
one which assumes the co-existence of many actual possible worlds. 1 9 
Skyrms claims that Lewis is going about arguing for the plurality of worlds in 
the wrong way and the only kind of argument that could show the existence of a 




plurality of worlds is a physical argument, that is, an argument from our physical 
theories. 
Skyrms' argument runs as follows. Lewis is claiming the existence of a plurality 
of physical worlds. I f we were to argue about the existence of other physical 
objects, e.g. the Easter rabbit, goblins, angels or Pegasus, we would require 
physical evidence e.g. rabbit tracks. 
... if they are supposed to exist in as concrete and robust a sense as our own 
[world] ... then they require the same sort of evidence for their existence as 
other constituents of physical reality.20 
Skyrms is arguing that the only sort of evidence that can be admitted to a debate 
on the alleged existence of some physical object is physical evidence. 
What does Skyrms mean by physical evidence? He seems to have something like 
the Quine-Putnam criteria of indispensability in mind. I f our best physical theory 
requires the existence of some physical object, then we are justified in asserting 
the existence of that object. I f our best physical theory does not require a given 
object then we have no good reason for asserting its existence. 
Skyrms then goes on to look at an example. The Everett-Wheeler interpretation 
of quantum mechanics claims that in order to explain quantum mechanics we 
need to posit a plurality of worlds. These worlds are physical and 'just as real' as 
ours, just like those discussed by Lewis. Skyrms quotes a discussion of the 
Everett-Wheeler interpretation saying their theory requires 
...a continual splitting of the universe into a multitude of mutually 
unobservable but equally real worlds. 
DeWitt, B. and N. Graham, eds., The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics 




However, in the end, Skyrms decides that the Everett-Wheeler interpretation is 
not sufficient to warrant belief in a plurality of worlds. I won't go into his 
arguments for this here. What I want to look at is the claim that being a 
requirement of our best physical theory is the correct criterion for claiming the 
existence of physical objects. In short I want to deny what I am calling Skyrms' 
proof thesis. 
Skyrms' proof thesis: Claims about the existence of physical objects must be 
backed up with physical evidence. 
This thesis is exhibited in the following quote: 
What is required to support the many-worlds contention is a demonstration 
that the best physical theory requires a richer reality, which from the 
standpoint of our current perspective, is a reality of many worlds. 
Now, i f we are to believe in physical things in this world, we need a certain kind 
of proof or evidence of their existence. It seems quite plausible that this should 
be the sort of evidence that Skyrms refers to - seeing rabbit tracks is good 
evidence for the existence of rabbits. More generally, the existence of physical 
entities of a given kind must be required by our best physical theory in order for 
us to be justified in asserting their existence. However, 'mere' possibilia are a 
special category of physical object and I wil l argue that they differ from other 
physical objects in a way that warrants us having different criteria for asserting 
their existence. 
The important difference between mere possibilia (on Lewis' understanding) and 
other this-worldly physical entities is that other possible worlds and their 
contents are causally isolated from this world. This fact is crucial to this 
2 2 Skyrms, "Possible Worlds, Physics and Metaphysics," 330. 
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argument as possible worlds are in principle incapable of giving us physical 
evidence of their existence. According to Skyrms' proof thesis, we therefore 
have no reason to believe in them. 
There are at least two possible reasons that we can fail to have physical evidence 
for the existence of an object. Firstly, i f that object does not exist we wil l be 
unable to find physical evidence of its existence. Secondly, i f an object is 
causally isolated from this universe, we wi l l be unable to find physical evidence 
of its existence. Now Skyrms' thesis confuses these two different circumstances. 
He makes the fallacious step of arguing that because no non-existent object wi l l 
yield physical evidence of its existence, then i f we have no physical evidence of 
the existence of a physical object it must be presumed not to exist. 
The origin of this problem is the seemingly innocent assumption that any 
physical object wi l l be capable of yielding physical evidence of its existence and 
we will be capable of observing this evidence. However, it is obvious that if this 
evidence is causally isolated from us this cannot be the case. 
This shows up another false assumption in Skyrms' argument. Skyrms seems to 
assume that the type of evidence required to assert the existence of a kind of 
object depends solely on what kind of object it is. E.g. Physical objects require 
physical evidence. However this is implicitly denying the following thesis: 
Appropriate evidence thesis: The kind of evidence required to justify claiming 
the existence of a certain kind of object depends, not only on (i) the kind of 
object involved, but also on (ii) the kind of evidence that object is capable of 
producing and (iii) our ability to observe that evidence. 
Possibilism 
Skyrms has assumed that i f we are discussing the existence of a physical object 
the only sort of evidence that can be used is physical evidence. However, he has 
ignored (indeed begged the question of) the possibility that there are physical 
objects causally isolated from us, and so in principle, incapable of yielding any 
physical evidence, which we can encounter. Perhaps Skyrms has assumed that 
'physical' means this worldly but this is to beg the question of whether or not 
there are physical entities outside of this world. As this is exactly what is at issue 
here it is an inappropriate assumption. 
Whether or not belief in a given object requires physical evidence depends, not 
only, on whether that object is physical, but also, on whether or not that object is 
capable of yielding physical evidence that we are capable of observing.23 
Possible worlds are not capable of producing physical evidence that we can 
observe but that does not mean we cannot be justified in believing in their 
existence. 
It could be objected that I am interpreting the idea of physical evidence in too 
simplistic a way. Skyrms gives us two interpretations. He says (i) that observing 
rabbit tracks is evidence for rabbits and (ii) that being required by our best 
physical theory is the criterion for claiming the existence of entities. We don't 
have physical rabbit-track-equivalents for possible worlds but perhaps it could be 
argued that our best physical theory could claim the existence of possible worlds. 
I f so possible worlds would be capable of yielding the sort of evidence required. 
However, this is not a promising line of inquiry. There are three reasons for this. 
Firstly, the example Skyrms uses is the Everett-Wheeler interpretation and he 
2 3 1 use the word 'observing' here not just to mean seeing but experiencing in any way that could 
count as physical evidence. 
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concludes that it does not require us to believe in the existence of other possible 
worlds. Also, it's not clear that this is our best theory. 
Secondly, even if Everett-Wheeler is our best physical theory and Skyrms is 
mistaken so Everett-Wheeler does require the existence of a plurality of worlds, 
these are not the worlds stipulated by Lewis. Lewis' worlds are causally isolated 
from each other in a way that those discussed by Everett-Wheeler (EW-worlds) 
are not. EW-worlds seem to share pasts. In Lewis' account there are worlds 
whose pasts are indistinguishable from each other but they are still separate 
worlds according to his counterpart theory. In the admittedly brief account of 
EW-worlds, which Skyrms gives, worlds seem to separate from each other at 
particular points in time. The difference can be seen as EW-worlds are described 
as branching - many different endings from a single start - whereas Lewis' 
worlds are non-branching. 
Thirdly, EW-worlds cannot do all the work required by a metaphysics of 
modality. It seems like a plausible assumption that the laws of physics could 
have been different. EW-worlds don't seem to allow for this fact. They represent 
an interpretation of physical possibility but not of metaphysical or logical 
possibility. I f EW-worlds exist then they exist for every possible variation since 
the big bang. Perhaps they even exist for different initial states of the universe. 
However, they do not exist for other possibilities. The laws of physics could have 
been slightly or even radically different. However, none of these possibilities are 
represented by EW worlds. This is the most fundamental problem with Skyrms 
project of finding physical evidence of any kind for possible worlds. It can only 
yield an understanding of a limited range of possibilities not of the possibilities 
represented by worlds with different physics to the actual world. 
39 
Possibilism 
What would Skyrms say to this? In the absence of physical proof for the Easter 
rabbit, etc. he says we should be suspicious of discussions of the Easter rabbit. 
He could do likewise with modal-talk. He could claim that talk about the 
possibility of worlds with radically different physics from ours is suspect. 
However, this is hardly an argument. Furthermore, it is exactly to remove this 
suspectness that Lewis posits the plurality of worlds so answering this criticism. 
In summary I disagree with Skyrms for several reasons. Physical evidence is not 
the only kind of evidence we can have for the existence of possible worlds. 
Secondly and more generally, the kind of evidence required for asserting the 
existence of something is not just determined by the kind of object involved but 
also by the kind of evidence that object can be expected to produce. Thirdly, i f 
our best physical theory requires a plurality of worlds, then it seems unlikely that 
this plurality wi l l explain modal claims about worlds, which have different laws 
of physics to the actual world. I f we want to claim the existence of Lewis' 
plurality of worlds, physical evidence wil l not be sufficient but that does not 
mean that we should abandon Lewis' account. 
Lewis 2 4 also discusses Skyrms' paper. In order to reply to Skyrms' charges he 
draws a parallel between discussions of modality and discussions of 
mathematics. He points out that: 
... we have knowledge of a vast realm of mathematical objects beyond the 
reach of our causal acquaintance.25 
He also says that: 




I do not see how any of these different statements supports the alleged 
connection between different ways of knowing and different kinds of 
entities to be known. 
So Lewis has a similar position to mine - the kind of object whose existence is in 
question does not directly determine the kind of evidence we require to make that 
existence claim. 
I explain the features relevant to the sort of evidence we should give for an object 
using the appropriate evidence thesis. Lewis, on the other hand, claims that the 
feature of an object, which is relevant to the kind of evidence required for an 
existence claim, is the modal status of that object. 
...the department of knowledge that requires causal acquaintance is not 
demarcated by its concrete subject matter. It is demarcated instead by its 
contingency.2 
Contingent knowledge such as that donkeys exist in our world requires causal 
evidence. Lewis says it requires 'causal contact' with donkeys. (He does not 
mention whether or not being a pre-requisite of our best scientific theory would 
count as evidence.) The knowledge that there are donkeys at some other possible 
worlds is necessary knowledge. This does not require causal evidence. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Melia has argued against possibilism on the grounds that it violates parsimony 
assumptions. I have shown that even i f this is the case, Lewis can still use his 
'price is right' argument in his defence. Its not clear that either Melia's attack or 
Lewis' argument from the quantitative / qualitative distinction works because 
they both use the ambiguous phrase 'of a kind' without explaining what is meant 
2 6 Ib id . 111. 
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by this. I have shown that a number of different interpretations are available and 
the parsimonious status of Lewis' theory depends on which of these is 
appropriate. 
Skyrms claims that Lewis does not give the right kind of reasons for believing in 
his plurality of worlds. I have shown that this is not the case. Skyrms' notions 
about what is appropriate evidence are too narrow and beg the question of 
possibilism. 
So it remains unclear whether or not Lewis' account is sufficiently parsimonious. 
Melia's attack may still be relevant but that of Skyrms certainly is not. 
Now we've seen some reasons for accepting and rejecting possibilism, let's have 
a look at its alternative: actualism. 
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3 A C T U A L I S M 
This chapter breaks down into two main sections. In the first part I wi l l look at 
what actualism is and survey a few of the philosophical problems attending it (as 
I did with possibilism in the last chapter). Unlike possibilism, actualism comes in 
many different forms. In the second part of this chapter I wi l l look at a few of 
these specific forms of actualism in more detail. In particular I wi l l consider how 
they fare when faced with my question (ii) could there have been no concrete 
objects. 
3.1 The challenges for actualism 
The challenge for the actualist is that they have to explain how the following 
claims are true without reference to merely possible worlds or objects. Below are 
three tests that any actualist account must pass i f it is to be adequate for 
explaining our beliefs about modality. An actualist must be able to explain, 
without reference to merely possible objects, that: 
• This world is actual (first challenge). 
• The other worlds could have been actual (second challenge). 
• There could have existed objects that do not actually exist (third 
challenge). 
There are numerous versions of actualism. As I mentioned before, I can't give a 
comprehensive account of actualism and its variations in one chapter. However I 
do need to give an outline of some of the problems the actualist faces which we 
wil l consider later in discussing nihilism. So for brevity, I wil l look only at 
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Plantinga's actualist account of worlds. Most other accounts are analogous to 
Plantinga's. 
Plantinga defines actualism as the claim that 
... there neither are nor could be any nonexistent objects.1 
Plantinga thinks that possible worlds are maximally consistent states of affairs. 
His replies to the challenges listed above mostly turn on the distinction between a 
state of affairs' existing and a state of affairs' obtaining. He says 
There are such things as states of affairs; among them we find some that 
obtain, or are actual, and some that do not obtain. 
Lets look at an example of this distinction: the state of affairs of Quine's being a 
philosopher exists and obtains, whereas the state of affairs of Quine's being a 
politician exists but does not obtain. States of affairs are tenseless, the state of 
affairs of Quine's being a philosopher still obtains even after his death. 
So for Plantinga, worlds are complex states of affairs and the maximal state of 
affairs that obtains is the actual world. So for an object to be actual is for a state 
of affairs that involves it to obtain. For a world to be actual is for a given 
maximal consistent state of affairs to obtain. 
Now we are ready to look at Plantinga's answer to the first challenge for 
actualism - can Plantinga explain the fact that this world is actual without 
reference to mere possibilia? Plantinga can reply to this quite easily. A l l the 
possible worlds are maximally consistent states of affairs. A l l these maximally 
consistent states of affairs exist. However, only one of them obtains. The one that 
1 Plantinga, A., "Actualism and Possible Worlds," in The Possible and the Actual, ed Loux, M. J. 
(London: Cornell University Press, 1979), 257. 
2 Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity 44. 
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obtains is the actual world. For a world to be actual is just for the relevant 
maximal consistent state of affairs to obtain. 
What of the second challenge - can Plantinga explain the fact that the other 
worlds could have been actual? Again the distinction between obtaining and 
existing comes into play. The other worlds exist - they are states of affairs in this 
world but they do not obtain - they are not actual. But they could have been 
actual - they could have obtained. The fact of their existence as consistent states 
of affairs guarantees the fact that they could have obtained. He says regarding the 
state of affairs of Quine's being a politician 
Of course it isn't my claim that this state of affairs does not exist, or that 
there simply is no such state of affairs; indeed there is such a state of 
affairs. But it does not obtain; it isn't actual. It could have been actual, 
however, and had things been appropriately different, it would have been 
actual; it is a possible state of affairs. 9's being prime , on the other hand, is 
an impossible state of affairs that neither does nor could have obtained.3 
So possible states of affairs are ones that could have obtained, so they could have 
been actual. In contrast impossible states of affairs could not have been actual 
and could not have obtained. 
The third challenge is harder - surely there could have existed objects other than 
those which actually do exist? Plantinga thinks it should be explainable. He says 
It is certainly plausible to suppose that there could have been an object 
distinct from each object that does in fact exist; i.e. ... Possibly, there is an 
object distinct from each object that exists in a. 4 
Yet in Plantinga's definition of actualism he claims that there neither are nor 
could have been things that do not exist. How can we reconcile these two 
seemingly incompatible claims? 
3 Plantinga, "Actualism and Possible Worlds," 258. 
4 Ibid., 256. 
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Well, what Plantinga wants to say is that other worlds don't obtain. The things 
whose existence or actuality would be entailed i f those worlds were actual or 
obtained do not exist. But i f one of those worlds were actual or obtained then the 
entities entailed by that would also obtain and be actual. For example, there 
could have been a world with flying donkeys. This does not mean that flying 
donkeys exist, it just means that i f such a world had obtained they would have 
existed. Likewise, i f a world without donkeys of any description obtained then 
there would not be any donkeys. It would still be possible for there to be donkeys 
but they would not actually exist. So when we say that there could have been 
flying donkeys we do not mean that there exist possible but non actual flying 
donkeys, neither do we mean that there could have existed possible but non-
actual flying donkeys. A l l we mean is that i f the world that obtained was one that 
entailed flying donkeys then they would exist. They would then be actual and not 
merely possible. 
What Plantinga is trying to deny is not the plausible claim that this world does 
not contain every object that could have existed, rather he is trying to deny that a 
form of Meinongianism is metaphysically possible. He wants to deny that there 
are non-existent objects and that there could have been non-existent objects (i.e. 
that there is a world at which there exist non-existent objects.) Of course there 
are worlds which contain objects that do not exist at this world but it is not the 
case that there is any world, w, at which there exist objects that don't exist in w 
although at w there might exist objects that don't exist at a. 
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Of course the actualist wi l l happily concede that there could have been an 
object distinct from any that exists in a. Hence there is a possible world W 
in which there exists an object distinct from any that actually exists.5 
But, for Plantinga, worlds are states of affairs and how can there be states of 
affairs about non-existent objects? For example, i f it is possible that there be 
flying donkeys then there is a possible world (or maximally consistent state of 
affairs) at which there are flying donkeys. This state of affairs exists at our world 
although it does not obtain at our world. But how can a state of affairs about 
flying donkeys exist in a world where no flying donkeys exist? What is this state 
of affairs? What is its relationship to flying donkeys? Are they constituents of it? 
Can it exist i f they do not? 
Plantinga explains these queries using essences (sometimes called haecceities). 
He claims that a state of affairs of the form 'x exists' is not a compound of the 
object x and the property of existing. Rather it is a compound of the property of 
existence and an individual essence. For Plantinga an essence is a kind of 
property. 
The initial idea is this: an essence of Socrates is a property (or a group of 
properties) that Socrates has essentially and that is unique to him... to be an 
essence of Socrates, a property must be such that nothing else could have 
had i t . 6 
So how do essences help us get around the problem of existing states of affairs 
involving non-existent objects? Plantinga claims that essences exist necessarily 
(i.e. in all possible worlds) but they need not correspond to any actual individual 
i.e. an essence can exist in a world where there is no object corresponding to that 
essence. I f this is the case, we say that the essence is unexemplified, although of 
5 Ibid., 268. 
6 Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity 70. 
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course it still exists. Essences are essential to their exemplars but the exemplars 
are not essential to the essences. I.e. In every world in which Socrates exists he 
has his essence (which Plantinga calls Socrateity) but Socrateity exists in some 
worlds in which Socrates does not exist. Socrateity is just the property of being 
identical with Socrates. 
...exemplifying Socrateity is essential to him. Socrateity, however, does 
not have essentially the property of being exemplified by Socrates.7 
So although no flying donkey exists in our world, the state of affairs of there 
being flying donkeys exists but does not obtain. The state of affairs can exist 
without any flying donkeys (actual or merely possible) existing, it requires only 
that there exist in this world an essence which in some other world is co-
exemplified with the property of being a flying donkey. 
3.2 Varieties of ersatzism 
Unlike possibilism, actualism comes in many different forms. Most of what I've 
said so far is general and covers all varieties of ersatzism. Now I want to discuss 
two particular kinds of ersatzism - linguistic ersatzism (in 3.2.1 below) and 
modal fictionalism (in 3.2.2 below). 
3.2.1 Linguistic ersatzism8 
Joseph Melia 9 argues for a form of what Lewis calls 'linguistic ersatzism'. He 
claims that: 
... possibilities can be reduced to sets of sentences.10 
7 Plantinga, "Actualism and Possible Worlds," 268. 
8 Thanks to Philip Bricker and Joseph Melia for detailed comments and discussion of this section. 
9 Melia, J., "Reducing Possibilities to Language," Analysis 61 (2001). 
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Linguistic ersatzism has been attacked by Lewis" and Bricker. 1 2 
I want to argue against, at least some forms of, linguistic ersatzism. My main 
claim is that linguistic ersatzism reduces in the wrong direction. Possibility is 
something far more fundamental than language so any attempt to explain it in 
terms of language (even the very unconventional language that Melia suggests) 
cannot succeed. As a result of this, some forms of linguistic ersatzism 
(reductionist versions) mean that we cannot get a non-arbitrary answer to my 
question (ii). I argue that this means they are not satisfactory answers to my 
question (i). 
3.2.1.1 What is linguistic ersatzism? 
Linguistic ersatzers claim that possibilities can be reduced to language or that 
possible worlds can be reduced to linguistic entities. Bricker defines linguistic 
entities as 
finite sequences of types of concrete marks or sounds ... and set-theoretic 
constructions out of such sequences.13 
Melia states that 
each possible world is identified with a set of sentences of some world 
making language.14 
What is the world making language? Bricker gives us criteria that any successful 
world-making language must fu l f i l . Firstly in order to avoid circularity the 
1 0 Ibid.: 19. 
I I Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds 142-65. 
1 2 Bricker, P., "Reducing Possible Worlds to Language," Philosophical Studies 52 (1987). 
1 3 Ibid.: 332. 
1 4 Melia, "Reducing Possibilities to Language," 19. 
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language must not contain names for each of the possible worlds. Secondly 
natural languages wi l l not suffice although a modified natural language might 
suffice i f it satisfies Bricker's five conditions. The conditions are: 
(1) A l l sentences are declarative sentences. 
(2) Truth values of sentences are independent of contexts of inscription or 
utterance. 
(3) A l l sentences are unambiguous. 
(4) There is no vagueness in the truth conditions for sentences, let alone 
indeterminacy of a more radical sort. 
(5) Sentences can be uniquely parsed so as to exhibit their truth-functional 
and quantificational form. 1 5 
So the simplest suggestion for an account of linguistic ersatzism is 
Possible worlds are maximal consistent sets of sentences of L 1 6 
where L is some language satisfying these five criteria. Two worlds are distinct i f 
there is some sentence of L that is true at one and false at the other. 
There are two main forms of linguistic ersatzism.17 Linguistic ersatzers can either 
claim that modality can be completely reduced to linguistic conventions or claim 
that modality is primitive and cannot be fully reduced. It is only the first sort of 
linguistic ersatzer (the reductionist) whom my arguments here work against. It is 
also this first sort of ersatzer that Bricker was mainly attacking in his paper. 
3.2.1.2 Reducing modality to language 
It seems to me that, in attempting to reduce modality to language, the ersatzer is 
trying to reduce in the wrong direction.1 8 Modality is a far more fundamental 
1 5 Bricker, "Reducing Possible Worlds to Language," 333. 
1 6 Ibid.: 37. 
1 7 This was pointed out to me by Philip Bricker. 
1 8 My arguments here only work against the reductionist linguistic ersatzers. 
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property of the world than language. I f there were no languages there would still 
be modal truths about the world (e.g. that there could have been languages.) This 
is not to say that modality is absolutely primitive. 1 9 It is to say that languages, 
even those artificial specimens suggested by the linguistic ersatzers, are not a 
very fundamental element in any ontology. Take the Lagadonian suggestion that 
entities could be the words that name themselves in a given language. Now it is 
obvious that the existence of some entities is prior to those entities naming 
themselves. But the existence of a kind of entity is going to require many modal 
facts - that such entities could exist, the conditions under which they can co-exist 
with other entities, etc. These modal facts are more primitive and fundamental to 
our understanding of the world than the linguistic facts which the linguistic 
ersatzer is calling on to explain them. This shows us that the reduction is going in 
the wrong direction. You can only reduce to something more primitive. 
3.2.13 The lack of modal intuitions 
The linguistic ersatzer explains worlds in terms of maximal consistent sets of 
sentences of a language. But Bricker 2 0 points out that there is a circularity here. 
Consistency is a modal term. This means explaining modal notions in terms of 
worlds and worlds in terms of a modal notion. How can the reductionist 
linguistic ersatzer accept this? They want to claim that modality can be 
completely eliminated. Bricker suggests that they could claim that those parts of 
1 9 Lewis criticises the ersatz accounts of modality as they take modality as primitive in some very 
fundamental way - namely that it cannot be reduced to anything else. This claim is not necessary 
to the argument I am advancing here. All I am claiming is that modality is more primitive than 
language. Hence if modality can be reduced it cannot be reduced to language, it must be reduced 
to something more fundamental than itself. This argument is agnostic as to whether or not 
modality is primitive in the more radical way that Lewis accuses the ersatzers of claiming. 
2 0 Bricker, "Reducing Possible Worlds to Language," 338ff. 
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reality that we have no intuitions about are not really of concern to us or even 
that there is no truth of the matter about such obscure possibilities. 
... where modal intuitions give out and are unable to decide the truth value 
of some sentence about possible worlds, the realist and the reductionist 
disagree as to what to say. The realist maintains that there is a fact of the 
matter, but that the fact is unknown and perhaps unknowable. The 
reductionist maintains that there is no fact, and that the truth-value of the 
sentence is to be conventionally decided one way or the other.... For 
although the realist thinks that the reductionist is bound to get many of the 
unknown facts of modality wrong, he cannot object in this way without 
merely begging the question whether or not there are any such facts.2 1 
So what about my question (ii) could there have been nothing? or is there an 
empty possible world? This seems to be the sort of issue where our 'modal 
intuitions give out' so is it to be answered by mere convention? Presumably the 
linguistic ersatzer would claim that there is no fact of the matter as to whether 
there is an empty possible world or not and so it doesn't matter which convention 
we adopt. 
But why should we accept this? Intellectual inquiry is not simply a matter of 
formalising our intuitions and leaving gaps where we have no intuitions. 
Furthermore, people have intuitions on both sides of this and other modal 
metaphysical disputes. Consider the similarities between metaphysics and some 
branches of pure mathematics e.g. set theory or topology. Both consider the 
nature and properties of certain kinds of objects. Neither are areas where we have 
natural intuitions about the more detailed questions. Yet in mathematics we have 
no qualms about admitting that progress can be made and that we can use our 
reason to work out problems we have no intuitions about or have conflicting 




modality - that things could have been different to the way they are, etc. - and 
working from these using reasoned argument we can develop more robust 
theories of modality. From some of these theories we can discover answers to 
questions such as whether or not there is an empty world. 
It could be objected that mathematics is the area of inquiry where we have the 
least disagreement. Metaphysics and philosophy on the other hand are areas 
where there is a huge amount of disagreement. However the mere fact that there 
is disagreement does not show that there is no fact of the matter. The linguistic 
ersatzer's claim is that where we have no intuitions or can't decide an issue it 
should be decided by convention. However this completely misses the point that 
there are better and worse accounts and we can choose the best one and have 
good reason to hope it is close to the truth. 
The linguistic ersatzer's more radical claim that there is no truth of the matter 
seems far too strong a claim to be based on our intuitions alone. He claims that 
those issues that we have no intuitions on are those where there is no fact of the 
matter as to what is the right answer. However, why should we have so much 
faith in our intuitions. Wouldn't we be extraordinarily lucky to have intuitions 
about all and only those issues on which there is a fact of the matter and none 
about those that are pseudo-issues? Again we can use the mathematical analogy 
to give a counterexample. There are plenty of mathematical problems about 
which most people have absolutely no intuitions. Indeed even i f the question 
were explained we might still be unable to find an intuition on one side or the 
other. However, using mathematical techniques the answers to some of these 
questions can be found. I see no reason why deep and difficult metaphysical 
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issues shouldn't likewise have answers despite the apparent lack of intuitions 
concerning them. 
3.2.1.4 Conclusion 
I have argued against reductionist versions of linguistic ersatzism. (I think these 
arguments would work against some other kinds of non-Lewisian reductionism 
about possible worlds.) Linguistic ersatzism, in its reductionist form, cannot 
tackle my question (ii), the nihilism question, in an objective way. This is 
because the reductionist linguistic ersatzer's way out of the circularity problem 
rests on the assumption that we are fortunate enough to only have intuitions in 
exactly those areas of inquiry in which there is a fact of the matter. A l l these 
issues come about because the attempt by the linguistic ersatzer to reduce 
possibilities to language is an attempt to reduce in the wrong direction. Modality 
is not necessarily primitive but it is more fundamental than language and so any 
attempt to reduce it to language cannot succeed. 
The reductionist linguistic ersatzer may not accept these arguments - they would 
probably say my arguments beg the question about whether or not we can reduce 
modality to language. However I think that these arguments would at least be 
persuasive for someone who is agnostic about this position. Certainly, i f one 
thinks that my question (ii) is a meaningful question, then we have good reason 
to reject reductionist linguistic ersatzism. In other words, I think these are good 
reasons for rejecting reductionist linguistic ersatzism, even though they might not 




Modal fictionalism claims that we can understand and use modal terminology, 
even the language of possible worlds, without any commitment to the existence 
of possible worlds or their contents. According to fictionalism, modal discourse 
should be understood as having a suppressed prefix 'According to the story, S, 
Where S is some account of modality. The fictionalist position can be 
formalised as follows: 
A i f f According to GMR, A * 2 2 
Where A is an ordinary modal statement and A* is the genuine modal realist 
translation of A. An example would be the following: This table could have been 
blue i f f according to genuine modal realism there is another possible world in 
which this table is blue. By 'genuine modal realism' (GMR) the fictionalist refers 
to Lewis' views on possible worlds. 
The fictionalist neither confirms nor denies the truth of the 'story' they are using: 
... what the realist regards as true metaphysics, the fictionalist regards as a 
(probably) false story, to be mentioned but not asserted in his account of 
modality. 2 3 
The relationship between a modal statement and its GMR translation is that the 
translation explains the truth of the modal statement. But how can the fictionalist 
claim that this story whose truth they deny explains the truth of our ordinary 
modal propositions? Can claims about the details of a fictional story explain 
truths? Given that the realist asserts that A i f f according to S, A*, can we accept 
Divers, J . , "A Modal Fictionalist Result (Plurality of Worlds Hypothesis)," Nous 33 (1999): 318. 
Rosen, G., "Modal Fictionalism," Mind 99 (1990): 332. 
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A, deny (or at least not assert) A* and yet claim that the truth of A can be 
explained by the fact that according to S, A*? 
Rosen gives as an example of safe use of fictions in philosophy. He says that: 
Russell thought that according to Leibniz's monadology the table is really a 
colony of souls. But we do not conclude on this basis that Russell was 
himself committed to the animist metaphysic.24 
However, given this situation, Russell cannot then go on to use Leibniz's account 
to explain certain features of the table. He could do so within quotes - he could 
say that 'according to Leibniz this explains why the table is the way it is' but it 
would be absurd for him to accept this explanation himself without accepting the 
Leibnizian premise on which it is based. 
3.2.2.1 Which story should the fictionalist accept? 
I suggest that there is a problem about which story should be used by the 
fictionalist. 2 5 Rosen2 6 suggests that we use Lewis's account of modal realism. He 
also acknowledges that Armstrong's very different account could be used.27 It 
may be that other accounts like that given by Plantinga or others could also be 
used. Rosen says that he is assuming that the debate between Lewis and the 
ersatzer has been concluded and the Lewisian account has won out. 2 8 However, 
as this debate is far from over, we must consider the possibility that ersatz 
2 4 Ibid.: 331. 
2 5 A related but different argument is given in Baldwin, T., "Modal Fictionalism and the 
Imagination," Analysis 58 (1998). 
2 6 Rosen, "Modal Fictionalism." 
2 7 Ibid.: 332n. 
2 8 Ibid.: 329. 
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accounts may provide the fiction we need. I f this is the case, then a problem 
arises when we ask why we should choose one of these accounts over the others. 
I f we were to ask a non-fictionalist approaching these accounts for the first time, 
what was their motivation for choosing one of these accounts rather than its 
competitors, they would probably cite its likely proximity to the truth of the 
situation. But this is not compatible with fictionalism. The characteristic premise 
of fictionalism is that it does not assert the truth of the story it relies on. The story 
must be thought of only as a fiction. We could not choose a story based on its 
truth or its proximity to the truth. 
What other criteria do we use for choosing between rival theories? Simplicity -
can we accept the simplest story? Well, what is the simplest theory in this 
context? Probably the story that requires the existence of the fewest kinds of 
entity, perhaps some sort of ersatzism. However, what is the motivation for 
choosing the simplest theory? Surely it is to avoid multiplying entities beyond 
necessity. I f we are not asserting the existence of these entities then that is not a 
problem. The motivation for choosing the simplest theory is often its likely 
proximity to the truth. Given two theories with equal explanatory power the 
simpler is more likely to be true. Hence our choice of it. But it is important for 
the fictionalist that the truth of the theory is not the criterion used, as we have 
seen above. 
Another criterion that the fictionalist might try to make use of is coherence with 
one's prior modal beliefs. She could choose the theory that coheres best with 
what she already believes to be the case. Most accounts of possible worlds agree 
on the basic modal intuitions that we have before we engage in the intricacies of 
modal theories. The modal propositions whose truth is disputed by the 
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proponents of various modal accounts are obviously just those modal 
propositions whose truth is not determined by our basic modal intuitions. Let's 
consider my question (ii) again. The nihilist proposition that there could have 
been nothing, wi l l be true according to some accounts of possible worlds and 
false according to others (including the standard Lewisian account). If, as Rosen 
suggests, the fictionalist just accepts the Lewisian story as their fiction, then they 
are begging the question of metaphysical nihilism. So the fictionalist needs to 
have a philosophical position on the nature of nihilism, prior to choosing their 
fiction. 
3.2.2.2 Conclusion 
So we have found a criterion that the fictionalist can use for choosing their 
fiction. They can use coherence with their prior beliefs. However, all our 
standard, pre-philosophical and low-level philosophical beliefs about modality 
wil l be agnostic between fictions. It is only complicated philosophical issues like 
metaphysical nihilism which wi l l require particular accounts of possible worlds. 
Rosen's suggestion begs the question of nihilism. I f we want to choose standard 
GMR as our fiction on the basis of coherence with our other beliefs, we need to 
deny metaphysical nihilism, and have good reasons to do so, and only then 
accept GMR as our fiction. I f on the other hand, we believe in metaphysical 
nihilism, then we need to choose another fiction. 
3.2.3 Conclusion 
We now have a clear idea of what actualism is and how it deals with some of the 
challenges facing it. We have also seen that certain forms of linguistic ersatzism 
are not able to deal with my question (ii). This is because they reduce in the 
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wrong direction - from something more fundamental to something less 
fundamental. Modal fictionalism, as defended by Rosen and others, begs the 
question of my question (ii). This is because it uses the standard Lewisian 
account of worlds without considering why that would be the appropriate story 
for explaining modal facts and specifically without considering the truth of 
metaphysical nihilism. 
Now we have an understanding of both possibilism and actualism and some of 
the philosophical problems associated with both, we can leave question (i) and 
start to consider question (ii): could there have been nothing? 
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4 T H E SUBTRACTION ARGUMENT 
Metaphysical nihilism 1 is the claim that there could have been nothing or the 
equivalent claim that there is an empty possible world. 2 Metaphysical nihilism 
has various detractors from whom Baldwin 3 and Rodriguez-Pereyra4 wish to 
defend it. Their defence is the subtraction argument. The subtraction argument 
argues that because the world would exist i f any given object in the world did not 
exist, so the world would exist i f no objects existed at all. 
In this chapter I wi l l explain and analyse the subtraction argument in its current 
forms. I wil l not seek to defend it here but merely to work out the implications 
and consequences of the two different versions that Baldwin and Rodriguez-
Pereyra have produced. 
4.1 The subtraction argument 
Let's look in some detail at the actual argument. Baldwin explains it as follows: 
( A l ) There might be a world with a finite domain of 'concrete' objects. 
(A2) These concrete objects are, each of them, things which might not 
exist. 
1 This term is introduced by Lowe (Lowe, E . J. , "Metaphysical Nihilism and the Subtraction 
Argument," Analysis 62 (2002).) to distinguish this claim from the other claims known as nihilism 
in the history of philosophy. I will follow his usage for the same reason. 
2 The title of Baldwin's paper is "There might be nothing" however the position he is describing is 
really that there could have been nothing. That is, the possibility under discussion is not the 
epistemic claim that for all we (or more accurately I) know there might be nothing in the actual 
world (except me) but rather that had the world been other than it is there might have been 
nothing. 
3 Baldwin, T., "There Might Be Nothing," Analysis 56 (1996). 
4 Rodriguez-Pereyra, G., "There Might Be Nothing: The Subtraction Argument Improved," 
Analysis 57 (1997), Rodriguez-Pereyra, G., "Lowe's Argument against Nihilism," Analysis 60 
(2000), Rodriguez-Pereyra, G., "Metaphysical Nihilism Defended: Reply to Lowe and Paseau," 
Analysis 62 (2002). 
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(A3) The non-existence of any one of these things does not necessitate the 
existence of any other such thing.5 
From these three premises Baldwin reasons as follows. There is a world, wi 
accessible from the actual world, W, such that there is a finite number of 
concrete objects in wi (from (Al ) ) . For any object xi in wi there is another 
world, W2 which is accessible from wi which resembles wi completely except 
that it lacks xi (and anything else whose existence depends on the existence of 
xi) . This follows from (A2). W2 does not contain anything that does not exist in 
wi (by (A3)). This process can be repeated until a world is reached which 
Baldwin calls w^,,. w,nin consists of either one object or a group of objects such 
that if one of them were not to exist then none of them would exist. From this 
world we can use the subtraction procedure once more to get to w n j j . w ^ is the 
world where there are no concrete objects. 
S4 modal logic is sufficient for the subtraction argument as the argument requires 
transitivity but not symmetry of the accessibility relation between worlds. Hence 
Wnii is accessible from or possible relative to our actual world, W. There is a 
possible world accessible from this world where there is nothing. According to 
the standard possible worlds analysis of modal claims, something, P, is possible 
i f and only i f there is a (accessible) possible world at which P is the case. So 
there could have been nothing. 
Baldwin 6 goes on to cash out his argument. His criterion of concreteness is that 
an object is concrete i f and only i f it fails to satisfy the identity of indiscernibles. 
Otherwise similar objects can be distinguished by their spatio-temporal location. 
5 Baldwin, "There Might Be Nothing," 232. 
6 Ibid.: 233. 
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So now we know how the argument goes and it seems to be valid. But is it 
sound? Lets look at the premises one at a time and see i f they are plausible. 
4.2 Premise (Al) 
(Al) There might be a world with a finite domain of 'concrete' objects. 
How does Baldwin justify his claim that there can be a finite number of concrete 
objects? First of all, he claims that unit sets and spatio-temporal regions do not 
constitute concrete objects. This is important as i f they did it would lead to an 
infinity of such objects. Rather, he claims they satisfy the identity of 
indiscernibles. 
This is where Rodriguez-Pereyra7 suggests his first improvement to the 
subtraction argument. Rodriguez-Pereyra points out that ( A l ) fails on three 
counts. It does not exclude (i) controversial unit sets, (ii) spatio-temporal points 
or (iii) the parts of spatio-temporal objects from the domain of concrete objects. 
I f these criticisms are correct then Baldwin cannot propose a world with finitely 
many concrete objects. Each of these problems points to there being infinitely 
many objects in every possible world. I f any unit sets are concrete then there 
must be an infinite number of concrete objects as each unit set wi l l itself have a 
unit set. Likewise if spatio-temporal points or parts of concrete objects are 
concrete then there cannot be a finite number of concrete objects. 
4.2.1 The identity of indiscernibles 
Before considering what objects Baldwin may or may not have committed to 
concreteness, lets look at his account of concreteness. Baldwin's 'mark of 
7 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "There Might Be Nothing," 162-3. 
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concreteness' is that an object is concrete i f and only i f it fails to satisfy the 
identity of indiscernibles. I f the principle of the identity of indiscernibles is right 
then two objects are the same i f and only i f they have all the same properties. I f 
two objects share all the same properties and yet are distinct then they do not 
satisfy the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. So Baldwin claims it is the 
mark of concrete objects that two distinct concrete objects could share all their 
properties. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra claims that Baldwin's account of concreteness is too strong. 
The identity of indiscernibles has two forms. On the stronger version (which 
Rodriguez-Pereyra8 attributes convincingly to Baldwin) two objects which share 
all their intrinsic properties must be the same object. On the weaker version, only 
objects that share both intrinsic and relational properties must be the same. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra cites Baldwin's (B1)-(B3) as evidence that Baldwin is using 
this stronger version. (Baldwin's argument (B1)-(B3) is discussed in more detail 
in 4.4 below and 7.3 below.) In (B l ) for example, Baldwin says: 
...the identity of a concrete object is not determined by the intrinsic 
properties which determine what kind of thing it is. 9 
There is further evidence for this interpretation when Baldwin first introduces the 
identity of indiscernibles. Baldwin states that: 
I shall take it that the primary mark of concreteness is failure to satisfy the 
identity of indiscernibles. This connects with the familiar criterion of 
spatio-temporal locatedness via the assumption that space-time provides a 
way of distinguishing exactly similar objects.1 0 
8 Ibid.: 161. 
9 Baldwin, "There Might Be Nothing," 234. 
1 0 Ibid.: 233. 
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This seems to indicate that Baldwin thinks that objects with exactly the same 
intrinsic properties may nonetheless be differentiated on the grounds of their 
spatio-temporal location. Spatio-temporal location is surely a relational property. 
It is an object's location relative either to other objects and events ( i f the 
relationist theory of space and time is correct) or relative to absolute space and 
time (if the substantival theory is right). 
So Baldwin's criterion of concreteness i f we are to spell it out is: 
An object is concrete i f and only i f it could share all its intrinsic properties with 
some other object. 
4.2.2 Unit sets 
Back to the argument. Rodriguez-Pereyra claims that ( A l ) is false because an 
infinite number of unit sets, spatio-temporal points and parts of concrete objects 
are all concrete on Baldwin's criterion. Lets look at unit sets first. Rodriguez-
Pereyra claims that unit sets do not satisfy the stronger version of the identity of 
indiscernibles that is advocated by Baldwin. He develops a dilemma to show that 
either unit sets must be concrete or else everything satisfies Baldwin's version of 
the identity of indiscernibles and so nothing is concrete. Lets look firstly at 
Baldwin's 1 1 reasoning and then secondly at Rodriguez-Pereyra's criticisms of it. 
Baldwin argues that unit sets are not concrete on his criterion. His argument runs: 
Consider two very similar physical objects, xi and X2 and their unit sets {x i} and 
{ X 2 } . Now the sets {x i} and { X 2 } are not identical to each other as they have 
different intrinsic properties. { x i } has the identity of xi as an intrinsic property 
" Ibid. 
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and { X 2 } has the identity of X2 as an intrinsic property. Therefore { x i } and { X 2 } 
do not share all the same intrinsic properties and so they are abstract. I f they did 
share all their intrinsic properties then they would be concrete by Baldwin's 
account as they are distinct objects and only concrete objects according to 
Baldwin can have different identities but share all their intrinsic properties. So 
each unit set has the identity of its only member as an intrinsic property. This 
means no two have all the same intrinsic properties as no two have the same 
member. Hence no two can have all the same intrinsic properties and yet be 
distinct. Hence no unit sets are concrete. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra criticises this argument. He claims that Baldwin was mistaken 
in assuming that the identity of a member of a set is a property of that set. The 
identity of Xi is a property of xi but it is not a property of { x i } . The relevant 
property is the property of 'having xi as its only member'. This is a property of 
{ x i } and determines the identity of { x i } . However this is a relational rather than 
an intrinsic property. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra's arguments here turn on the distinction between intrinsic and 
extrinsic (or relational) properties, but what is that distinction? Relational 
properties are properties that involve another particular in an essential way. This 
is the account that Rodriguez-Pereyra12 gives. There is some controversy over the 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. One way to understand an 
intrinsic property is as a property that an object could possess even i f it were the 
only object that existed.13 There isn't time to go into this dispute now but the fact 
1 2 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "There Might Be Nothing," 162. 
1 3 This is what Lewis and Langton (Lewis, D. and R. Langton, "Defining 'Intrinsic'," Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998): 116.) call a lonely object. 
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that there is debate about this matter gives us reason to be suspicious of using 
intrinsicness as an essential part of our account of concreteness.14 It could be 
argued that all philosophical positions wi l l involve some assumptions that are 
controversial in other areas of philosophy but I think that in this case it is a valid 
criticism of the nihilist's view. Nihilism is a position about concrete objects 
(namely that there could have been none) and so its defenders need to have a 
fully cashed out account of what concreteness is. 
Back to Rodriguez-Pereyra's argument, the property of 'having xi as its only 
member' involves xi which is distinct from { x i } so it is a relational property. 
Now if xi is indistinguishable from X2 then the only properties that distinguish 
{ x i } from { X 2 } are those properties which involve xi or X2. So { x i } and { X 2 } 
differ only in their relational properties not in their intrinsic properties. But that 
means that { x i } and { X 2 } are two different objects which share all their intrinsic 
properties. This means that they fail to satisfy Baldwin's identity of 
indiscernibles and so must be concrete. Hence unit sets of concrete objects are 
concrete and given the existence of one concrete object we are immediately faced 
with the inevitability of an infinite number of concrete objects contra Baldwin's 
premise ( A l ) . 
Is any way out available? What if we claim that 'having xi as its only member' is 
an intrinsic property of {xi}? Well Rodriguez-Pereyra thinks that this won't help 
either. He claims that even if we were to allow this then it would surely mean 
that 'being the only member of { x i } ' is also an intrinsic property of x i . But then 
xi and X2 do not share all their intrinsic properties and so we have no reason to 
1 4 This issue is discussed in detail in Lewis, D., "Extrinsic Properties," Philosophical Studies 44 
(1983), Lewis and Langton, "Defining Intrinsic'." 
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believe that they fail to satisfy the identity of indiscernibles. This would mean 
that the only thing which could have all the same properties as x i is x i . But then 
xi is not concrete as it couldn't share all its intrinsic properties with anything else 
and in fact neither is anything else concrete. Each object has some unique 
intrinsic property (being the only member of its own unit set) so nothing fails to 
satisfy the identity of indiscernibles and nothing is concrete. So no, this is not a 
way out. 
So Rodriguez-Pereyra has found a dilemma for Baldwin's criterion of 
concreteness. Either unit sets are concrete or nothing is concrete. Obviously it is 
not the case that nothing is concrete. The best approach is to accept his first 
criticism (that 'having xi as its only member' is a relational rather than an 
intrinsic property). Hence unit sets of concrete objects are concrete given 
Baldwin's criteria of concreteness. 
However its not obvious that Rodriguez-Pereyra's second criticism holds. Even 
if 'having xi as its only member' is an intrinsic property of { x i } it doesn't follow 
that 'being the only member of { x i } ' is an intrinsic property of x\. The identity 
of a set is determined by its members so it is easy to see why having a certain 
member is an intrinsic property of a given set. But objects themselves exist 
independently of their unit sets so I don't see why Rodriguez-Pereyra wants to 
say that: 
... i f having xj as its only member is intrinsic, then so, surely, is xi ' s 
property of being the only member o f f x i j } 5 
So the second horn of Rodriguez-Pereyra's dilemma is not as damning as he 
thinks it is and Baldwin is not forced to accept Rodriguez-Pereyra's conclusion 
1 5 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "There Might Be Nothing," 162. 
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that unit sets are concrete. However, if Baldwin were to take this horn of the 
dilemma he would have to accept that 'having xi as its only member' is an 
intrinsic property of {x i} which seems implausible on any account of intrinsic 
ness. 
To conclude, Rodriguez-Pereyra may be right that 'having x\ as its only member' 
is a relational rather than intrinsic property of { x i } . It is a property that involves 
another object in an essential way. It is also not a property that something could 
have had i f it was the only object that existed. However I have made two 
criticisms of his view here. One is that given that the intrinsic / relational 
distinction is problematic and controversial, an argument that turns so centrally 
on this distinction needs to give an account of intrinsicness and reasons for 
accepting that particular account. And secondly, even i f 'having xj as its only 
member' is an intrinsic property of {x i} it doesn't follow that 'being the only 
member of { x i } ' is an intrinsic property of xi as the first seems far less 
controversial than the second. So one horn of Rodriguez-Pereyra's dilemma does 
not work. However, that horn was the less plausible one anyway so Rodriguez-
Pereyra's overall argument holds and Baldwin must admit to the concreteness of 
an infinite number of concrete objects. 
4.2.3 Spatio-temporal points 
Rodriguez-Pereyra's second attack on Baldwin's ( A l ) focuses on the status of 
spatio-temporal points. Lets adopt the same approach as before and look firstly at 
Baldwin's argument and then at Rodriguez-Pereyra's criticisms of it. Baldwin 
claims that 
...regions of space-time do not count as concrete objects by the identity of 
indiscernibles test, since although otherwise indistinguishable objects can 
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be distinguished by their space-time location, space-time regions 
themselves cannot be thus distinguished.16 
So if two regions of space and time are indistinguishable they must be identical. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra says that this cashing out of the identity of indiscernibles 
relies on the very controversial absolutist account of space and time. Why? Well 
spatio-temporal location gives us a way of distinguishing between otherwise very 
similar objects according to Baldwin. But Max Black 1 7 has shown that this is not 
necessarily so. Black argues that in a world containing only two iron spheres we 
can only tell the two apart using spatio-temporal location i f space-time is 
understood according to the absolutist account. So Baldwin can't 
uncontroversially cite spatio-temporal location as a way of distinguishing 
otherwise indistinguishable objects. I f space-time is relational then he would be 
committed to saying that these spheres are abstract which is obviously absurd - 1 
am quite confident that nothing made out of iron is abstract. As Rodriguez-
Pereyra says: 
Baldwin's argument for nihilism thus depends on an absolute view of 
space-time and is therefore at least as controversial as that view. 1 8 
But, can Baldwin still say that spatio-temporal points are not concrete using 
failure to satisfy the identity of indiscernibles alone as the criterion of 
concreteness? No, all spatio-temporal points are exactly the same intrinsically. 
They differ only in relational properties - the relationships they have to each 
other. But we do not think that all spatio-temporal points are one and the same. 
1 6 Baldwin, "There Might Be Nothing," 233. 
1 7 Black, M., "The Identity of Indiscernibles," Mind 61 (1952). Cited in Rodriguez-Pereyra, "There 
Might Be Nothing." 
1 8 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "There Might Be Nothing," 162. 
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So they fail to satisfy Baldwin's version of the identity of indiscernibles. They 
are different entities which all share the same intrinsic properties. So they must 
be concrete. 
So again Rodriguez-Pereyra has shown us that when we cash out Baldwin's 
notion of concreteness we find that ( A l ) must be false. Baldwin's account only 
works i f the absolutist account of space time is correct. I f not, then there cannot 
be a merely finite number of concrete objects, there is an infinite number of 
spatio-temporal points and each of these is concrete. 
4.2.4 Parts of concrete objects 
Rodriguez-Pereyra's third attack on Baldwin's ( A l ) is based on the fact that the 
parts of concrete objects are themselves concrete objects. This subject is not 
mentioned in Baldwin's original paper. Rodriguez-Pereyra's suggestion is that as 
space is infinitely divisible, any concrete object, x, that occupies a region of 
space, must occupy an infinite number of smaller regions of space. These smaller 
regions are parts of the largest region that x also occupies. Rodriguez-Pereyra 
argues that it follows that x must have an infinite number of parts occupying the 
infinitely many regions of space-time that make up the largest region that x 
occupies. And as x is concrete then its parts must be concrete. So again, 
Rodriguez-Pereyra has shown us that if we use Baldwin's conception of 
concreteness then we are committed to an infinite number of concrete objects 
which is contrary to Baldwin's premise ( A l ) . (I discuss this argument again in 
7.2 below.) 
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4.3 Rodriguez-Pereyra's improvements 
Rodriguez-Pereyra suggests improving the subtraction argument so as to rule out 
these three problems. There are three steps in his improvement. The resulting 
modified argument he calls the subtraction argument*. 
The first step is to replace all references to concrete objects in the original 
argument with references to concrete* objects. Secondly he shows that i f in Wnii 
there are no concrete* objects then there are also no concrete objects (this extra 
step is not needed in Baldwin's original argument). Finally he modifies the 
criterion of concreteness so that if an object is concrete then it non-vacuously 
fails to satisfy the identity of indiscernibles. Lets look at these points in detail. 
The first change that Rodriguez-Pereyra makes in Baldwin's argument is to 
introduce the notion of a concrete* object. Now Rodriguez-Pereyra defines a 
concrete* object as follows: 
...let us call x concrete* i f and only i f x is concrete, memberless and a 
maximal occupant of a connected region. 1 9 
He also explains the idea of a maximal occupant of a connected spatio-temporal 
region. 
A region A is connected i f and only i f every two points in A can be joined 
by a path of points in A and disconnected i f and only i f it is not connected. 
Let us say that x is a maximal occupant of a connected region i f and only i f 
x occupies a connected region and for all y, i f x is a part of y then y is 
scattered, where a scattered object is one occupying a disconnected 
20 
region. 
This means that a solitary brick, to use Rodriguez-Pereyra's example, is a 
maximal occupant of a connected region as it occupies a connected region and it 
1 9 Ibid.: 163. 
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is not part of any larger unscattered object. As the brick is not scattered its parts 
are not maximal occupants of connected regions as they are parts of the larger 
unscattered object that is the brick. 
This tells us what it means for something to be a maximal occupant of a 
connected region. We already know what it means for something to be concrete 
(that is, we know Baldwin's account and Rodriguez-Pereyra only modifies it 
slightly as we wi l l see shortly). But Rodriguez-Pereyra gives us no idea here 
what it means for an object to be memberless. Perhaps he thinks the meaning of 
memberlessness is obvious but I wi l l argue that this notion is not well defined 
and leads to problems in Rodriguez-Pereyra's broader account of modality. (See 
5.2.3 below.) However I don't think it affects his version of the subtraction 
argument. 
We can now look at Rodriguez-Pereyra's modified subtraction argument*: 
( A l *) There might be a world with a finite domain of concrete* objects. 
(A2*) These objects are, each of them, things which might not exist. 
(A3*) The non-existence of any one of these things does not necessitate the 
existence of any other such things.2 1 
The subtraction argument* follows the same lines of reasoning as the original 
argument but the conclusion is that w^i is a world with no concrete* objects. But 
this is not the conclusion we want. Metaphysical nihilism is the claim that there 
is a world with no concrete objects and as we have seen the domain of concrete* 
objects is quite restricted compared to the domain of concrete objects. So 
Rodriguez-Pereyra's next step is to show us that i f there is a world with no 
2 1 Ibid.: 164. 
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concrete* objects then it must have no concrete objects. Let's call this premise 
A4* of the subtraction argument*: 
(A4*) If there is a world with no concrete* objects then it must have no concrete 
objects. 
His argument rests on the claim that in w„ii there are no spatio-temporal objects. 
This is because we know from the subtraction argument* that in Wnii there are no 
maximal occupants of connected regions of space-time. Now i f there are no 
maximal occupants of space-time regions there must be no occupants of space-
time regions and so no physical objects at all. So i f w„ji contains no concrete* 
objects it contains no concrete objects. 
4.3.1 Parts of concrete objects revisited 
I f we accept ( A l * ) then it does not matter i f concrete objects have an infinite 
number of parts. This is because we only need there to be a finite number of 
concrete* entities, not of concrete entities. As the parts of concrete objects wi l l 
not be maximal occupants of connected regions, they are not concrete*. 
Lowe takes issue with this point concerning the parts of concrete objects. He 
does not want to claim that Rodriguez-Pereyra's reformulation is unsuccessful in 
avoiding this problem. Rather he wants to claim that there was no problem in the 
first place. He claims that there is nothing wrong with supposing that concrete 
objects are mereologically simple. Of course, not all concrete objects are 
mereologically simple, but some might be. He cites electrons and quarks as 
examples of entities, which in some sense have spatio-temporal location (thus 
Lowe, "Metaphysical Nihilism and the Subtraction Argument," 63-5. 
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conforming to Lowe's criterion of concreteness) and yet have no parts (as they 
are fundamental particles). I f Lowe is right then the problem of the concreteness 
of parts of concrete objects is avoided and there is no need to modify Baldwin's 
original ( A l ) in the way that Rodriguez-Pereyra suggests. This is because i f there 
is a finite number of concrete objects but their mereological atoms are a finite 
number of concrete fundamental particles, then we are not faced with the infinite 
number of concrete objects which Rodriguez-Pereyra was trying to avoid. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra replies to Lowe's point saying that: 
... the possibility of a world with a finite domain of concrete objects would 
depend on the possibility of a world with a finite number of concrete 
mereological atoms. This depends on the possibility of concrete 
mereological atoms. Both possibilities are more controversial than the 
possibility of a world with a finite domain of concrete* objects.23 
His specific reply takes two steps. Firstly he declines to commit himself on the 
question of whether or not there could be concrete mereological atoms. He goes 
on to point out that even i f there are such things they could not be extended in 
space. 
The first thing to notice in this disagreement is the fact that Rodriguez-Pereyra 
and Lowe are using different criteria of concreteness. (This wi l l be discussed in 
much more detail in 6.2 below.) This is why Rodriguez-Pereyra is able to admit 
that he is uncommitted on the issue of concrete mereological atoms but decidedly 
committed against spatially extended mereological atoms. In contrast Lowe 
defines concreteness as location 
... ' in ' space and time, or at least in time 2 4 
2 3 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Metaphysical Nihilism Defended," 173. 
2 4 Lowe, "Metaphysical Nihilism and the Subtraction Argument," 62. 
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so he cannot make this distinction. 
Once we have noted this difference we can carry on looking at Rodriguez-
Pereyra's argument. His argument runs analogously to his original argument that 
concrete objects must have an infinite number of parts. He says that i f an 
electron, for example, occupies some region of space, then that region's parts 
must be occupied by the parts of the object. As the region wi l l be composed of an 
infinite number of spatio-temporal points there must be an infinite number of 
parts of that object such that each part occupies a point. So these parts of the 
object must be point-sized as they occupy a point-sized region of space. Hence 
they are not spatially extended. 
Once Rodriguez-Pereyra has made this point he goes on to argue that even i f 
there were such atoms, that does not mean there could be just a finite number of 
them. And even i f this were the case, he claims that does not mean there could be 
a world with only a finite number of concrete objects. I f this is the case, although 
there is no world with a finite domain of concrete objects, there are still worlds 
with a finite domain of concrete* objects. So Rodriguez-Pereyra's reformulation 
of ( A l ) as ( A l *) seems preferable. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra also discusses the possibility that i f mereological atoms are 
point-sized then (if they existed isolated from other objects) they are not 
concrete* objects. The problem is that i f every world with a concrete object in it 
also had an isolated mereological atom in it, and these atoms are not concrete* 
then the subtraction argument would yield a world with no concrete* objects but 
nonetheless containing a concrete object - our isolated mereological atom. 
However, Rodriguez-Pereyra believes that this is not the case. I f there are 
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isolated mereological atoms then they are concrete*.25 This is because an isolated 
mereological atom, i f it existed, would be a maximal occupant of a connected 
spatio-temporal region. This is because it occupies a point and a point must be a 
connected region. One could say it is trivially a maximal occupant of a connected 
region. It is also concrete and memberless, therefore it is concrete*. Hence the 
projected problem is avoided. 
So far it seems like ( A l * ) is plausible. The nature of parts of concrete objects 
does not cause a problem for it. Alternatively, as Lowe has pointed out, i f there 
could be a finite number of concrete mereological atoms and concreteness is 
defined as location in space and time, we can accept ( A l ) and yet avoid the 
problems that Rodriguez-Pereyra has suggested. 
4,3.2 Unit sets revisited 
Rodriguez-Pereyra points out that A l * (unlike A l ) is consistent with the claim 
that unit sets are concrete but claims that they are not concrete* (as they are not 
memberless). This combined with premise A4* means that the existence of an 
infinite number of concrete unit sets does not cause a problem for the subtraction 
argument* whereas it does cause problems for the subtraction argument in its 
original form. We had previously discussed whether or not the unit sets of 
concrete objects are concrete. However in w„ii there are no concrete objects and 
so there are no unit sets of concrete objects so it is not an issue. 
It could be argued that there is a tension between Rodriguez-Pereyra's two claims that (i) an 
infinite number of concrete mereological atoms which are the parts of concrete objects are not 
concrete* (this is required for A l * to be true if there are an infinite number of parts to any 
concrete objects) and (ii) an isolated mereological atom would be concrete*. However I think this 
apparent tension is just that - apparent. The difference is that in the first case the atoms are not 
maximal occupants of a connected region whereas in the second case, the isolated atom is, albeit a 
point-sized region. 
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Lowe 2 6 discusses this point too and again his disagreement with Rodriguez-
Pereyra rests on their opposing accounts of what it is that makes an object 
concrete. Of course the unit sets of concrete objects are not concrete for Lowe as 
they do not exist in space and time. So again Lowe is unconvinced by Rodriguez-
Pereyra's claim that ( A l ) needs to be re-written as ( A l * ) . 
Our overall conclusion so far is that either Rodriguez-Pereyra is right about the 
divisibility of concrete objects and the correct criterion of concreteness, in which 
case ( A l * ) is plausible, or Lowe is right about the divisibility of concrete objects 
and the criterion of concreteness and ( A l ) is plausible. 
4.3.3 Spatio-temporal points revisited 
What about space-time points and regions? Well i f the relational account of 
space-time is correct then as Wnii has no spatio-temporal objects there is no space-
time. So even i f space-time points are concrete there are none. 
I f the relational account is not correct then space-time points seem to be concrete. 
This is where the third prong of Rodriguez-Pereyra's improvement comes into 
play. He modifies Baldwin's mark of concreteness so that an object is concrete i f 
and only i f it fails non-vacuously to satisfy the identity of indiscernibles: 
... Ks are concrete i f and only i f Ks have intrinsic properties and there is 
some possible world in which at least two Ks share all their intrinsic 
properties.27 
How does this help with the question of space-time points? Well Rodriguez-
Pereyra claims that space-time points have no intrinsic properties. They have no 
shape, size, temperature or mass. So their failure to satisfy the identity of 
2 6 Lowe, "Metaphysical Nihilism and the Subtraction Argument," 64. 
2 7 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "There Might Be Nothing," 165. 
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indiscernibles is trivial - they don't share their intrinsic properties because they 
do not have any intrinsic properties to share. So, on this modified criterion of 
concreteness, space-time points are not concrete. This means that even i f the 
absolutist account of space-time is right that does not mean there are concrete 
objects in w^i . 
I have argued elsewhere that a consequence of this is that Rodriguez-Pereyra has 
ruled out the possibility that space-time points (and other objects) have 
haecceities or essences.28 Haecceities are properties held uniquely by a single 
object. (I will discuss this point further in section 5.1.3.3 below.) 
Space-time regions are a slightly different matter to space-time points. Space-
time regions, Rodriguez-Pereyra claims, are sets of space-time points. As such 
they have intrinsic properties like shape and size. This means that two spatio-
temporal regions of similar shape and size could share all the same intrinsic 
properties and yet be different, thus failing to satisfy the identity of 
indiscernibles. I f this is the case they would be concrete. However Rodriguez-
29 
Pereyra points out that as space-time points are abstract and sets of abstract 
entities are abstract then space-time regions must be abstract too. But surely there 
is a problem here. Rodriguez-Pereyra is using two different criteria of 
concreteness. On the one hand he is claiming that to be concrete is to non-
vacuously fail to satisfy the identity of indiscernibles. On the other hand he 
claims at although spatio-temporal regions non-vacuously fail to satisfy the 
identity of indiscernibles they are nonetheless abstract as they are sets of abstract 
Coggins, "World and Object: Metaphysical Nihilism and Three Accounts of Worlds." 
Rodriguez-Pereyra, "There Might Be Nothing," 165. 
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objects. Rodriguez-Pereyra30 gets out of this by claiming that non-vacuous 
failure to satisfy the identity of indiscernibles is a necessary but not sufficient 
criterion of concreteness. A l l concrete objects non-vacuously fail to satisfy the 
identity of indiscernibles but not all objects that non-vacuously fail to satisfy the 
identity of indiscernibles are concrete. He does not speculate as to what 
additional criteria are needed to give a fu l l specification of the abstract / concrete 
distinction. 
It's not clear that we should accept Rodriguez-Pereyra's account of what a space-
time region is. He tells us that they are sets of space-time points but is this true? I 
think that there are two problems with Rodriguez-Pereyra's account. Firstly, sets 
are not the sorts of things that physical objects can occupy, whereas space-time 
regions can be occupied by physical objects. Conversely sets are the kinds of 
things that can have numbers, for example, as members. But space-time regions 
can't have members. So space-time regions are not sets. Secondly, although there 
is obviously some sort of very important relationship between space time points 
and space-time regions, it isn't one of a set and its members. Perhaps it's a 
mereological relationship of a whole and its parts. Rodriguez-Pereyra even uses 
these terms earlier in the paper saying 
.. .every such object x that occupies a space-time region has infinitely many 
parts, each of them occupying some of the infinitely many regions included 
in the region x occupies. 
3 0 Ibid. 
3 1 Ibid.: 163. 
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The use of the term 'includes' does not usually signify a set-membership relation. 
It adds credence to the thought that space-time regions are mereological sums of 
space-time points rather than sets of those points. 
How does this affect Rodriguez-Pereyra's account? His aim is to say that space-
time regions are sets of abstract objects, and so are abstract, although they fail to 
non-vacuously satisfy the identity of indiscernibles. I am suggesting that they 
may be sums or aggregates rather than sets of abstract objects. This would still 
seem to make them abstract, so Rodriguez-Pereyra's point holds. 
To sum up where we've go to so far in this section. I f relationism about space 
and time is correct then there is no problem with space-time points and regions 
for the nihilist. I f absolutism is correct then a problem arises as Wnu seems to 
contain concrete space-time points, contra to the nihilist claim. Rodriguez-
Pereyra modifies the nihilist criterion of concreteness in two ways in order to 
avoid this result. Firstly he says that it is non-vacuous failure to satisfy the 
identity of indiscernibles that is the mark of concreteness. This means that space-
time points are abstract. However, I have pointed out that this means the nihilist 
must reject haecceity theory.3 2 Secondly he claims that non-vacuous failure to 
satisfy the identity of indiscernibles is only a necessary condition for, not a 
compete characterisation of concreteness. This means that space-time regions 
(which Rodriguez-Pereyra construes as sets of space-time points) are not 
concrete. However I have criticised this on the grounds that space-time regions 
are more like aggregates of space time points than sets of space time points. This 
means the nihilist can still claim that they are abstract. So nihilism still has a 
3 2 Coggins, "World and Object: Metaphysical Nihilism and Three Accounts of Worlds." 
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coherent position but it has the unexpected consequence that haecceity theory 
must be false. 
Lowe 3 3 is unconvinced by this, Rodriguez-Pereyra's final attempt to motivate the 
replacement of ( A l ) with ( A l * ) . The reason is the same as before - the 
difference in criteria of concreteness between Lowe's account and that of 
Rodriguez-Pereyra. I f all and only those objects that are located in space and 
time are concrete, then space-time points and regions are not concrete. As Lowe 
says: 
... they do not exist in space and time and do not have spatio-temporal 
locations - rather, they constitute the spatio-temporal locations of concrete 
objects which happen to occupy them. 3 4 
However Lowe does admit that Baldwin's original argument is committed to the 
highly controversial absolutist account of space and time. Despite this he does not 
claim that Rodriguez-Pereyra's modification is justified. This is because he is 
implicitly suggesting his own modification. I f we accept Lowe's claim that spatio-
temporal locatedness is the criterion of concreteness rather than Baldwin's claim 
that failure to satisfy the identity of indiscernibles is the mark of concreteness 
then we have no need to modify ( A l ) . In summary then, Lowe suggests that we 
can retain Baldwin's original argument (A1)-(A3) and have no need for 
Rodriguez-Pereyra's modified premises i f we simply abandon Baldwin's criterion 
of concreteness and adopt a spatio-temporal criterion instead. 
3 3 Lowe, "Metaphysical Nihilism and the Subtraction Argument," 64-5. 
3 4 Ibid.: 65. 
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4.3.4 God and the null set 
Rodriguez-Pereyra again uses his incomplete specification of the criteria of 
concreteness to avoid commitment to the concreteness of the null set and a god, 
should it exist. This is important because i f God and the null set exist it is likely 
that they exist necessarily. This would mean that i f they were concrete there 
could be no empty world and metaphysical nihilism would be false. I f there is a 
god it must fail to satisfy the identity of indiscernibles. Rodriguez-Pereyra is 
unclear as to whether the null set would also fail to satisfy the identity of 
indiscernibles but even i f it does, he claims, it must still be abstract. So whatever 
detail is required to complete the criterion of concreteness it must assure the 
abstractness of the null set and God. 
4.3.5 Conclusion 
By replacing ( A l ) with ( A l * ) , Rodriguez-Pereyra's improved subtraction 
argument* has dealt with the three problems Rodriguez-Pereyra identified in 
Baldwin's original argument. In w„ii there are no spatio-temporal objects. The 
unit sets of concrete objects don't exist as there are no concrete objects. Likewise 
the parts of concrete objects don't exist. Finally even i f space-time would exist in 
Wni] in the absence of concrete objects, the points and regions of space-time 
would not be concrete objects either. 
Alternatively, if we accept Lowe's criterion of concreteness and his position on 
the divisibility of concrete objects, we can retain Baldwin's ( A l ) without any 
modifications and without the problems that Rodriguez-Pereyra identified. 
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4.4 Premise (A2) 
(A2) These concrete objects are, each of them, things which might not exist. 
(A2) excludes the possibility of a concrete necessary being. This could be said to 
beg the question against the ontological argument. In order to avoid this charge 
Baldwin puts forward an argument in support of (A2). He suggests a second triad 
of premises. Here they are with both Rodriguez-Pereyra's improved (Bl*) and 
Baldwin's (B l ) . 
(B l* ) It is a necessary condition of concrete objects, and therefore of 
concrete* ones, that they non-vacuously fail to satisfy the identity of 
indiscernibles. So the identity of a concrete* object is not determined by the 
intrinsic properties which determine what kind of thing it is. 3 5 
(B1) It is a mark of concrete objects that they do not satisfy the Identity of 
Indiscernibles. So the identity of a concrete object is not determined by the 
intrinsic properties which determine what kind of thing it is. 
(B2) In the case of any being whose existence is necessary, the fact that its 
existence is necessary is determined by the kind of thing it is, and thus by 
its intrinsic properties. 
(B3) For any being whose existence is necessary, the intrinsic properties 
which determine its existence also determine its identity. 3 6 
( B l ) follows from Baldwin's criterion of concreteness and ( B l * ) follows from 
Rodriguez-Pereyra's criterion of concreteness*. (B2) Baldwin informs us is 
uncontroversial. (B3) however, is not obviously true. Baldwin informs us he has 
only one example to go on - the ontological argument. The ontological argument 
centres on the notion of perfection. It is a characteristic of perfection that it 
entails uniqueness - only one thing can be perfect. Therefore, i f the ontological 
Rodriguez-Pereyra, "There Might Be Nothing," 165. 
Baldwin, "There Might Be Nothing," 234. 
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argument works it works only in one case. (B3) is a generalisation from this case 
and Baldwin believes it to be a 'reasonable hypothesis'. 
I f we accept these premises then we must accept that there cannot be a concrete 
being whose existence is necessary. The identity of a concrete object is not 
determined by the intrinsic properties which determine what kind of thing it is. 
The identity of a necessary object is determined by its intrinsic properties. As the 
property of having one's identity determined by one's intrinsic properties is not 
compatible with not having one's identity determined by one's intrinsic 
properties, no object can have both of these properties. As these properties are 
linked by ( B l ) or (Bl*) - (B3) to the properties of concreteness and 
concreteness*, and necessary existence respectively, no object can have these 
two properties either. There cannot be a concrete necessary being or a concrete* 
necessary being. 
In a lot of ways this argument is at least as important as (A1)-(A3). (B1)-(B3) 
denies the conclusion of the ontological argument - no concrete thing is 
necessary. (A1)-(A3) broadens this claim to deny Lowe's position (although 
there is no necessary object it is necessary that there be some object) and entails 
metaphysical nihilism. Really these are two parallel arguments which together 
bring us to metaphysical nihilism rather than an argument for metaphysical 
nihilism and a sub-argument for one of its premises as the layout of Baldwin's 
paper might suggest. 
Ibid.: 235. 
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4.5 Premise (A3) 
(A3) The non-existence of any one of these things does not necessitate the 
existence of any other such thing. 
Finally Baldwin defends (A3). He discusses the following inference: if, for every 
individual object, it is possible that that object has some attribute (e.g. non-
existence) then it is possible that all objects have that attribute. This he 
formulates as: 
C: (Vx)O(Fx) |-0 (Vx) (Fx) 3 8 
C is of course false. This is the move that Armstrong discusses when he says that 
They [metaphysical nihilists] can see no reason to prevent them proceeding 
from the distributive contingency of everything to the collective 
- i n 
contingency of everything. 
Of course Armstrong has his own reasons for denying this move which we wil l 
discuss in section 5.1.3.1 below. 
However, Baldwin claims that the falsity of C is not a threat to (A3). This is 
because if we take the property denoted by F to be non-existence, that does not 
provide a counterexample to C. Properties such as 'is at least as heavy as anyone 
else' do provide counterexamples to C. This is because this kind of property 
involves an ordering of a domain of more than one object. Non-existence is not 
the sort of property that involves this sort of ordering. So although C is false i f F 
denotes the property 'is at least as heavy as anyone else' there is no obvious 
reason to think C is false i f F denotes non-existence. 
Armstrong, D. M., A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989) 64. 
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Baldwin also considers the claim that every possible world requires a concrete 
object. On this understanding, a possible world only exists or can be identified i f 
it has at least one concrete object. That is, it is a background condition of a 
possible world that it has some object to generate possibilities. Lowe claims that 
the necessity of arithmetic depends on the existence of concrete objects. This 
involves denying the existence of the null set and Baldwin 4 0 is not prepared to do 
that (see 7.4.2 below). 
4.6 Paseau's criticisms 
A critique of the subtraction argument has recently been published by Alexander 
Paseau.41 Paseau's claim is that Rodriguez-Pereyra's third premise (A3*) can be 
interpreted in two ways. What's more, on both of these interpretations the 
argument is invalid. Before we look at these two readings let's just remember 
what (A3*) said. 
(A3*) The non-existence of any one of these things does not necessitate the 
existence of any other such things. 4 2 
Paseau distinguishes a weaker and a stronger reading of this claim. The weaker 
version is: 
On the weaker reading of premise (A3*) it states that the non-existence of 
any given one of the finitely many objects of which ( A l * ) and (A2*) speak, 
namely, xi , X 2 , ...x„, does not necessitate the existence of any other given 
one of these X j . In other words, for any two of the X j , there is a world in 
which neither of them exists.43 
4 0 Baldwin, "There Might Be Nothing," 237. 
4 1 Paseau, A., "The Subtraction Argument Does Not Add Up," Analysis 62 (2002). 
4 2 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "There Might Be Nothing," 164. 
4 3 Paseau, "The Subtraction Argument Does Not Add Up," 74. 
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Paseau goes on to show that on this reading, (A3*) and ( A l *) and (A2*) could 
all be true even i f Rodriguez-Pereyra's conclusion - that there is an empty world 
- was false. I f this is the case the argument is invalid - there is a possible 
situation in which the premises are true and the conclusion is false. So how does 
Paseau's argument go? Well he gives a counter example. In his model there are 3 
concrete* entities. The X j i.e. X i and X2 are the members of the finite domain of 
concrete* objects referred to in ( A l * ) and (A2*). The third concrete* object, o, 
does not overlap with the other two, xi and X2. There are seven worlds in the 
model each of which can be represented by a set: { x i } , { X 2 } , {o} , {x i , x 2 } , 
{x i ,o} , { x 2 , o}, { x i , X2, o) . In this model, Paseau claims, the weaker reading of 
(A3*) is true, {x i , X2} represents a world with finitely many concrete* objects. 
There is a world where neither of them exists (the world represented by {o}) . 
And neither of them is in every world (xi is not in { x 2 , 0 } for example and X2 is 
not in {x i ,o}) . Yet there is no empty world. So for any two of the X j there is a 
world in which neither of them exists. This result he tells us can be generalised 
and holds for any finite number of X* greater than 1. So Paseau has shown us that 
although none of the X j may exist, there is still a non-empty world containing a 
concrete* object, o. 
The stronger reading of (A3*) states that: 
... the non-existence of any one of these X j does not necessitate that there is 
even one of the Xi . . . . this is to say that there's at least one world in which 
none of the X j exists.44 
However Paseau, using the same model, goes on to show that the conjunction of 
this stronger reading of (A3*) along with ( A l * ) and (A2*) is also compatible 
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with the denial of Rodriguez-Pereyra's conclusion. Hence this version forms an 
invalid argument too. The reasoning goes like this. In the world containing only 
o, none of the X j exist. However the model still contains no empty world. So 
there is at least one world in which none of the X j exists but that does not require 
the existence of the empty world. Like the earlier claim this can be generalised 
for any finite number of X j greater than 1. 
So Paseau concludes that whichever interpretation of (A3*) we choose the 
argument is still invalid. According to the weaker version there are worlds where 
any two of the X i fail to exist and according to the stronger version there are 
worlds where each of the X i fail to exist. Neither of these claims in conjunction 
with ( A l * ) and (A2*) entail Rodriguez-Pereyra's intended conclusion. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra45 thinks that this objection is not fatal to his argument. His 
defence is that neither of Paseau's interpretations of (A3*) was the interpretation 
that he had intended and that the intended interpretation makes the argument 
valid. The intended interpretation is: 
... the non-existence of each of those concreta* does not necessitate the 
existence of any other concreta*, not merely of the concreta* of which the 
first two premises speak.46 
(A3*) says that the non-existence of any one of these things does not necessitate 
the existence of any other such thing. Paseau had interpreted 'these things' and 
'such thing' to be referring to the specific concreta* mentioned in ( A l * ) and 
(A2*) whereas Rodriguez-Pereyra and Baldwin had intended these phrases to 
refer to concreta* (and concreta in Baldwin's case) in general. This is why 
4 5 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Metaphysical Nihilism Defended." 
4 6 Ibid.: 172. 
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Paseau can introduce o, some other object not referred to in ( A l * ) and (A2*) 
whereas on Rodriguez-Pereyra's interpretation of (A3*) this is not possible. 
Paseau has shown us that there is a model where none of the X i mentioned in 
( A l * ) and (A2*) exist in some world despite there being no empty world in that 
model. But Rodriguez-Pereyra has shown us that any model where there is a 
world with no concreta* at all is one with an empty world. 
4.7 The balance sheet on the subtraction argument 
Between Baldwin and Rodriguez-Pereyra we have two parallel arguments for the 
claim that there could have been no concrete objects. I think it is worth quoting 
the final version of the subtraction argument* in fu l l so we can see exactly how 
the argument now stands formally: 
( A l * ) There is a possible world wi with a finite domain of concrete* 
objects, x i , x n . 
(A2*) For each of the concrete* objects x; in w j , there is a possible world 
w* where X j does not exist. 
(A3*) The non-existence of any of the Xj that exist in wi does not 
necessitate the existence of any other concrete* object, whether or not these 
exist in w i . That is: for all worlds w and for all the concreta* x; in w i , i f X j 
exists in w then i f there is a world w* where X j does not exist, then there is 
a word w** where the only existing concreta* are those of w except X i (i.e. 
w** is such that for every concrete* object y, y exists in w** i f and only i f 
y x, and y exists in w ) . 4 7 
This combined with A4* appears to give us a valid argument, which concludes 
that there is an empty world accessible from this world. Alternatively, as Lowe 
has pointed out, i f we use spatio-temporal locatedness as our criterion of 
concreteness and deny that concrete objects are infinitely divisible, then we can 
retain Baldwin's original (A1)-(A3). We would probably have to modify them 
4 7 Ibid. 
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slightly to disambiguate the issues raised by Paseau but this would not be 
difficult. 
However, as I have pointed out, Rodriguez-Pereyra's version does rule out the 
existence of haecceities. I f there are haecceities then nothing is concrete given 
the criterion of concreteness used by the subtraction argument. We wil l see 
below (see 5.1.3.3 below) that this is a more serious problem once we try to 
combine the subtraction argument with some account of the metaphysics of 
possible worlds. 
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5 W O R L D AND O B J E C T 
The aim of my thesis is to look at the metaphysics of possible worlds. This 
breaks down into two issues: (i) what are possible words? (ii) is there an empty 
possible world? In looking at the first question I am looking at the different 
accounts of possible worlds - Lewisian realism, ersatzism, etc. In looking at the 
second question I am looking at the discussions of metaphysical nihilism, the 
modal ontological arguments, etc. In this chapter I am drawing these two strands 
together in order to show how the position we hold on one of these issues affects 
the position we should hold on the other. 
In this chapter I wil l , firstly, give a general argument about the sorts of accounts 
of possible worlds that are compatible with metaphysical nihilism and secondly 
look at a specific attempt to combine metaphysical nihilism with a view about 
possible worlds. 
5.1 Metaphysical nihilism, the subtraction argument and 
worlds 
In this section I wi l l argue that the proponents of the subtraction argument are 
either committed to an ersatz view of worlds or to the conjunction of what I shall 
be calling the container view of worlds and an absolutist account of space and 
time. 
It is normally assumed that metaphysical nihilism (the claim that there could 
have been nothing) is a common sense position devoid of ontological 
commitment. However I wil l argue: 
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(i) That nihilism is incompatible with what I call the compositional 
account of worlds. 
(ii) That the argument for nihilism (the subtraction argument) involves 
tacit acceptance of what I call the 'container' view of worlds. 
(iii) That this view requires an absolutist account of space and time. 
(iv) That nihilism is prima facie compatible with the ersatz view of worlds 
but 
(v) That nihilism and the subtraction argument in all their published 
forms are incompatible with most ersatz views and compatible only 
with those ersatz views that do not produce a very robust account of 
modality. 
(vi) That by changing the criterion of concreteness used in the subtraction 
argument it may be possible to develop an argument for nihilism that 
allows for a more robust ersatz account of worlds. 
5.7.7 Metaphysical nihilism 
Metaphysical nihilism, we wi l l remember, is the claim that there is a world at 
which nothing concrete exists, i.e. an empty world. There is some debate as to 
whether a world at which no concrete objects exist is genuinely empty - might 
there not still be abstract objects? Well for the purposes of this discussion we wi l l 
consider only a world at which no concrete objects exist and call that the empty 
world. This is not to beg the question of whether a world with only abstract 
objects is empty or not ( I do discuss this question in 6.1 below), it is just to make 
a terminological stipulation. In this section, I wi l l not argue either for or against 
92 
World and Object 
the claim that there is a world containing no concrete objects but rather wi l l look 
at what else would have to be the case in order for this to be true. 
5.7.2 The subtraction argument 
The supporters of metaphysical nihilism usually advance the subtraction 
argument1 or a modified version thereof.2 I have already explained this argument 
but the outline of it is as follows. There could have been a finite number of 
concrete objects. Each concrete object is contingent - it could have not existed. 
The non-existence of any of these objects would not necessitate the existence of 
another one. Given these three premises we can assert the existence of a further 
world accessible from the one we are discussing such that at this new world one 
of the objects does not exist. I f anything else depends for its existence on that 
object it too must not exist at this new world. By iterating this process (along 
with S4 or an equivalent or stronger modal logic) we eventually get to a world, 
Wmin where the non-existence of one of the objects implies the non-existence of 
all. From here w nn the world with no concrete objects is accessible. 
In order to explain the subtraction argument the following analogy can be made. 
Imagine a room containing a finite number of people. (For most readers, this wi l l 
not require a great deal of imagination.) Any one of them could leave the room 
but the room would still be there. Furthermore, i f any of them leaves the room 
there is no necessity that someone else should enter the room (or even be born in 
the room or pop into existence in the room). So eventually all of them could leave 
but the room would still be there. Similarly, according to the subtraction argument 
1 Baldwin, "There Might Be Nothing." 
2 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "There Might Be Nothing." 
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each concrete object may be missing in a given world suitably far away from our 
actual world and eventually we reach a world where there are no concrete objects 
but the world still remains. 
5.1.3 Three views of worlds and objects 
So what does this tell us about the relationship between worlds and objects in 
those worlds?3 What sort of view of worlds does this argument require? Well, a 
world must be the sort of thing that can 'hold' or contain concrete objects but 
might not hold or contain any such objects. Its existence is not dependent on its 
holding any objects: worlds are the sort of things that exist regardless of whether 
or not they contain any concrete objects at all. We wil l look at three views of 
worlds to see which, i f any, are compatible with the subtraction argument. 
5.1.3.1 The compositional view 
The compositional view is the view that worlds are composed of concrete 
objects. There are two forms of compositionalism: Lewisian and Armstrongian. 
Lewis 4 says the worlds are maximal sums of spatio-temporally related objects. 
The worldview required for the subtraction argument means that the worlds in 
question must not be mereologically composed of concrete objects. I f worlds 
were composed of concrete objects, in the way Lewis suggests, then the world 
containing no concrete objects would not exist. This is because according to 
standard mereology the null sum is not a sum at all . 5 So, if metaphysical nihilism 
3 Some of the arguments in this section form part of Coggins, "World and Object: Metaphysical 
Nihilism and Three Accounts of Worlds." 
4 Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds 69. 
5 Simons, P., Parts: A Study in Ontology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) 13. 
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is true, then the relationship between worlds and concrete objects must not be 
one of mereological composition. I f worlds were sums of concrete objects there 
could not be a world containing no concrete objects. 
Armstrong6 also advocates a version of the compositional view. Although, 
according to Armstrong's view, worlds are not mereological sums of concrete 
objects, they are nonetheless constituted by concrete objects.7 He explains this 
distinction: 
The term 'constituent' replaces the term 'part' which I would once have 
used. This is because these constituents have a non-mereological relation to 
the properties and relations of which they are constituents.8 
So Armstrongian possibilities are states of affairs which are constituted by 
individuals and universals. This is why it is a sort of compositionalist view and, 
hence, no Armstrongian world could exist without some concrete objects i.e. 
Armstrong's account of worlds is true if and only i f metaphysical nihilism is 
false. He says that 
... the simplest possible world wil l be a state of affairs of the form Fa, with 
F and a simple.9 
(Of course Armstrong's position is motivated by his naturalism: his claim is that 
there are no non-natural, or non-spatio-temporal objects. He states this: 
6 Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. 
7 Of course Armstrong wants to say that there are no other worlds as such but just combinations. 
His account still has all the features relevant to the compositional account - it's just not an account 
of worlds. 
8 Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility 38-9.Further discussion of this distinction is 
to be found at Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility 41. 
9 Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility 64. 
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Every systematic philosophy must give some account of the nature of 
possibility. The main constraint I wish to place on such an account is that it 
be compatible with Naturalism. The term 'Naturalism' is often used rather 
vaguely, but I shall understand by it the doctrine that nothing at all exists 
except the single world of space and time. So my objective is to give an 
account of possibility, which is in no way otherworldly. 1 0 
I f there were to be an empty world then at that world there would be only 
abstract or non-natural objects. If, like Armstrong, we want to deny the existence 
of abstract objects, it seems inevitable that we must deny the existence of the 
empty world.) 
Rather than the room analogy, the compositional account corresponds to an 
analogy suggested by Armstrong." He says that an army wi l l continue to exist i f 
any given soldier leaves but that does not mean that the army can exist without 
any soldiers at all. This is analogous to the compositional account because it says 
that a world could have lacked any given object but it couldn't have lacked all of 
its objects, as it would no longer be a world. 
So whether the sort of compositionalism in question is mereological, as in Lewis' 
case, or of another kind, like that of Armstrong, compositionalism about worlds 
and metaphysical nihilism cannot both be true. 
5.1.3.2 The container view 
So what other kind of relationship could hold between worlds and concrete 
objects? I use the phrase 'the container view of worlds' for the suggestion that 
the world is not composed of the other objects it contains, rather it is another 
object that contains them. According to the container view i f we were able to 
1 0 Ibid. 3. 
1 1 Ibid. 24. 
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count up all the objects in the world we would not have counted all the objects 
that exist as the world is a further object, which is not ' in ' itself. 
So perhaps the subtraction argument is making use of the container view of 
worlds. This is brought out in the room analogy as the room is a form of 
container in which there may or may not exist any people. The container view is 
certainly compatible with the subtraction argument. But does the container view 
make sense? What is this container? What ontological category does it belong to? 
What properties does it have? 
What could the container be? Now one of the only things we know about the 
container is that it is the sort of thing that concrete objects could exist in. A good 
candidate for fitting this description is space-time. I f the container is empty 
space-time then we have a fairly clear idea of what the relationship between the 
concrete objects and the world is. The world is the space-time within which 
concrete objects can exist and have location. 
But there is a problem with this suggestion. Remember, my aim in this section is 
to work out what account of the nature of possible worlds is compatible with 
metaphysical nihilism. I f the container is space and time and metaphysical 
nihilism is true (as we are assuming for now) then empty space-time must be able 
to exist on its own. This means accepting an absolutist or substantivalist account 
of space and time. Most philosophers and physicists hold that space and time are 
relational and would not exist 'empty' i f there were no physical objects. I f we 
accept this relationist account then the subtraction argument does not work. The 
room would simply not exist i f there were no people in it. 
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Perhaps it could be objected that even i f the relationist account of space-time is 
correct in this world the absolutist account could have been right. I f this were 
true then there would be other possible worlds where space and time are 
absolute. The otherwise empty world would have to have absolute space and 
time. 
But it seems implausible to say that space-time is relationist in this world but 
could have been absolute. This is particularly true because the difference 
between these two accounts is so great. The absolutist account seems to talk 
about something so different from the relationist account that it's hard to see how 
one could have been the other. 
It should be pointed out that the sort of possibility we are referring to here is 
metaphysical rather than epistemic possibility. In order for the proposition 'time 
could have been absolute' to be true, and to do the job that the supporter of the 
conjunction of the container view and metaphysical nihilism wants it to do, the 
'could' must be a metaphysical could. The claim is not the epistemic claim that 
'for all we know (about the actual world) Newton's account of absolute time and 
space might be correct'. Rather it is the metaphysical claim that that account, 
though false at our world, is really true at some other possible world accessible 
from here. 
I am not arguing here that absolutism about space and time is wrong. My point is 
that i f the only account of possible worlds that is compatible with nihilism 
requires that space and time be absolute then that is a problem for nihilism. It is a 
problem for two reasons. Firstly, most philosophers wi l l reject it simply because 
it conflicts with their beliefs about space and time. Secondly, it is a problem with 
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a philosophical theory i f it entails some controversial view about an otherwise 
relatively separate branch of philosophy. 
But there are further problems for the container view. What properties does the 
container have? Is it abstract or concrete? I f the container is abstract (take 
whatever account of abstractness you prefer e.g. is not temporal, cannot engage 
in causal interactions, satisfies the identity of indiscernibles) then it is hard to 
know how it could 'contain' concrete objects. Does containment become merely 
metaphorical? Abstract objects can be instantiated by concrete ones (in the case 
of universals) and they can have concrete objects as members (in the case of sets) 
but can they contain concrete ones? It's hard to see what sense this makes. I f the 
world is abstract and the contents of the world include concrete things then the 
world must not be a container. 
I f the container is not abstract then surely it must be concrete. But i f the container 
is concrete then w„ii is not a world with no concrete objects - there exists a 
concrete object at w n i i - the world. It could be objected that i f the world is 
concrete, w„ii still contains no concrete object as the world does not contain 
itself. However we can still say that w n j i is not a world where there are no 
concrete objects. I f you ask the question at w„ii 'are there any concrete objects?' 
the answer must be 'yes'. The question 'does the world contain any concrete 
objects?' would require a negative answer but that is not enough for 
metaphysical nihilism. Using the terminology of the subtraction argument we 
would want to say this is not really w^i but actually Wmm - the world with the 
minimum number of concrete objects. Surely we could subtract that object too? 
But on this account of worlds, there is no world that can be described as 'w^,, 
minus one object'. So although there is no world where it is true to say 'there are 
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no concrete objects' there is a world at which it is true to say 'there are no 
concrete objects in the world.' Surely the first unrestricted claim is metaphysical 
nihilism rather than the second narrower claim. So it seems that if worlds are 
containers then they can neither be abstract nor concrete. 
Two ways out of this emerge: (i) we could say that some worlds are concrete 
(those that contain some concrete objects) whilst some are abstract (including 
w„ii) or (ii) we could say that worlds are neither abstract nor concrete. The first 
seems arbitrary and metaphysical dubious. How could different worlds all be 
worlds and yet some be abstract and some concrete? 
The second alternative is to deny that the abstract-concrete distinction is 
collectively exhaustive, to say that worlds are neither abstract nor concrete. Given 
the amount of dispute concerning the nature of the abstract-concrete distinction 
this might seem like a good suggestion. However, i f we do this, the problem just 
re-appears. One popular account of the abstract-concrete distinction suggests that 
to be concrete is to exist in time. I f we get rid of the word 'concrete' we can run 
the same argument. I f the world is a container it must either exist in time or not 
exist in time. I f it exists in time then at the empty world there is something that 
exists in time so it seems strange to say it is empty. I f it does not exist in time then 
it is impossible to grasp how it could 'contain' physical objects, which do exist in 
time. Another alternative is that the container is time. However, as we have seen, 
this means that either we must accept absolute time, or we must deny the 
existence of the empty world. 
So i f metaphysical nihilism is true, then the only case in which the container 
view makes sense is i f time is possibly absolute and so there is at least one world 
(wmi ) where time exists on its own without any concrete objects. 
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Although I haven't cited any published sources where the container view is 
explicitly held, I think it is latent in many discussions of the subtraction 
argument. An example is the analogy with a room, which I cited. It is also latent 
in our pre-philosophical intuitions about what this world is. We talk about things 
in the world, etc. This is why I consider it worthwhile to discuss it. In a similar 
way Lewis argues against 'magical ersatzism' - not because anyone explicitly 
endorses it but because he thinks it is a latent assumption in many more 
respectable views. 
We can see a few examples of where it is latent in philosophical discussions of 
metaphysical nihilism. Baldwin uses the phrase 'contain' in his discussion of the 
subtraction argument: 
...by (A3), the domain of W2 does not contain things which do not exist in 
w , . . . 1 2 
Nonetheless within a few lines Baldwin refers to a world 
• • • Wmin whose domain consists of one or more concrete objects... 1 3 
which seems to be a compositional view of worlds. 
Baldwin also refers to metaphysical nihilism as an 'empty case' and we talk 
about the 'empty world' which seems to assume a view of worlds as objects 
which could be empty or could contain things. 
I think Baldwin's aim is to be noncommittal - to give an argument for 
metaphysical nihilism but avoid commitment to any particular account of worlds. 
My point is that this agnosticism about the nature of worlds is not really 
1 2 Baldwin, "There Might Be Nothing," 232. 
1 3 Ibid. 
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agnosticism and hides the fact that the idea that worlds are containers is latent in 
this discussion. As I have shown, this idea is incoherent when cashed out. 
5.1.33 The ersatz view 
We've looked at the compositional account and the container view of worlds and 
saw that except in one very particular circumstance they are not compatible with 
the subtraction argument. Is there any other view of worlds that would work? 
Well, there is the view accepted most notably by Plantinga that worlds are 
neither composed of concrete objects nor containers for concrete objects. For 
want of a better word let's call this the ersatz account.14 According to the ersatz 
account worlds are maximally consistent ways things could have been. They are 
representational and they are the sort of things (or collections of the sorts of 
things) according to which physical objects exist. They are not things in which 
concrete objects exist. This is analogous to novels or works of fiction. Concrete 
objects do not exist in novels, nor are novels composed of concrete objects, but 
novels are the sorts of things according to which concrete objects can exist or not 
exist. 
This view can be cashed out in terms of states of affairs, propositions, novels, 
etc. A l l these accounts share the feature relevant to this discussion. Leibniz's 
account, which says that worlds are ideas in the mind of God, is also a version of 
this view. This is because Leibniz explains these ideas as things according to 
1 4 Hie word 'ersatz' is used to cover a broad spectrum of views. For now I am understanding it 
just to mean any account where possible worlds are those things (or sets of those things) according 
to which objects exist, donkeys talk, etc. Armstrong, for example is obviously using a broader 
understanding of the term when he refers to his account as an ersatz account (Armstrong, A 
Combinatorial Theory of Possibility 4-5.) I don't apologise for categorising the different accounts 
of worlds differently to the way they have previously been categorised. Indeed, this is exactly my 
point. I want to say that, from the point of view of discussing metaphysical nihilism, my 
categorisation of the different accounts of possible worlds is more accurate and useful than the 
simple Lewis - versus - ersatzism distinction. 
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which such-and-such is the case. That is, i f some other idea had been actualised 
rather than this one the world would have been constructed according to the 
specifications of that idea. Ersatz views can be expressed in terms of sets e.g. sets 
of propositions. In this case the sets themselves are not the sorts of things 
according to which something could be the case but the propositions in those sets 
are. Hence it is an ersatz or representational account of worlds. ( I discuss this 
possibility in more detail in 5.1.4 below.) 
This view certainly appears to be compatible with the subtraction argument. This 
is because the non-existence of concrete objects seems to be a maximally 
consistent way things could have been. The premises of the subtraction argument 
also seem to be consistent with this account - a world with a finite number of 
concrete objects (or concrete* objects) is a maximally consistent way things 
could have been. So is a world just like that one but minus any one of its objects, 
etc. 
So it seems that there is a reasonable account of what a world is which is 
compatible with the subtraction argument. The original analogy concerning the 
people in the room corresponds to the container view of worlds. The 
compositional account corresponds to Armstrong's army analogy. Where does 
the ersatz account of worlds stand with these analogies? Well, it could be said 
that the world is like a club or society that is governed by certain rules.1 5 These 
rules would determine who could be a member, what the society does, where it 
meets, etc. Now suppose the last members die or the society stops meeting: given 
that the identity and existence of the club depends on the rules governing it we 
1 5 This analogy was suggested to me by Tom Stoneham. 
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would not necessarily want to say that the club had ceased to exist. Rather we 
might say it has no members at the current time. This intuition is strengthened 
when we consider that new members could join or the old members could re-
subscribe and start meeting again even after several years. There are certain rules 
that govern whether or not someone is a member of the club and these hold true 
even i f no one is a member at a given time. Likewise in the ersatz account of 
worlds, there are certain considerations that determine whether any physical 
objects exist according to a given possible world. These hold true at every world, 
even one according to which there are no physical objects. 
So far it seems as i f metaphysical nihilism must be compatible with an ersatz 
account of worlds. Now we must remember that metaphysical nihilism and the 
subtraction argument are two separate but closely related issues. The subtraction 
argument is an argument for metaphysical nihilism. More importantly, it is, 
effectively, the only argument for metaphysical nihilism. It is the nihilist's answer 
to those who claim that nihilism is a naive position advocated only by those who 
have not thought through the implications of their theory for the philosophy of 
modality. This is the claim made by Armstrong: 
Philosophers are inclined to say, off-hand, that there could have been 
nothing at all. But this is only to follow out a relatively superficial line of 
reasoning.16 
The subtraction argument is the only defence the nihilists have offered against 
this accusation, so i f we can show that this has problematic consequences then it 
is a problem for nihilism in general. This is precisely what I wi l l do now. I wi l l 
argue that whilst nihilism itself seems to be prima facie compatible with the 
Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility 64. 
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ersatz account of worlds, the subtraction argument as it stands, the only argument 
for nihilism, is not compatible with any adequate version of the ersatz account. 
My argument turns on the fact that the subtraction argument and the subtraction 
argument* are both incompatible with the existence of essences or haecceities. 
However, essences or haecceities are necessary for a robust ersatzism. I have laid 
out the argument that the subtraction argument in all its forms is incompatible 
with the existence of essences or haecceities in another paper.17 This argument 
turns on the use of failure to satisfy the identity of indiscernibles as a necessary 
condition for concreteness. What remains to be seen is how and why an ersatz 
account of worlds requires haecceities. 
There are a few reasons why ersatzers need haecceities (see my discussion of the 
third challenge for actualism in 3.1 above). (All ersatzers are of course actualists 
as they seek to explain modal claims without reference to mere possibilia.) The 
third challenge put to actualism is to explain, without reference to merely 
possible objects, how we can account for the fact that there could have been 
some objects other than those that actually exist. The actualist needs essences or 
haecceities to answer this. The argument is that although an object, o, does not 
exist at this world, its essence does. This essence can be involved in non-
obtaining states of affairs. So non-obtaining states of affairs involving this object 
exist at this world and hence explain how modal truths about o (such as that it 
could have existed) are true.1 8 
Coggins, "World and Object: Metaphysical Nihilism and Three Accounts of Worlds." 
1 8 This is Plantinga's account but similar accounts are needed by all actualists who want to claim 
that there could have existed objects other than those that actually exist or that there could have 
existed two different objects neither of which actually exist. 
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Bearing this in mind, let's look at Baldwin's account of possible worlds to see if 
his metaphysical nihilism is compatible with his views on possible worlds. 
It is not surprising that Baldwin 1 9 advocates a view that conforms to what we are 
calling an ersatz view of worlds. It is a form of fictionalism. It is ersatz in my 
sense because it says that worlds are the sort of things according to which certain 
claims are true. Although he describes his position as fictionalist, it seems to be 
closer to linguistic ersatzism. He claims that worlds are fictions and i f these 
fictions were true then those worlds would have been actual. However, he claims 
that we do not actually need to have linguistic fictions: instead, as the linguistic 
ersatzers do, he claims that the languages that these fictions are written in can be 
Lagadonian. This means that each object is the word for itself and each property 
is its own predicate. He says 
... possibilities do not need linguistic representations. Instead they are best 
represented in a 'Lagadonian' fashion ... whereby objects and properties 
represent themselves, and possible states of affairs are represented by 
sequences of properties and objects, which can be assumed to exist i f the 
properties and objects do... the actual world is distinguished from all other 
worlds precisely by not being fictional: it is represented by the totality of 
Lagadonian representations which represent actual states of affairs ... 
possible worlds are possibilities represented by totalities of consistent 
20 
representations. 
This account of Baldwin's has one surprising consequence. He must deny the 
standard reductionist claim for modalities: P is possible i f and only i f there is 
some possible world at which P is the case. However he does not need to reject 
this claim outright, which would be controversial, he needs only to make a small 
change. He rephrases it as: 
1 9 Baldwin, T., Contemporary Philosophy: Philosophy in English since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 140-3. 
2 0 Ibid. 141. 
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Possible truth is truth according to some consistent representation of a 
world, rather than truth in some possible world. 2 1 
This is because Baldwin's account emphasises the difference between 
representations of worlds (which are real) and the worlds themselves (which are 
not real for Baldwin). 
So that's Baldwin's position - how does it f i t in with my analysis? The problem I 
identified for the philosopher who wants to maintain both ersatzism and 
metaphysical nihilism is that given the criterion of concreteness specified in all 
versions of the subtraction argument, they are unable to satisfy my third 
challenge to actualism. Without haecceities or essences (which are ruled out by 
the criterion of concreteness) and without mere possibilia (which are ruled out by 
actualism) how can they explain the fact that there could have been some objects 
other than those that do actually exist. 
Well, does this criticism trouble Baldwin's account? I think, given the brevity of 
Baldwin's account, it is best to look for an answer to this question in the closest 
relation to Baldwin's theory. (And, anyway, we are more interested in whether 
any account of worlds is compatible with the subtraction argument than in the 
exegesis of the work of any individual philosopher.) The closest relation as I said 
is linguistic ersatzism like that advocated by Melia. 2 2 I have discussed this 
position in detail in section 3.2.1 above. The relevant point for this discussion is 
what Bricker 2 3 calls the problem of descriptive impoverishment. This is a 
problem for any account that relies on a Lagadonian language for its possibilities. 
2 1 Ibid. 142. 
2 2 Melia, "Reducing Possibilities to Language." 
2 3 Bricker, "Reducing Possible Worlds to Language," 349ff. 
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This language wi l l give us names for all the objects that actually exist but won't 
give us names for those that don't. 
Melia 2 4 replies by pointing out that we can express the idea that some non-actual 
object could have existed by saying that there could exist some object x, such 
that x is not identical to any of the actually existing things. This represents a 
possible world where some object exists that does not exist in the actual world. 
But a problem occurs when we try to distinguish between different non-actual 
objects. I could have been one of triplets - all female. Now any Lagadonian 
account of modality wil l be unable to distinguish between these two possible 
sisters. In fact they are unable to distinguish between any cases of non-actual 
objects, which share all their intrinsic properties.25 The world where one of my 
sisters, let's call her Anne, is an astronaut and the other sister, let's call her Jane, 
is a philosopher is not distinct from one where Jane is an astronaut and Anne is a 
philosopher. A l l possibilities involving similar non-actual objects are conflated in 
a Lagadonian account. 
Melia thinks that this is a trivial problem. He denies that worlds are complete and 
is willing to accept this consequence. It is interesting to note that Baldwin refers 
to worlds as totalities. Perhaps his account is more vulnerable to my objection 
than Melia's account is for this reason. 
I wi l l not argue against Melia's claim that we should accept the incompleteness 
of other possible worlds here. But the conclusion we can draw is that the only 
version of ersatzism which metaphysical nihilism and the subtraction argument 
2 4 Melia, "Reducing Possibilities to Language," 20. 
2 5 Electrons are a paradigmatic instance of this as all electrons have the same intrinsic properties. 
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in its current form are compatible with is some form of haecceity-free account 
like Lagadonianism. No haecceity-free ersatz account can avoid this problem -
they are committed by their Lagadonianism to conflating diverse worlds 
containing objects that do not exist in the actual world, to just one incomplete 
possibility. 
I f we want to adopt metaphysical nihilism and the subtraction argument in its 
current form then we are committed to conflating possibilities involving non-
actual objects. I f this is not acceptable then we must reject either metaphysical 
nihilism or the subtraction argument. 
Finally, we should note that it is the criterion of concreteness used by the nihilists 
rather than anything more central to nihilism that leads to this conflict between 
nihilism and robust accounts of possible worlds. I suggest that the subtraction 
argument can be re-written using a different criterion of concreteness which may 
lead to a position compatible with some more robust views of worlds. 
As we have seen there are several issues that need to be considered in the 
subtraction argument so I wi l l start in the next chapter by considering whether or 
not we can re-write it and so find a version that is compatible with some more 
robust accounts of worlds. 
5.1.4 What about sets? 
There are a number of questions that come to mind after considering the 
arguments in the last few sections but many of them can be summed up under the 
umbrella question 'what about sets?' The basic idea is that worlds could be sets 
of some kind and that this is something I need to take into account in my 
arguments. As there is an empty set, the thought goes, if worlds are sets then 
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there can be an empty world. I can distinguish four different ways that this 
question can meaningfully be asked and I wil l deal with them now. The four 
options are (i) that sets are an example of the compositional view and so my 
claim that the compositional view is incompatible with metaphysical nihilism is 
false, (ii) that sets contain their elements and as there is an empty set, they give a 
counterexample to my claim that there could not be an empty container (iii) that 
sets are some sort of ersatz entities and (iv) that sets are a fourth account of 
worlds that doesn't f i t into any of the categories I have given. 
The claim that worlds are sets is not a version of the compositional view. This is 
because the set-membership relationship is radically different from both the part-
whole relationship in mereology and the sort of compositionalism advocated by 
Armstrong. I f anyone is unconvinced by the claim that set-membership is 
radically different from the part-whole relationship here are two simple 
disanalogies. A set containing concrete objects is itself an abstract object (unless 
one holds a very radical philosophy of sets) whereas the mereological sum of a 
group of concrete objects is a concrete object. Secondly, mereological parthood 
is a transitive relationship whereas set membership is not. 2 6 The set {3,4} is a 
member of the set of two-membered sets whereas 3 and 4, the members of {3,4} 
are not themselves members of the set of two-membered sets. In contrast, any 
molecules that are parts of the leg of my chair are also parts of the chair. 
Armstrong is compositionalist but his sort of composition is different from the 
mereological composition advocated by Lewis. However, disanalogies with set-
membership are again available. Armstrong considers possibilities to be 
2 6 This example was suggested to me by Jonathan Lowe. 
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maximally consistent states of affairs. These states of affairs are composed of 
particulars and properties. A state of affairs composed of concrete entities, like 
particulars and instantiated properties, is concrete, whereas a set of particulars 
and properties is abstract. The form of composition advocated by Armstrong is 
also transitive. Set membership, as we have seen, is not transitive. 
So i f worlds are sets then they don't fi t into the compositional view of worlds. 
The second option is to say that the world is a set where we see the world as a 
container. I have argued against this claim but perhaps the philosopher who 
thinks the world is a set could object to my arguments. As sets are abstract 
objects, it seems as though the step in my argument they would reject is my 
claim that abstract objects cannot literally contain concrete objects. They would 
say that as sets contain their members, even if their members are concrete, 
abstract objects can contain concrete objects. 
However I think that this objection is flawed. This is because sets do not literally 
contain their objects. Remember that the container view is the account of worlds 
that I found implicit in the subtraction argument. I think that the transitivity 
arguments I used above can also be used against this suggestion. This is because 
the sort of containment described in the container view is transitive whereas the 
set-membership relationship, as we have seen, is not. That the containment 
relationship is transitive can be seen by considering again the room analogy. I f 
the room contains a box and the box in turn contains a pen, then the room also 
contains the pen. 
So there is a disanalogy between the container view and the idea that the world is 
a set. So i f the world is a set, the container view must not be right. 
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The third version of this objection, the claim that the world is a set where a world 
is some sort of ersatz object, is the option that is most plausible. This is because 
some versions of ersatzism do say that the world is a set. For example the world 
could be a set of propositions. This would be an ersatz world because the 
propositions would be the things according to which something is the case. I am 
happy to admit that these sorts of worlds are plausible and compatible with 
metaphysical nihilism. They are within the range of ersatz views I have discussed 
before. 
However, those philosophers who object to my arguments tend to think that 
worlds are not sets of propositions, or ersatz entities in this sense, rather they are 
sets of concrete (and maybe also abstract) objects. They are sets containing all 
the objects that exist in that world. This is not an ersatz view. Neither, as we have 
seen, is it a compositionalist or container view. Hence, i f it is a plausible view at 
all it is a fourth view. 
I now want to argue that this fourth view is not convincing. The idea is that the 
27 
world containing x, y and z actually is a set {x ,y ,z , . . .} . (The other elements 
would include the unit sets of these objects, the null set, and combinations of 
these.) Let's leave aside for now the question of whether or not the actual world 
is a set, like all the others, or this world is something else. I wi l l try to argue 
against the strongest possible version of this view and so wil l accept which ever 
of these two options makes the view most plausible. 
In fact, we will see later that it is probably a proper class rather than a set, but it is at least a set-
like object i.e. the sort of thing that can have members or elements. Where I say 'sets' in this 
discussion, I usually mean set-like objects, unless I have specified otherwise, for example, by 
contrasting them with proper classes. 
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One problem with this view is the question of how there can be worlds which 
contain non-actual objects. In an actualist philosophy, it seems implausible to 
suggest that a set could exist in a world where some of its members did not 
exist.2 8 So i f one were to accept this view one would have to (a) be a possibilist 
or (b) reject the claim that an actualist can only accept the existence of sets in 
worlds where their members exist or (c) radically reduce the number of 
possibilities available so that the only possibilities which are real are those that 
involve actual objects. 
(c) sounds very radical and implausible: rejecting the idea that worlds are sets 
would surely be preferable to this. 
As for (b), it seems convincing to say that a set could not exist without its 
members. The identity of a set is determined by its members, so it's hard to see 
how it could exist without those members existing. You could say that there is a 
set containing a unicorn or Sherlock Holmes and so sets can exist in worlds 
where their members do not exist. However, this is not convincing. The problem 
can be seen when I ask questions like 'which unicorn does that set contain'? I 
think that i f there are sets containing fictional objects, then (assuming an actualist 
metaphysics) the fictional objects they contain are abstract entities that do exist 
in this world rather than concrete, non-actual objects. 
So that leaves us with (a), (a) means accepting possibilism, the view that Lewis 
advocates, that claims that there are non-actual objects. Let's try to cash out this 
view. So our assumptions are (i) that worlds are sets and (ii) that there are non-
actual objects which exist in other non-actual worlds. So these non-actual worlds 
2 8 Lowe makes this assumption in Lowe, "Metaphysical Nihilism and the Subtraction Argument," 
67. 
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are sets containing non-actual objects. However, it's not clear what work the 
claim that worlds are sets is doing here. I f there are objects in a world so that the 
world-set is non-empty then there also exists a mereological sum of all the 
objects in that world. Why not just say that that is the world? I suppose i f one 
believed in metaphysical nihilism and in the arguments I have given above then 
one might cite these as reasons for saying that the world is the set containing all 
the objects in the world rather than the sum of those objects. But what about the 
empty world? The empty world would either be the set of all the necessary 
abstract objects or the null set. Now it's interesting to note that both of those sets 
exist in this world. This seems to fit uneasily with possibilism. I f the other worlds 
are supposedly non-actual objects then it would be strange i f they were actual 
objects. Of course, this may be good reason for saying that worlds are proper 
classes rather than sets. ( I discuss this further in 5.2.2 below.) 
There are several other problems with the claim that worlds are sets. The central 
problem among these is what I call the problem of structure. The problem is that 
the objects in the world are essentially related to each other.2 9 In contrast the 
members of a set bear no substantive relations to each other. Sets, in and of 
themselves, impose no order or structure on their members. While it's true that 
for any world there is a set which contains all and only the objects in that world, 
there seems to be something confused in claiming that that set is the world. So i f 
we call our world-set, W i , and the objects in the world, oi , 02, ... o nthen W i = { o i , 
02, 03 , . . . o n } : but surely this set is just a model of the world, not the world itself. 
A similar argument (although about facts, rather than physical objects) is given in Grossman, R., 
The Existence of the World (London: Routledge, 1992) 84. 
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There is a set containing me and all the other people in this library now and all 
the books and shelves, etc. but that set is not the library itself. 
One could object to this that we can impose order and structure on sets. We do 
this by including in our set, not just the objects in the world but also the 
relationships between those objects. So our world set is larger than the one I've 
suggested above, it also contains properties, Pj, and relations, R,. The set is 
W 2 = { o i , 02, 03, ...o n, Pi, P2, ... Pm, Ri , R2, ... Rk} . 3 0 But this option is not 
satisfactory either as it there are numerous worlds that f i t this description - there 
is one world where object Oi stands in relation Ri to object 02 and another where 
all those objects and relations exist but the relations are instantiated differently. 
This way of dividing up worlds conflates all these different possibilities and so it 
is unsatisfactory. 
But the friends of the claim that worlds are sets are not beaten by this. They say 
things like 'you can do that with ordered n-tuples'. The idea is that the world is 
not only the set of all the objects, properties and relations that hold in that world: 
it also contains as elements ordered n-tuples that describe the patterns of 
relationships between those objects. Our world-set now looks like this 
W 3 ={oi ,o 2 , ... o n, Pi, P2, ... Pm, Ri , R 2, ... R k, <Pi, O i > , ... <Pm,o n>, <Ri, o 2 ) o 3>, 
... <Rk, o n, o n>, . . . } where the ordered pair <Pj, o,> represents an object which 
has a certain property and the ordered triple <Rj, Oi, Oi> represents the fact that 
two objects stand in a certain relation to each other. Surely we now have a 
In any ways in which my notation is not agnostic between different accounts of properties and 
universals, I am sure it can be re-written so as to be compatible with any particular theory of 
universals. 
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completely determined world? Isn't this what the advocate of the claim that the 
world is a set wanted? 
Well, yes and no. We have been able to use set notation to express world-sized 
possibilities but in doing so I think we have ventured away from our original 
claim that the world is a set. The idea is that worlds are sets of objects, 
properties, relations, and ordered n-tuples that describe the patterns of properties 
and relations between the objects. But what are these n-tuples? N-tuples are 
surely not one of the fundamental kinds that reality is made up of, they are 
abstract entities - it seems strange to think of a world being made of them. Really 
what the n-tuples are doing is describing or expressing how the world is. This is 
something more like the ersatz account of worlds than the fourth account that 
sees worlds as sets. In fact the n-tuples represent states of affairs, ways things 
could have been or descriptions of ways things could have been (depending on 
whether one takes an Armstrong-like compositionalist approach to states of 
affairs or a Plantinga-like ersatz approach to states of affairs). As such they f i t 
into my ersatz camp (for Plantinga-like accounts) or the compositionalist camp 
(for Armstrong-like accounts). 
I f one is committed to states of affairs anyway, its hard to see what's the point in 
having worlds as sets. Surely we could just say that those states of affairs are the 
worlds. Those who are compositionalist about states of affairs wi l l not be able to 
advocate metaphysical nihilism. This is because once they analyse the 
metaphysics of their ordered n-tuples they wil l see that there cannot be anything 
represented by empty n-tuples in this way. In that alleged world with no states of 
affairs there wi l l be no objects or properties or relations either. 
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Those who advocate a Plantinga-like account of states of affairs can retain 
metaphysical nihilism but are essentially ersatz theorists and so pose no problem 
to my claim that only an ersatz account is compatible with nihilism. This is 
because the sets which they claim are worlds are not just sets of objects but sets 
of ways things could have been, the sort of things according to which something 
could have been the case. 
5.1.5 Conclusion 
We have seen that i f we want to hold metaphysical nihilism and use the 
subtraction argument we must (i) deny the compositional account of worlds, (ii) 
deny the container view (unless we are willing to accept that absolute time is 
metaphysically possible) and (iii) accept the ersatz view. So the analogy of 
people leaving a room is not appropriate to explaining the subtraction argument 
(as it involves implicit acceptance of the container view). Likewise Armstrong's 
analogy of the army is incompatible with the subtraction argument (as it involves 
acceptance of the compositional view). The appropriate analogy is that of a club 
whose existence and identity is determined by the club rules regardless of 
whether or not there are any members. Its hard to see how there could be a 
plausible fourth option where worlds are seen as sets that does not collapse into 
one of the first three options. 
5.2 Rodriguez-Pereyra's position 
My arguments have shown that there seems to be no point to saying worlds are 
sets (except where this claim is a version of ersatzism). I f we want to say that 
worlds are sets we have to also embrace Lewisian possibilism and acknowledge 
the existence of states of affairs. M y argument is that there is then no point in 
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saying that there is also a set containing all these things. It just seems superfluous. 
However there is a possible objection to this view. I f we could show that this 
claim that worlds are set-like objects (in a non-ersatz way) is compatible with 
metaphysical nihilism, then i f metaphysical nihilism were true, we might have a 
good reason for accepting this view of worlds. This is exactly the sort of argument 
that Rodriguez-Pereyra31 runs and we wil l look at his suggestion now. 
Lewis amongst others has assumed that genuine modal realism and 
metaphysical nihilism are incompatible. Genuine modal realism (as Lewis 
describes it) is a form of the compositional view of worlds, which I have shown to 
be incompatible with metaphysical nihilism (see 5.1.3.1 above). However, 
Rodriguez-Pereyra argues that metaphysical nihilism is compatible with a form of 
modal realism. While he does accept a modified form of Lewisian modal realism, 
it is precisely Lewis's compositionalism that he modifies. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra defines the two theses under discussion as follows: 
Metaphysical nihilism: (1) it is possible that nothing concrete exists.33 
Modal Realism: (2) Merely possible worlds exist and are of a kind with the 
actual world. 3 4 
There are two unclear expressions here - firstly 'concrete' can mean physical, 
spatio-temporal, causal or can have any of a number of other interpretations. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra says that spatio-temporal objects are concrete but doesn't say 
what criterion of concreteness he is using. Secondly, 'of a kind' is a seemingly 
3 1 Rodriguez-Pereyra, G., "Modal Realism and Metaphysical Nihilism" (paper presented at the 
Joint Session, York, 2001). 
3 2 Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds 73ff. 
3 3 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Modal Realism and Metaphysical Nihilism", 1. 
3 4 Ibid., 2. 
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inoffensive little phrase but actually carries quite a lot of metaphysical weight. I 
have argued elsewhere (see 2.2 above) that Lewis's characterisation of other 
merely possible worlds as being 'of a kind' with our own world is ambiguous 
and needs clarification. We wil l look at both of these phrases later. 
5.2.1 Rodriguez-Pereyra's negative argument 
At first glance (1) and (2) do not appear to be incompatible so where is the 
problem? Specifically, the characterisation of modal realism given in (2) does not 
entail compositionalism about worlds, so the incompatibility I pointed out 
between compositionalism and metaphysical nihilism is not present here. 
According to Rodriguez-Pereyra the problem occurs when these two claims are 
combined with some other claims commonly held about modality, particularly 
commonly held by modal realists. He gives us an inconsistent quadrant: 
(1) It is possible that nothing concrete exists. (Metaphysical nihilism) 3 5 
(4) 3 6 A possible world is a maximal sum of spatio-temporally related 
objects. 
(5) Spatio-temporally related objects are concrete objects. 
(6) A sentence like ' i t is possible that p ' is true just in case there is a 
possible world where p . 3 7 
These four theses result in a contradiction. I f they are all true then 
the world in which nothing concrete exists is a world where some concrete 
objects exist.3 8 
Of course, Lewis does not accept concrete / abstract distinction and so might have trouble with 
Rodriguez-Pereyra's characterisation of metaphysical nihilism, however it will be seen further on 
that the use of these terms is irrelevant to the overall argument. The argument would run just as 
well without the terms 'concrete' and 'abstract'. 
3 6 I've retained Rodriguez-Pereyra's numbering as I do discuss each of his claims. 
3 7 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Modal Realism and Metaphysical Nihilism", 3. 
3 8 Ibid. 
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Hence, i f (1) (metaphysical nihilism) is true then only two of 4, 5 and 6 can be 
true - all three cannot be true. 
(6) Is held not only by modal realists but also by nearly all philosophers who 
discuss modality. Furthermore, the motivation for modal realism is to give a 
plausible 'cashing out' of this claim. So we don't want to reject (6). 
I f one wanted to query (5) then (1) could be reformulated so that the 
39 
inconsistency re-occurs. 
So the only claim we can deny is (4). I f we deny (4) then we must deny either (2) 
(modal realism) or 
(3) The actual world is a maximal sum of spatio-temporally related 
objects.4 0 
As (2) is modal realism, which Rodriguez-Pereyra is trying to save, then he must 
reject (3). In order to do this legitimately he sets himself three challenges - he 
must (a) give a reason why (3) is not true, (b) explain what kind of thing the 
actual world is, so that (2) has content and 
(c) show that there is a world where no concrete objects exist and that this 
world is of a kind with the actual world. 4 1 
So in order to maintain both (1) and (2) Rodriguez-Pereyra must reject (3) and 
(4). 
Ibid., 4. 
' Ibid., 2. 
Ibid., 5. 
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5.2.2 Rodriguez-Pereyra'spositive argument 
Rodriguez-Pereyra therefore tries to reformulate the description of the actual 
world given in (3) in a way that avoids the apparent contradiction between (1) 
and (2). In order to do this he develops the notion of a sum* as follows: 
S is a sum* i f f (a) S is a sum of memberless objects and (b) if any object in 
S has a duplicate that is spatio-temporally related to any object, then 
everything in S is spatio-temporally related to everything in S.42 
He also invokes the existence of certain abstracta, namely sets. He claims that 
pure sets exist and are necessarily abstract. I.e. in every world in which pure sets 
exist, they lack spatio-temporal location. As Rodriguez-Pereyra believes that 
pure sets are independent - i.e. their existence does not depend on the existence 
of any other objects or kinds of objects, he believes that there is a world where 
only pure sets exist. This world is called W p u re. 
When Rodriguez-Pereyra refers to the duplicate of an object he means that 
a duplicate of an object x is any object having the same intrinsic properties 
asx. 4 3 
Now the concrete objects in the actual world form a sum*. The empty set is also 
a sum*. So the sum of the concrete objects in the actual world and the null set are 
'of a kind'. However, Rodriguez-Pereyra has not yet proved that the actual world 
and the empty world are of a kind. This is because the actual world, he claims, is 
not just a sum of concrete objects but also contains abstract objects (pure sets). 
In order to finish off the argument Rodriguez-Pereyra claims that the actual 
world, and hence by (2) the other merely possible worlds, are collections of 
4 2 Ibid., 9. 
4 3 Ibid., 9-10. 
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... a maximal sum* and its set-theoretical expansion.44 
And what is a set-theoretical expansion? 
The set-theoretical expansion of a sum S consists of (a) the sets formed from 
the (proper or improper) parts of S; (b) the subsets of the sets in (a); (c) the 
sets formed from the sets in (b); and (d) the sets formed from any 
combination of parts of S, sets in (a), sets in (b), sets in (c), and any sums 
thereof.45 
Both the actual world and the other worlds, including W p u r e , are such collections. 
So they are 'of a kind'. Hence Rodriguez-Pereyra has shown that metaphysical 
nihilism (it is possible that nothing concrete exists) and modal realism (merely 
possible worlds exist and are of a kind with the actual world) can both be true. 
As to what kind of collections worlds are, Rodriguez-Pereyra tends to think they 
are proper classes. They cannot be sets as each world contains all the sets that 
exist. So i f worlds are set-like objects, they are proper classes. He also suggests 
that they may be sums or mere pluralities. 
5.2.3 The problem with memberlessness 
I want to consider the clause in Rodriguez-Pereyra's definition of a world that 
involves memberlessness. 
Firstly I want to argue that a sum* is not a genuine class of entity or ontological 
category. The argument Rodriguez-Pereyra has offered is that there are certain 
common features between the things that are sums* such that it is legitimate to 
class them together. These common features are being memberless and being 
potential base-elements in a set-theoretical hierarchy. 
4 4 Ibid., 10. 
4 5 Ibid., 8. 
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Our examples of sums* are the null set and the sum of the concrete objects in the 
actual world. It is certainly true that both of these objects can be at the bottom of 
a set-theoretical hierarchy but that in itself is not sufficient to make them a 
unique metaphysical category. I can't think of any entity except proper classes 
that couldn't be at the bottom of the set-theoretical hierarchy. I f practically any 
object could do this job then there is no metaphysical significance in the fact that 
various objects have this feature in common. There is no sense in which dividing 
the world into proper classes and everything else is carving reality at the joints. 
It's more like cutting of f a fingertip. 
What about memberlessness - can this characteristic provide proof of a distinct 
ontological category? I suggest that it cannot. This is because Rodriguez-Pereyra 
uses the notion of memberlessness in a strange way. The null set is by definition 
memberless. My pen is also memberless. Now Rodriguez-Pereyra claims that 
this is a feature that the two objects have in common. However, it seems to me 
that having members is a property that only sets have. (Obviously social groups, 
political parties, secret societies, the human race and armies all have members 
but the sense of 'membership' we are talking about is set-membership. Set 
membership is also the only kind of membership that Rodriguez-Pereyra seems 
to be thinking of.) The null set is interesting because it is a set (the kind of thing 
that could have members) but does not have any members. Rodriguez-Pereyra 
wants us to believe that the null set and physical objects share this feature of 
being memberless, but it seems that this is not the case in anything but the least 
significant way. 
An analogy is available with being married. I am not married and neither is my 
pen. Does this mean there is a significant property, which my pen and I have in 
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common - the property of being unmarried? No, I am the kind of thing which 
could get married or could not whereas my pen does not have the option of 
getting married. In order for two objects to belong to the same ontological 
category there has to be more in common between them than this. Sets are not 
just the kinds of things that could have members but are essentially the kinds of 
things that could have members. So while the null set is memberless, my pen, 
although having no members could hardly be described as being memberless just 
as it is unlikely to be described as being unmarried. It is metaphysically 
impossible for my pen to have members, as it's just not that kind of thing. This 
shows that there is no metaphysically significant understanding of membership 
according to which my pen and the null set are 'of a kind'. To suggest that there 
is is to make a category error. 
Perhaps we need two notions of memberlessness in order to clarify this 
distinction. The null set is memberlessj as it is the sort of thing, which could 
have members (a set) but happens to not have any. My pen is memberless2 as it is 
not the sort of thing that could have members. 
Of course there is an important sense in which the null set could not have 
members. Usually in discussions of modality we would paraphrase a sentence 
like 'the null set could have had members' as 'there is a world at which the null 
set does have members' according to principle (6) (see section 5.2.1 above.) 
However this paraphrase is not true. The null set is necessarily memberless. I f it 
exists at all, then it exists at every world and it is empty at every world. Because 
the identity of sets is determined by their members, i f the empty set were to 
contain something it would not be the empty set, it would be some other set. So 
what is it that I am trying to express when I say the empty set could have had 
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members. Well it's that it belongs to the class of things (sets), which can have 
members. So the 'could' in this context is not an expression of metaphysical 
possibility. It is telling us that this set belongs to the right ontological category to 
have members but it doesn't have any. A better way of expressing this is that the 
null set is accidentally memberless whereas my pen is in principle memberless. 
I f two objects belong to the same ontological category then they wi l l have the 
same criterion of identity. This is not the case with memberless objects. The 
identity of a set is determined by its membership. The null set is that set which 
has no members. The identities of physical objects are determined by other 
factors. So there is no ontological category of memberless objects that includes 
both of these. 
One could reply that of course there is an ontological category to which they both 
belong - particulars is one, entities is another. But this is to miss the point. We 
are interested in knowing the lowest level ontological category to which they 
belong. This is informative. Every object belongs to the category of entities. That 
does not help us make progress. Physical objects belong to some lower level 
category such as concrete objects or physical objects or spatio-temporal objects 
(depending on your favoured ontology), which does not include sets. Likewise 
sets belong to some lower level category (perhaps the category of sets), which 
physical objects do not belong to. So although at some level they do both belong 
to the same category there is a lower level where they definitely do not. It is the 
lower levels where the real work is done. 
It could also be suggested that perhaps they are of the same ontological category 
because there is a criterion of identity for memberless objects. Namely they are 
those, which do not have any members. However, when it comes to cashing out 
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this criterion we would encounter the problems I have described above. What 
does it mean to be memberless? Well, it means two different things - either to be 
the sort of thing that could have members but happens not to, or to be the sort of 
thing that can't have members. But any disjunctive criterion of identity is ad hoc 
and arbitrary. As such it is a sign that our carving up of reality has gone awry. 
However we divide up reality, all sets should be in the same category. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra is breaking this rule by dividing up reality in such a way that 
some sets have more in common with non-sets than with other sets (as shown in 
diagram 1). 
Whereas in diagram 2, which represents the way I am suggesting we ought to 
divide up reality, all sets fall into the same subcategory and we only distinguish 













Membered member-apt entities 
(Non-empty sets) 
Non-membered member-apt entites 
(Empty set) 
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According to the notion of a maximal sum* the sum of all the actual concrete 
objects and the empty set are both maximal sum*s. But they seem to have 
nothing in common except this superficial property of memberlessness and the 
near-universal property of being the base-elements of a set-theoretical hierarchy. 
There is another issue we need to address in relation to the problem of 
memberlessness. We have seen that the problem dogs Rodriguez-Pereyra's 
attempt to reconcile nihilism with Lewisian modal realism but does the problem 
also contaminate the subtraction argument itself? In Rodriguez-Pereyra's 
improved version of the argument he uses the idea of a concrete* object. An 
object is concrete* we wi l l remember (see section 4.3 above) if and only i f it is 
concrete, memberless and a maximal occupant of a spatio-temporal region. I f the 
collection of memberless objects does not form a genuine ontological category 
can the argument proceed? Well it seems that it can. This is because in the 
improved subtraction argument* the notion of concreteness* is used to make the 
argument simpler. It is a shortcut that allows Rodriguez-Pereyra to avoid having 
to make the claim that there is a world with a finite number of concrete entities. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra just claims that there is a world with a finite number of 
concrete* objects. Sets are not concrete* objects. Using the notion of 
memberlessness in the improved subtraction argument* allows Rodriguez-
Pereyra to follow the form of Baldwin's argument but avoid commitment to the 
world with a finite number of concrete objects. As it is argumentative shortcut 
there is no problem with the fact that the criterion of memberlessness is 
disjunctive. In this case the term is just a short way of writing out that disjunction 
and the argument could be re-written in this longer disjunctive manner i f need be. 
So although it is problematic to use memberlessness* in his attempt to reconcile 
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nihilism with modal realism, it is not in his reformulation of the subtraction 
argument*. This is because in the first case he seems to be using 
memberlessness* to refer to a genuine class of entity - an ontological category -
whereas in the later case he is just using memberlessness* as a shorthand for 
something that could unproblematically be written out in a longer form. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra could object by saying that he did not intend 
'memberlessness' to be a metaphysically serious term. He could suggest that it is 
just shorthand for a disjunction of several different properties. This might be true 
but if it is then I think it renders Rodriguez-Pereyra's account of worlds less 
plausible. A recurring criticism of possible world theories is that some 
philosophers claim that it is hard to see what these possible worlds have to do 
with modality. Even i f there are these other worlds, they say, what do they have 
to do with explaining the truth of modal claims about this world? In the case of 
Lewis' account and many ersatz accounts I think this criticism is not very 
effective. In Lewis' account the other worlds really are things like this one so it's 
obvious that they are other ways this one could have been. In those ersatz 
accounts where worlds are states of affairs or proposition-like or novels, it is also 
relatively easy to see that those describe other ways this world could have been. 
But the more separated from that intuition our accounts of worlds become, the 
harder it is to see how this is the case. Rodriguez-Pereyra's account says that 
worlds are a collection of a maximal sum of memberless objects (with the 
appropriate conditions) and its set-theoretical expansion. I f we then take into 
account that the group of memberless objects have nothing significant in 
common then it becomes harder and harder to see how this can explain our 
modal claims. 
128 
World and Object 
Secondly, i f Rodriguez-Pereyra is willing to embrace this disjunctive nature of 
memberlessness and deny that it carries any metaphysical weight, then he could 
perhaps be accused of being ad hoc. If, in our attempts to reconcile modal 
realism with metaphysical nihilism, we are forced to use disjunctive 
characterisations of reality, then perhaps modal realism and metaphysical 
nihilism are not really compatible or are only compatible i f we make ad hoc 
modifications to our definition of worlds. 
5.2.4 The 'of a kind problem' and Lewis and Rodriguez-Pereyra's 
common ground 
This brings us back to the broader point I made about the phrase 'of a kind' (see 
2.2 above). The notion of 'of a kind' used by Lewis in various contexts is i l l 
defined. The fact that we can find some superficial feature, which two objects 
appear to share, does not tell us anything about the metaphysics of those objects. 
This means the characterisation of modal realism given in (2) is not sufficient. 
This lack of clear definition is accentuated when we consider that an actualist, 
who holds an account of possible worlds diametrically opposed to Lewis's 
possibilism, could actually accept Rodriguez-Pereyra's characterisation of modal 
realism. This is because the world does not have to be identified with the 
universe. An actualist, who holds that, for example, the actual world is the 
maximally consistent proposition that describes the universe, would also hold that 
the other possible worlds are maximally consistent propositions. So these other 
worlds are 'of a kind' with the actual world. 
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So what Lewis means when he says 'of a kind' is that both the actual and the 
merely possible worlds are spatio-temporal. This is what distinguishes them from 
the ersatz worlds. 
It is usually considered that spatio-temporal entities form a distinct ontological 
category - often called concrete objects. So the precise formulation of Lewis' 
position that is hinted at by 2 is 
2a: Both the actual world and the merely possible worlds are maximal sums of 
spatio-temporally related entities. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra, on the other hand means that 
2b: both the actual world and the merely possible worlds are collections of a 
maximal sum* and its set-theoretic expansion. 
Now it could be argued that there is a common claim that both Lewis and 
Rodriguez-Pereyra hold which is 
2c: Both the actual world and the merely possible worlds belong to the same 
ontological category. 
However, this is not the case. While it is commonplace to suggest that spatio-
temporally related objects form an ontological category I have shown above that 
collections of a sums* and their set-theoretic expansions do not. So it seems that 
there is no clearly defined thesis with which we can replace 2 that Rodriguez-
Pereyra and Lewis could both assent to. 
However, i f Rodriguez-Pereyra's preference for taking collections to be proper 
classes rather than mere pluralities is correct, then maybe 2d is true: both the 
actual world and the other possible worlds are proper classes. 
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5.2.5 Conclusion 
I suppose my point in the previous sections is that Rodriguez-Pereyra's account 
wants to retain the power and ontological economy of Lewis' account whilst also 
diverging from Lewis' account so as to gain compatibility with metaphysical 
nihilism. I have merely been pointing out just how divergent from Lewis' 
account this is. Rodriguez-Pereyra's characterisation of modal realism is so 
broad that even hard-line ersatzers, the opponents of Lewis' theories, could 
accept Rodriguez-Pereyra's characterisation of modal realism (2). Given that 
Lewis' account is so well-worked out and documented, it is not obvious that we 
can make changes this large without affecting the power and usefulness of the 
theory. 
It is also worth noting that Rodriguez-Pereyra's ontology is really extremely 
large. Many philosophers have problems with accepting abstract objects into an 
ontology (including Lewis). Many others have problems with possibilia (except 
Lewis). However Rodriguez-Pereyra is committed to both. So this seems like an 
extremely expensive ontology. 
5.3 Conclusion 
Metaphysical nihilism is often taken to be a view without or with a very minimal 
amount of ontological commitment. I have shown that this is not the case. It is 
usually taken to be a common sense view, agnostic between accounts of what 
possible worlds are, a basic hypothesis, which we should hold on to until 
persuaded otherwise. What I have shown is that it is none of these. It is not 
agnostic between the different accounts of possible worlds. Nihilism itself is not 
compatible with a compositional account of worlds. The container account of 
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worlds is assumed in some discussions of nihilism and seems to be taken to be an 
agnostic, common sense view that we can hold harmlessly without impinging on 
our other beliefs. However, unless absolutism about space and time is correct, 
this view is untenable. Finally the ersatz view, although at first sight consistent 
with nihilism, is not compatible with any forms of the subtraction argument, the 
only argument for nihilism, so far advanced. Any account of worlds that sees 
worlds as sets is already committed to the ful l ontology of one of my other three 
accounts. One could argue that it is nonetheless worth having a larger ontology in 
order to make nihilism compatible with something like Lewis' account of 
possible worlds. However the only attempt to do this results in a position quite 
different from that of Lewis, in fact, a position that is compatible with many 
forms of ersatzism. Its far from clear that a theory so radically different from 
Lewis' account could do everything that is required of Lewis' account. I f it is 
possible to give an account of a Lewisian theory of worlds that can do everything 
that genuine modal realism does and is compatible with metaphysical nihilism 
then a lot more work is needed to clarify exactly what this theory is and how it 
works. 
I suppose the reason that nihilism is seen to be low on ontological commitment is 
because it involves arguing for the existence of a very minimal sort of existent -
an empty world. This is hardly going to break the ontological bank, to carry on 
Lewis' economic metaphor. But the empty world is actually quite a big 
commitment for several reasons. Firstly as I have shown above, embracing its 
existence leads one to hold several other positions, which have varying degrees 
of ontological commitment, and rules out others. 
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Secondly we need to be careful with what we mean by ontological commitment. 
It is possible that the overall ontology required by a system invoking the empty 
world is smaller than that without it. But that does not mean that embracing the 
empty world is not a big commitment. A commitment to the non-existence of 
some entities is just as big as a commitment to their existence. What we should 
learn from parsimony principles is that we should not assume the existence or the 
non-existence of entities without arguing for them. Take for example the fact that 
accepting the empty world and Rodriguez-Pereyra's revised criterion for 
concreteness leads one to deny the existence of haecceities or essences. On a 
superficial reading of Ockham's razor this seems palatable - the fewer entities 
needed to explain the world the better. But with a deeper understanding of the 
point of Ockham's razor, we can see that we do not want a theory about one part 
of our metaphysics to accidentally rule out the existence of objects that might be 
necessary in another part of our ontology. The main point I am trying to make is 
that using naive principles of ontological economy in ontology itself can verge 
towards begging the question (see 2.2 above). We should adopt a principle of not 
accepting or denying the existence of any entities without weighing up the pros 
and cons of those entities in their entirety. Ruling out haecceities, which are 
prima facie irrelevant to the debate about metaphysical nihilism but central to 
that about actualism, on the basis only of considerations about nihilism is not 
going to contribute to a fully rounded ontology. 
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6 M E T A P H Y S I C A L N I H I L I S M 
My aim in this chapter is to look at metaphysical nihilism itself. It is important to 
remember that nihilism and the subtraction argument are two separate issues. In 
this chapter I want to find out exactly what nihilism is and what are the issues 
that motivate a nihilist to hold their position. 
At the end of the last chapter we saw that metaphysical nihilism and the 
subtraction argument, as they stand, are compatible with only a very limited form 
of ersatzism. However, nihilism itself seems prima facie to be compatible with a 
broader range of ersatz views. The main factor that limits the nihilist in her 
choice of possible world theories is not nihilism itself, or the subtraction 
argument per se. Rather it is a suppressed premise of the subtraction argument in 
all its published forms, namely the criterion of concreteness used by Baldwin and 
Rodriguez-Pereyra. This criterion rules out the existence of haecceities and 
essences. Because most ersatz views require the existence of some sort of 
essences, only the less robust theories of modality are left available to the 
unreconstructed metaphysical nihilist. 
This leads us to ask why the nihilist has used this particular criterion of 
concreteness and whether we could choose another without causing other 
problems for the nihilist. 
6.1 What is nihilism? 
There really are a vast number of different distinctions that use the terms 
'concrete' and 'abstract'. This means it is very hard to distinguish the 
philosophical issues surrounding the distinction from the terminological ones. 
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There is a sense in which these really are several different distinctions, which 
unfortunately have historically been described using the same two terms. In so 
far as this is the case there is not a serious philosophical issue at stake. 
However, to some extent, there is a serious philosophical issue. This is because 
in any given case, we need to decide which version of this distinction is the 
relevant one. In this thesis this is a really central and serious philosophical 
problem. The main question I am addressing is whether or not there is a world 
with no concrete objects. The sense in which this question is important and 
interesting and the answer we give to it all depend on what we mean by concrete. 
This is not a merely terminological issue but a core philosophical one: we have to 
work out what an empty world is. 
It has been an assumption of this discussion, not just in my thesis but also in all 
the other previous discussions,1 that an empty world might contain abstract 
objects. But it could be argued that by an empty world we mean a world with no 
abstract or concrete objects - no objects at all. We could call this position - that 
there could have been no abstract or concrete objects at all - absolute nihilism, in 
order to distinguish it from metaphysical nihilism. Absolute nihilism is a species 
of metaphysical nihilism - i f absolute nihilism is true (there is a world with no 
objects) then metaphysical nihilism is true (there is a world with no concrete 
objects). Answering my question (could there have been no concrete objects?) is 
a prerequisite for answering this other question (is there a world with no objects 
at all - no concrete and no abstract objects?). However, there are a few things 
1 Lowe, E . J . , "Why Is There Anything at All?: Ii," Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 
(1996), Van Inwagen, P., "Why Is There Anything at All?: I," Aristotelian Society Supplementary 
Volume (1996): 96. 
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that we can say here and now about what an answer to that other question might 
be. 
Lets return to some of the considerations in the last chapter: even if we do not 
adopt the container view we can still ask whether a world is itself concrete or 
abstract. In the compositional views the world is concrete. It is not surprising that 
those who hold these views do not really admit abstracta into their ontologies. 
Armstrong is, of course, a naturalist and so denies the existence of abstracta. 
Lewis denies there is any meaningful concrete / abstract distinction. The 
compositionalists think that the world and its contents are concrete, in so far as 
the word 'concrete' is useful at all. So the world with no concrete or abstract 
objects is just the same as the world with no concrete objects. They do not have 
to distinguish between these two questions. 
The ersatzers of course have to say that the merely possible worlds are all 
abstract things which exist in this world. I f one were to be an absolute nihilist -
to claim that there is a world with no abstract and no concrete objects, then I 
think one would have to be an ersatzer. This is because i f absolute nihilism is 
true there is a world where nothing exists, not even the world. In ersatzism, all 
that really matters is what exists at this world. So there could exist in this world 
an abstract object, according to which no abstract or concrete objects exist. This 
could be a world such that i f that world obtained there would be no abstract or 
concrete objects, including that world itself. Absolute nihilism is probably not 
even coherent when we work it out but I think it is obvious that the only way it 
could be true is i f ersatzism is true. 
I won't delve any further into absolute nihilism for now. Suffice to say that any 
progress we make towards solving the question of metaphysical nihilism wi l l 
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also help us on our way to solving the question of absolute nihilism. This 
distinction between absolute and metaphysical nihilism also reinforces the need 
to have a very clear definition of concreteness so that we know exactly what 
metaphysical nihilism is. This is the task we wil l turn to now. 
6.2 Criteria of concreteness 
What criterion of concreteness is relevant to metaphysical nihilism? In the 
controversial world where nothing concrete exists, what do we mean by 
'concrete'? Well, the obvious place to start our search for an answer to this 
question is by looking at the answers that have gone before. Baldwin suggested 
that failure to satisfy the identity of indiscernibles was the mark of concreteness. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra modified this so that non-vacuous failure to satisfy the 
identity of indiscernibles is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
concreteness. Lowe on the other hand suggests that a spatio-temporal criterion of 
concreteness be used. 
Neither Baldwin nor Rodriguez-Pereyra give any reasons for adopting failure to 
satisfy the identity of indiscernibles as their basic sign of concreteness.2 
Rodriguez-Pereyra does find Baldwin's account unsatisfactory on this count but 
just modifies it rather than questioning the use of the identity of indiscernibles in 
the first place. 
We saw (see 5.1.3.3 above) that this criterion greatly limits the range of views of 
worlds available to the metaphysical nihilist. So let's leave the identity of 
2 1 have asked Tom Baldwin why he chose this criterion and he seems to have just thought it was 
adequate for the task in hand. Given the disagreement about what the concrete / abstract 
distinction is, and the fact that much of the disagreement seems to be terminological, he just chose 
a criterion that seemed to do the job. 
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indiscernibles aside for now and try to think about the other options. But what 
are the other options? 
It would be very easy to beg the question here. One could decide that, for 
instance, there could have been nothing, and so look for a criterion of 
concreteness that is compatible with this account. In order to avoid this let's try 
and work out in an objective way, what an empty world would be. We need to 
consider what kinds of objects, i f any, could exist in an empty world. 
Take the empty world where no concrete objects exist. My aim is to work out i f 
this is possible. In order to do this we must define exactly what this position 
consists in. We must also look at worlds in which very little exists. We are 
unlikely to confuse the actual world where there is an abundance of concrete 
objects with the empty world. However, worlds with only few objects or objects 
whose concreteness is debatable may be hard to distinguish from the empty 
world. As a guideline we wil l want to say that any object which is such that if it 
existed in a world, that world would not be empty, is a concrete object. However 
this, on its own, is uninformative. We want to know what property or properties 
of objects it is that means that i f an object possessing them existed in a world then 
that world would not be empty. Let's start this investigation by looking into some 
of the accounts of the concrete/abstract distinction that are available and seeing 
how they f i t with our loose characterisation of what sort of object could make a 
world non-empty. We' l l need some criteria for choosing between these different 
criteria of concreteness so I suggest we look at the following questions when 
weighing up the pros and cons of the various criteria of concreteness: 
(i) Would an object that is concrete according to this criterion, make a world 
non-empty? I f so then we have captured the intuitive notion of 
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concreteness used in discussions of nihilism so far. It should be noted that 
it may be impossible for there to be just one object existing in the world, 
so it may be that no one object is itself sufficient to show that a world is 
non-empty. What is important is that we identify the kind of object that 
would make a world non-empty. Satisfying this criterion would mean that 
i f any object of a certain kind existed in a world then that world would be 
non-empty. Of course this criterion on its own is circular. We want to 
know what would make a world empty of concrete objects and we then 
define concrete objects as ones which make a world non-empty. However 
I think that this is a benign circularity. This is because although it does 
not give us an explanation at a lower level than what we had, it is 
nonetheless informative as it does focus us on the relevant issues. More 
importantly, its circularity is irrelevant as this is not the only question I 
am using, I am also using the following other questions. 
(ii) Does this criterion allow that our paradigmatic instances of concreteness 
e.g. tables, atoms, planets are concrete and our paradigmatic instances of 
abstractness e.g. numbers, pure sets are abstract? Failure to satisfy this 
criterion would indicate that it was not really dealing with the issues that 
are relevant to nihilism. 
(iii) Are there other philosophical problems, which have no prima facie 
connection to the problems of concreteness, which are raised by this 
criterion? I f so then these problems may make this criterion more 
problematic than its competitors. 
(iv) Does the criterion itself vary from world to world? I f so it may indicate 
that we are not really dividing reality into two kinds of objects in the 
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comprehensive and objective way that we expect to, using the abstract / 
concrete distinction. 
(v) How does this criterion compare to the other criteria? Each criterion wi l l 
meet some of my above requirements to a greater or lesser extent. I wi l l 
then need to compare the relative merits of the different criteria. I f one 
can incorporate all our intuitions about concreteness but rests on 
problematic foundations in some other branch of philosophy, this might 
have to be weighed against one which is counterintuitive but involves 
fewer philosophical problems. Also some accounts may be stronger or 
weaker than or coextensive with other accounts, in which case they may 
collapse into each other bringing some of their benefits and problems with 
them. 
6.2.1 The sense-perception account 
According to the sense-perception account, an object's concreteness is determined 
by whether or not that object can be sensed by us.3 Those objects which we can 
smell or touch or see, etc. are concrete, whereas those that are invisible and 
inaudible and so on, are abstract. This makes sense so far as abstract objects are 
concerned - sets, numbers, etc., all our paradigm examples of abstract objects are 
impossible to sense, but it's not clear that all objects that we commonly think of 
as concrete are possible to sense. 
The main problem with this account is the fallibility and inadequacies of those 
senses. For example, sub-atomic particles cannot be seen, as they are too small. 
Likewise they cannot be heard, tasted, etc. I f this criterion of concreteness were 
3 Hale, B. , Abstract Objects (New York: Blackwell, 1988)46-7. 
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correct then it would mean that concrete objects would be fundamentally 
constituted by abstract objects, which seems dubious. It could be argued that these 
types of thing could be sensed indirectly e.g. sub-atomic particles can be detected 
in a cloud chamber. This brings me on to my next point. 
There is some philosophical dispute as to what exactly can be sensed by humans. 
Do we sense physical objects like chairs and tables or do we sense light-rays or 
some sort of sense data? Here we get into issues about direct and indirect theories 
of perception. I f our senses directly encounter only some sort of sense data or 
something intermediate between us and the macro-physical objects in the world, 
then those macro-physical objects would not be concrete according to the sense-
perception account of concreteness. On the other hand i f we do sense chairs and 
tables directly then they are concrete. 
But it's hard to see how issues about perception can have anything to say about 
issues concerning modality. It's also strange to think that the many worlds with no 
sensory beings would be divided into concrete and non-concrete objects according 
to some phenomenon which is merely possible relative to those worlds. 
This brings us to the central problem with this account: it is anthropocentric. The 
distinction is based on the somewhat arbitrary human senses. But surely the 
senses could have been different. For example we could have had the sonar 
abilities that bats have as well as all the senses we actually have. In that case then 
the realm of concrete entities would perhaps have been larger. But i f this is 
possible then there is some possible world where we have that extra sense and 
perhaps others that we cannot imagine. So in the empty world, there would be no 
objects that could be perceived by the senses. But would it be no objects that can 
be perceived by the actual human senses? Or no objects that could be perceived 
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by any actual senses (including those of bats)? Or no objects that could be 
perceived by any possible senses? Surely either the second or third of these must 
be the case. It would be far too arbitrary to say that the actual human senses at 
this stage of evolution are somehow philosophically important. Similarly, it 
seems arbitrary to include only those extra senses that exist in the actual world 
without including others that may exist in other merely possible worlds. But then 
we have no idea what these other senses might be. I f we say that concrete objects 
are those objects that could be sensed by some possible or actual sense organ 
then we have very little idea what we actually mean by this. Add to this the gross 
anthropocentricity of assuming that this metaphysical issue about the possibility 
of nothing existing has anything to do with the senses and this account starts to 
seem very unsatisfactory. 
The only common factor that entities that could be sensed by some possible or 
actual sense organ would have in common is the ability to cause perceptions in 
some being or other. This means that the sense-perception account would 
ultimately collapse into the causal account of concreteness, which I discuss in the 
next section. 
Perhaps the idea behind this kind of account is not metaphysical. It is suggesting 
that our division of objects into concrete and abstract is just a way of dividing up 
the world that makes certain things easier without any suggestion that we are, so 
to speak, 'carving reality at the joints'. As such it makes sense to divide things up 
according to the arbitrary but important human senses. However there seems to 
be no reason that we should call this the abstract / concrete distinction. Yes, there 
is a distinction between those objects that can be sensed and those that cannot. 
However it is of limited metaphysical importance and certainly wi l l not help us 
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to work out i f there could have been an empty world or not. For these reasons I 
wil l not be using it further. As I acknowledged at the beginning, there are many 
distinctions that go under the name abstract / concrete and my aim is not once 
and for all to decide which if any of these it is correct to call by that name, but 
just to work out which one is relevant to this discussion. Whichever one I choose 
wil l have to have some hope of 'carving reality at the joints' rather than just 
appealing to something arbitrary like the human senses. Otherwise my main 
question wi l l slip from being a metaphysical question to one about the 
philosophy of mind or perception or epistemology, dealing with our way of 
thinking about things rather than those things themselves. 
6.2.2 The causal account 
There are two versions of the causal account.4 According to the first version, an 
object is concrete i f and only if it could be part of a causal chain i.e. i f it could be 
affected by a cause or i f it itself could cause changes. The second, stronger 
version claims that an object is abstract just i f it cannot be a cause. In the first 
case an abstract object enjoys complete causal isolation. In the second it merely 
lacks causal efficacy - it can be caused but cannot be a cause. 
Like the sense-perception account and Baldwin and Rodriguez-Pereyra's account 
in terms of failure to satisfy the identity of indiscernibles, this criterion seems to 
be satisfactory in putting most of the uncontroversially abstract objects in the 
right category. I f something is abstract then it probably cannot be part of a causal 
chain, just as it cannot be sensed. However is this sufficient to characterise our 
distinction? Certainly this account seems preferable to the sense-perception 
4 Ibid. 47-8. 
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account. There is a metaphysical distinction between those objects that can 
interact causally and those that cannot. This is because causation is a 
metaphysical issue in a way that the evolution of the human senses is not. So this 
account lacks the arbitrariness we saw in the sense-perception account. 
However this account does share another problem with the sense-perception 
account. Just as the philosophical questions about what kinds of things it is that 
are involved in perception are unsolved, so too are the philosophical questions 
about the details of causation. We don't know what the causal relata are. Perhaps 
events are the only causes. But i f this is the case then the causal criterion means 
that macro-physical objects like tables and chairs are not concrete. Similarly with 
other accounts of the causal relata - i f anything other than our paradigmatic 
instances of concrete objects are the causally active entities in the world then our 
account of concreteness wi l l be seriously flawed. 
One could try to rescue the causal criterion from this problem. For example we 
could say that it is not only the direct causes and effects which are concrete but 
also other entities which are somehow involved in causation. For example,5 i f 
events are the causal relata and so the only kind of entities that can cause or be 
caused, we could still claim that ordinary physical objects are concrete. The idea 
is that events are partially constituted by ordinary physical objects and couldn't 
happen without them. These objects are therefore a central ingredient in the 
causal process and so can be included in the realm of concreta. 
Let's look at the differences between the two versions of this account. The 
stronger account means that supervenient minds would not be concrete. 
5 This example was pointed out to me by Jonathan Lowe. 
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According to many supervenience theorists, minds can be affected causally but 
cannot themselves be causes. But it seems strange to suggest that an important 
element of ourselves is abstract. Surely I am concrete and so are all the 
philosophically significant elements of me like my mind. Maybe this is begging 
the question of whether or not being causally efficacious is equivalent with being 
concrete, but it is merely following out some common intuitions about 
concreteness. Perhaps people or people's minds are not in that inner core of 
paradigmatically concrete objects like tables and planets, but they are certainly 
not far removed and much closer to those macro-physical objects in terms of 
concreteness than they are to paradigmatically abstract objects like numbers. I f 
supervenient minds are concrete, then inability to be a cause is not equivalent to 
abstractness. 
What about the other version then - that something is abstract i f and only i f it 
cannot engage in any causal activity? There is one thing that all entities involved 
in causation wil l have in common: they wil l all exist in time. They wi l l probably 
all exist in both space and time but it is enough to say that they wi l l all exist in 
time. Whatever theory of causation we hold and whatever account of space and 
time we hold, we can be certain that causation only happens within a temporal 
framework. Similarly, it seems as though all objects that exist in time could 
possibly engage in causal interaction. (If we do not adopt Lowe's 6 strategy for 
dealing with languages and games, and accept that languages and games are 
concrete, then it is quite plausible that languages and games can engage in causal 
interaction e.g. being spoken, being played, being learnt, etc.) This means that any 
6 Lowe, E . J., "Objects and Criteria of Identity," in The Companion to the Philosophy of 
Language, ed. Hale, B. and Wright, C. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 627-9. 
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account that says that concrete objects are all and only those objects that can be 
causally efficacious, will be saying nothing different from someone who claims 
that concreta are all and only those entities which exist in time. This is a version 
of the spatio-temporal criterion of concreteness, so let's look at it now and see i f 
we can do away with all reference to causation in our characterisation of 
concreteness and just use temporality. 
6.2.3 The spatio-temporal account 
Like the causal criterion there are two versions of the spatio-temporal criterion. 
Some claim that abstract objects are just non-spatial (weak criterion) whereas 
others claim they must be non-temporal too (strong criterion.) According to the 
strong criterion, only such paradigmatically abstract objects as numbers and sets 
are abstract. The weaker criterion on the other hand admits other objects such as 
souls or non-physical minds to the realm of the abstract. 
Let's look at the weaker criterion first. There appears to be a problem with this 
criterion because it makes Cartesian minds abstract. 
For our purposes, it seems that a world with a Cartesian mind must differ from 
the null world. A world containing any thinking being is surely not empty. This 
doesn't mean that I am claiming that Cartesian minds exist, but I am trying to 
work out what sorts of things would be concrete i f they did exist and it seems 
that Cartesian minds would. So the weak criterion cannot be what we are looking 
for. 
What about the strong criterion? It allows Cartesian minds to be concrete, as they 
exist in time. It also allows supervenient minds to be concrete, as they also exist 
in time and perhaps also space. In fact it seems hard to imagine anything that 
146 
Metaphysical Nihilism 
exists in space but not in time. We have seen some putative examples of entities 
existing in time but not in space but it is almost impossible to think of one that is 
the other way around. I f this is the case then we could reduce the strong criterion 
to: an object is concrete i f and only i f it exists in time. I f all temporal entities are 
also spatial then this criterion is co-extensive with our original formulation of it, 
which was that an object is concrete i f and only i f it exists in space and in time. 
The only thing that could perhaps be said to exist only in space but not in time is 
perhaps time itself. Does space exist in time and time in space? I f so they could 
both be accepted as concrete entities under this criterion. However this seems 
confused. First of all it is usual now to speak of space-time as one interconnected 
thing rather than two separate phenomena. Secondly, neither space nor time are 
objects. Objects have persistence conditions and criteria of identity and so on, 
whereas time, at least, can't be said to have these features.7 Thirdly, there doesn't 
really seem to be any sense in which time exists in space. Things that exist in 
space are spatially extended and have shapes, sizes, etc.8 Likewise it's hard to 
make sense of space existing in time. It seems better to consider time and space as 
being neither abstract nor concrete as they are not objects of any sort and so are 
neither abstract objects nor concrete objects. 
One potential problem with the strong criterion is the fact that this criterion 
appears to allow more objects than we require into the realm of the concrete. 
Hale 9 cites the English language and the game of chess as examples. According 
7 This question is discussed in more detail and historical context in Earman, J . , World Enough and 
Space-Time (London: MIT Press, 1989) 111-6. 
8 Admittedly some fundamental particles appear not to have some of these properties but they do 
have other properties that only spatial objects have such as spin, flavour, etc. 
9 Hale, Abstract Objects 48-50. 
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to this line of thought, these objects started to exist at a certain time in the history 
of the universe. English did not exist before anyone spoke English; chess did not 
exist before there were any thinking beings or chess pieces and chessboards. And 
so these objects are temporal i f not spatial. But this means that languages and 
games are concrete, which seems strange. I f a world contained only the English 
language I do not think it would be significantly different from the null world or 
a world, which contained, say only the Irish language. At least, not different in a 
way which affects my main question. So it seems that i f this criterion makes 
languages concrete then it may not be the correct criterion for using in 
discussions of metaphysical nihilism. 
There are two ways out of this problem - either we can accept that our intuitions 
may be incorrect and languages and games are concrete or we could reclassify 
languages and games, etc. as non-temporal entities. 
What would happen if we just admitted that languages and games are concrete? 
They are not amongst our paradigmatic examples of abstract objects like 
numbers and sets. They also depend in some sense on human beings who are 
obviously highly contingent existents. These are reasons for us to suppose that 
our initial vague intuition that these should be abstract may be flawed and it 
might be all right to admit them into the realm of the concrete. Whilst we do 
want to develop an account of concreteness that doesn't violate our strongly felt 
intuitions about abstract and concrete objects, we must admit that some of our 
less central beliefs about abstractness and concreteness may be corrected by a 
fully thought-out theory of abstractness and concreteness. This is a good thing in 
a theory - our metaphysics and our philosophy in general is not a mere 
formalisation of all our intuitions. It does involve consulting those intuitions but 
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it also involves filtering and reconsidering them so that we decide which are 
most likely to be true, and so should be retained by our philosophy, and which 
are not. Once we have worked out a functioning philosophical theory, we may 
see why some of our previous intuitions are wrong. This is why it is all right to 
accept that languages may be concrete even though we initially thought that they 
were abstract, whereas it would not be all right to come up with a theory of 
concreteness according to which atoms or tables are abstract. 
Alternatively, i f we re-classify languages and games as non-temporal entities, 
then they are abstract entities, according to the strong criterion. 1 0 This would 
mean that languages and games, etc. exist atemporally and it is only their 
instantiations, or instances of their use, that exist in time. Just as, say, redness is 
an atemporal, abstract thing whereas red jumpers are temporal concrete entities. 
As Lowe says (he is using biological species as his example rather than a 
language): 
The solution is to distinguish between biological species, which are 
concrete individuals consisting at any time of the mereological sum of their 
currently existing members (particular tigers or particular oaks), and 
biological sorts or kinds, which are universals instantiated by the members 
of those species ... Thus we can say that the horse species at one time did 
not exist and has evolved over millennia as its individual members have 
gradually taken on different morphological features, but the kind horse 
which all these past and present individual horses instantiate never 'came 
into' existence and has not itself undergone change.11 
So it seems as though this is not such a serious problem for the advocate of the 
strong spatio-temporal criterion - there are two ways out available. 
This is the account suggested in Lowe, "Objects and Criteria of Identity," 627-9. 
1 1 Ibid., 629. 
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Another question arises for this criterion about God. I f a god exists, does she exist 
in space or time or both? I f she is a causal agent, as is generally assumed then she 
must at least exist in time. Then she is concrete under the strong criterion. I think 
that this makes sense. Then i f there could be a god at all, i f there was a world 
containing nothing but a god, that world would not be empty. Perhaps this god 
chose not to create anything else, for example. 
What about the other problems that we considered in the cases of the sense 
perception and causal criteria? Well, like the causal criterion the spatio-temporal 
criterion seems to capture most of our intuitions about the abstract / concrete 
distinction. Paradigmatic cases of concreteness like medium sized physical 
objects obviously exist in time and so are concrete whereas paradigm cases of 
abstracta like numbers do not exist in time and so are not concrete.12 
The space-time criterion also lacks arbitrariness. There is a real metaphysical 
distinction between objects that exist in time and those that don't in a way that 
there isn't between objects we can sense and objects that we can't sense. So we do 
seem to be carving reality at the joints in dividing it into the temporal and the 
atemporal. 
It's important, here, to distinguish two properties: (i) being in a certain temporal 
location, which is surely relational - determined by the object's relation to other 
objects or to an absolute temporal framework (this is why Baldwin can use it to 
1 2 1 am assuming a non-constructivist account of numbers here. This is a subject of controversy but 
the non-constructivist account, which I am assuming, is the less controversial side of the 
argument. I don't have the time or space to go into this debate here. Anyone who is a 
constructivist about numbers might disagree with what I am saying here. But my main claim is 
just that this criterion agrees with the intuitions of most of us. If there are good philosophical 
reasons for being constructivists, that means those intuitions are wrong but doesn't mean that 
temporality is not the criterion of concreteness. It just means that the argument from intuitions to 
that conclusion must be abandoned. Given the weakness of arguments from intuitions I am not 
putting much weight on this point and so this is not a serious problem. 
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differentiate between two objects that share all their intrinsic properties), (ii) 
Being temporally located, which is a different property. It could be said, for 
example, that being temporally located is an essential property of physical objects 
- a table could not exist without existing in time - whereas being at a given 
temporal location is a contingent matter - the table could have existed at a 
different point in time. So while reference to temporal location would be an 
arbitrary way of dividing the world up, temporal locatedness is a more significant 
metaphysical feature. 
The philosophy of space and time is, of course, far from cut and dry. Just as with 
the problem of the relata of causation and the questions about indirect perception, 
could it be the case that other philosophical problems cause trouble for the spatio-
temporal criterion? It think not. In the case of causation, for example, we saw that 
the very objects whose concreteness we wanted to assert - medium sized physical 
objects - may not actually be the objects that are causally efficacious. Likewise 
with the sense-perception account, we saw that it might be sense data that are 
perceived, meaning that our paradigmatic cases of concreteness are not concrete. 
Although the philosophy of space and time is ful l of unsolved problems, none of 
them is as serious for the space-time criterion of concreteness as those analogous 
problems are for the other accounts. This is because there is little i f any 
philosophical debate about what objects are temporal. Certainly there are issues 
about persistence in time - do tables and chairs continue to exist over a period of 
time or are they made up of temporal parts which themselves exist only 
instantaneously? But in either case, we would want to say that all these things are 
temporal and also concrete. I f objects consist of temporal parts, these parts are 
temporal even i f they do not persist over a period of time. Likewise the tables and 
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chairs that are the sums of these temporal parts are in some sense temporal as they 
are made up of temporal parts. I f tables and chairs themselves persist then they 
are unproblematically temporal and concrete. So it seems as though the problems 
in the philosophy of time are less of a difficulty for the temporal criterion of 
concreteness than the problems in the philosophy of causation and perception are 
to the other two accounts we have considered. 
Another problem that we saw with the causal and to a greater extent the sense-
perception accounts is that the phenomena in question might themselves vary 
from world to world. This does not seem to be the case with the temporal 
criterion. I f something exists in time in this world then it seems that it is not the 
case that it could have not existed in time. This adds to the sense that this criterion 
is really dividing reality along a fairly significant joint. Any temporal thing like 
my pen or my cat could not have been atemporal. They could have not existed at 
all. They could have been imagined in a world where they did not exist, but they 
themselves must be temporal in any world where they do exist. This seems to f i t 
with another intuition we have about the abstract / concrete distinction, namely 
that if something is concrete it could not have been abstract. It may be that 
something is concrete in this world, e.g. me, and that my essence might have 
existed without me in another world as an abstract object. But my essence is not 
me. It is a property and I am not. I f something is temporal then it is essentially 
temporal. Likewise, it seems plausible that if something is concrete it is 
essentially concrete. This gives more reason to accept that temporality is 
necessary and sufficient for concreteness. 
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Another question is whether we want a world with empty space and time to be 
distinct from the null world. It has been suggested to me, 1 3 that it would make a 
difference. I f we accept that a world with empty 3-dimensional space is different 
from a world with empty 2-dimensional space then surely the world with 3-
dimensional space is different from the null world. However it is dubious as to 
whether any sort of empty space is possible (this is discussed in 5.1.3.2 above). It 
therefore seems even more questionable to suggest that there are different kinds of 
empty space. 
Gary Rosenkrantz suggests the following counterexample to the spatio-temporal 
criterion of concreteness. 
... there could be a static world containing a non-spatial thinking substance 
engaged in an atemporal contemplation of eternal truths. Yet it seems that a 
possible soul of this sort may possess [unrealised] potentialities to undergo 
intrinsic psychic changes or [unexercised] powers to bring about changes. 
Although an atemporally, non-spatial, thinking substance having such 
potentialities or causal powers would surely be a concretum, it obviously 
would not stand in spatial or temporal relations.14 
I don't find this example very convincing. It is primarily the atemporal 
contemplation that worries me. I can see that there may be atemporal or eternal 
truths but its not clear how there could be atemporal contemplation of those 
truths. Surely contemplation is a process that goes on over a period of time? So 
whilst Rosenkrantz's example aims to show that an entity that merits being 
termed 'concrete' could fail to exist in space and time, I claim that the entity he 
describes could not fail to exist in time and so satisfies this criterion of 
concreteness. 
1 3 This was suggested to me by Killian O'Brien. 
1 4 Rosenkrantz, G. Review of The Possibility of Metaphysics by Lowe, E. J. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research L X I V (2002): 728-36. 
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So, i f we define a concrete object as one which would distinguish an otherwise 
empty world from the null world, then which of these accounts is most 
appropriate for our discussion? It seems that both the strong version of the spatio-
temporal account and the causal account are contenders. The spatio-temporal 
criterion seems to have more going for it for three reasons. Firstly the problems in 
the philosophy of causation pose more complications for someone using this as 
their criterion than the problems of time do for a supporter of the temporal 
criterion. This is not to say that the philosophy of time is less problematic than the 
philosophy of causation but just that the problems it throws up have less effect on 
this issue than the analogous problems from the philosophy of causation. 
Secondly, i f something is temporal then it is essentially temporal and if something 
is concrete then it is necessarily concrete. Again the case for the causal criterion 
seems more problematic than this. Thirdly, the causal criterion includes the 
temporal criterion as nothing can potentially engage in causal interaction without 
existing in time and vice versa. So we may as well avoid the references to 
causation and the philosophical problems associated with it, as the temporal 
account is more or less co-extensive with the causal account but less problematic. 
So perhaps the spatio-temporal (or, as I pointed out above, temporal) criterion of 
concreteness is the one we should use. This criterion is obviously carving reality 
at the joints. This is reinforced by the fact that it seems to give us a condition 
which does not vary from world to world. It also guarantees that all our 
paradigmatic cases of abstract and concrete objects fall into the right categories. 
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6.2.4 Identity of indiscernibles 
So the temporal criterion is better and more appropriate than the other criteria we 
have considered but how does it compare with Baldwin and Rodriguez-Pereyra's 
use of failure to satisfy the identity of indiscernibles as the mark of concreteness? 
Well, this criterion of concreteness is incompatible with a robust ersatz account of 
worlds. In the absence of a ful ly worked out non-ersatz account of worlds that is 
compatible with nihilism, a robust ersatzism is the only fully worked out account 
of possible worlds the nihilist can rely on (as we saw in 5.1.3.3 above). This 
would mean that nihilism is false (if a robust ersatzism is true). But perhaps it is 
nonetheless the correct criterion to use in this case. As I said earlier, in order to 
avoid circularity and question begging in our decision about which criterion of 
concreteness is appropriate for this discussion, the decision has to be made 
without taking that sort of consideration into account. We must not choose (or 
reject) a criterion of concreteness simply because it makes nihilism true. So let's 
see how the criterion of failure to satisfy the identity of indiscernibles fares in 
comparison to that of temporality. 
When Rodriguez-Pereyra and Baldwin discuss this issue they ask about unit sets, 
parts of spatio-temporal objects and spatio-temporal regions. Why do they discuss 
these particular cases? Well, it is because a crucial step in Baldwin's original 
subtraction argument is that there could be a finite number of concrete objects. I f 
unit sets, parts of spatio-temporal objects or spatio-temporal regions are concrete 
objects then this premise may well be false. I wi l l take a different approach. As I 
stated above, I think it is important to find the version of the abstract / concrete 
distinction that gives us the most accurate understanding of nihilism. In trying to 
find a version of the distinction, which fits in with the premise of his argument, 
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Baldwin is in a sense begging this question. I wi l l consider issues thrown up by 
consideration of parts of concrete objects, unit sets, etc. only in an objective way, 
just as I have been considering other issues above. My hope is that by doing this I 
wil l find the version of the distinction most appropriate to nihilism and only then 
try to construct an argument for it. 
So let's recall exactly what Baldwin and Rodriguez-Pereyra's criteria are. 
Baldwin states that: 
I shall take it that the primary mark of concreteness is failure to satisfy the 
identity of indiscernibles.15 
Whereas Rodriguez-Pereyra's16 final version is that a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for concreteness is non-vacuous failure to satisfy the identity of 
indiscernibles. 
So let's try and work out i f either Baldwin's or Rodriguez-Pereyra's criteria can 
meet my requirements for relevance to the question of metaphysical nihilism. 
Do they mean that paradigm cases of concreteness like tables and planets are 
concrete whilst paradigm cases of abstractness, like numbers, are abstract? They 
seem to do so. Tables and chairs wi l l fail to satisfy the identity of indiscernibles, 
as each one wi l l have different relational properties. Numbers however do satisfy 
the identity of indiscernibles; anything, which shares all the intrinsic properties of 
the number 2, must be the number 2. But we still don't know i f it is the 
distinction, which is relevant to the characterisation of the empty world. 
1 5 Baldwin, "There Might Be Nothing," 233. 
1 6 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "There Might Be Nothing," 165. 
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Are Baldwin and Rodriguez-Pereyra using philosophical notions which are more 
problematic than those they are trying to explain? In 4.2.2 above I pointed out the 
difficulties in distinguishing intrinsic and relational properties. It is not clear 
where we draw the line or on what basis the line should be drawn. This means 
that there is some philosophical disagreement as to what is an intrinsic property of 
an object. This is an indication that by using intrinsicness in our characterisation 
of concreteness we may be adding to the philosophical problems rather than 
reducing them. 
What about the sense that we are in some way carving reality at the joints? Have 
Baldwin and Rodriguez-Pereyra picked out a genuine metaphysical distinction? 
This criterion has advantages over the sense-perception criterion as however we 
cash out the identity of indiscernibles, it is not something that wi l l vary from 
world to world. I f we can find a version of it that works then we wil l know that 
we have found something that works in all possible worlds and so has a degree of 
objectivity. 
17 
Baldwin says that his identity of indiscernibles - based criterion is intimately 
linked with spatio-temporality. Does this mean that his criterion is closely related 
to the spatio-temporal criterion? No, I don't think that it does. He is using spatio-
temporality not as a criterion of concreteness but as a criterion of identity for 
objects. He says that two objects, which share all their intrinsic properties, can be 
differentiated on the basis of their spatio-temporal location. This is very different 
from saying that something is concrete i f and only i f it is located in space and 
time. 
Baldwin, "There Might Be Nothing," 233. 
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I f Lewis is right about worlds then I think that there may be another problem for 
this criterion of concreteness. Space-time may not be the only way of 
distinguishing otherwise indiscernible concreta. Consider the question of 
duplicate worlds. Lewis 1 8 says he is agnostic as to whether any worlds have 
duplicates, just like themselves but distinct. He does say that i f there are 
duplicates then there are probably an infinite number of them as any finite number 
of duplicates would just be too arbitrary. Lewis admits that no particularly 
important philosophical point seems to hang on this issue and so is happy to be 
undecided on i t . 1 9 So why am I bringing it up? Well, Baldwin mentions spatio-
temporal location as a way of distinguishing between otherwise similar concrete 
objects. But in the case of duplicate Lewisian worlds this is not an option. The 
worlds have distinct space-times of their own. This means that they are not at any 
spatio-temporal distance from each other. They have no location relative to each 
other as there is no one space-time which includes both worlds. 
What does this tell us? Well, i f there are duplicate concrete worlds, then they are 
indistinguishable - they have all the same properties - and they cannot be 
differentiated by giving their spatio-temporal locations. So i f these duplicate 
worlds exist, they pose a counter example to Baldwin's criterion as it stands. 
There are two ways out of this problem. First of all Baldwin could say that his 
criterion means that there cannot be duplicate concrete worlds. Any entities that 
Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds 87. Although Lewis has recently expressed a preference for 
denying the existence of duplicate worlds (Lewis, D., "Truthmaking and Difference-Making," 
Nous 35 (2001): 606.) 
1 9 This is disputed in Divers, J . , "On the Prohibitive Cost of Indiscernible Concrete Possible 
Worlds," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1994). 
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can have all the same intrinsic properties as each other and cannot be 
differentiated on the basis of spatio-temporal location must be abstract. 
The other option is to adapt the criterion of concreteness so that there are other 
non-spatio-temporal ways of distinguishing between duplicate worlds. However 
it's not at all clear how we could do this. What is it that distinguishes duplicate 
worlds i f they exist? 
Given that little of philosophical importance seems to hang on the existence or 
non-existence of duplicate worlds, it would be acceptable for Baldwin to take the 
first way out and just deny their existence. However it is another effect of 
Baldwin and Rodriguez-Pereyra's acceptance of the identity of indiscernibles 
criterion without adequate reasons. Given the importance of the notion of 
concreteness to the question of whether or not there are any concrete objects, this 
just illustrates the unexpected philosophical positions that can fall out of adopting 
a particular criterion of concreteness. This is another reason why this extended 
discussion about which criterion of concreteness is relevant to the question of 
metaphysical nihilism is so important and must be decided on objective grounds 
rather than simply adapting what has gone before. 
This is only an issue for a Lewisian, as the ersatzer wil l claim that worlds are 
abstracta of some sort. It should be noted that Baldwin 2 0 accepts some sort of 
ersatzism and so this problem wil l not be an issue for him. However Rodriguez-
21 
Pereyra accepts something like a Lewisian view and so may be susceptible to 
this question about duplicate worlds. 
2 0 Baldwin, Contemporary Philosophy 140-3. 
2 1 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Modal Realism and Metaphysical Nihilism". 
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Looking at Rodriguez-Pereyra's22 account, he introduces the non-vacuous 
element in order to ensure that space-time points are not concrete (see 4.3.3 
above). However, this is an example of the question begging that I am anxious to 
avoid. He is trying to ensure that there are no concrete objects in a world with 
only empty absolute space-time. But this is motivated by his desire to create a 
successful argument for nihilism, not by an objective investigation into what 
criterion of concreteness is most appropriate for a discussion of nihilism. 
So, all in all, how does this identity of indiscernibles account fare when compared 
with our previous favourite - the temporal account? I think that the temporal 
account still comes out the better. This is because the identity of indiscernibles 
account is plagued by those philosophical problems about intrinsicness. There are 
no corresponding problems for the supporter of the temporal account. I f we were 
to drop the clause about intrinsic properties, then the criterion would be that: an 
object is concrete i f and only i f it could share all its properties with another object. 
' A l l its properties' would include its intrinsic and relational properties, although 
we would not distinguish them by those names. This would include its spatio-
temporal properties. But surely nothing can share all its properties - its spatio-
temporal or relational properties and its intrinsic properties with anything else. 
We can imagine, I suppose, a statue that was created from of a lump of bronze at 
the exact same time as that lump of bronze came into existence. Imagine then that 
both the statue and the lump of bronze were then destroyed at the same time as 
well. These two objects would share all their spatio-temporal properties. However 
they still would not share their intrinsic properties or even all their relational 
properties. For example, the statue might have the property of being aesthetically 
2 2 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "There Might Be Nothing," 165. 
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pleasing while the lump of bronze might not. Or the statue might have the 
property of being the finest work by a particular artist while the lump of bronze 
would not. 
So it seems as though the best way out is use the temporal criterion. This places 
our paradigm examples of concreteness and abstractness in the appropriate 
categories. It avoids added philosophical difficulties from the philosophy of time. 
This is where is has the advantage on the causal and the identity of indiscernibles 
accounts. The criterion itself does not vary from world to world - what it is for 
something to exist in time is the same in all possible worlds. And a world where 
there are objects, which exist in time, does seem to be significantly different from 
the empty world. The temporal criterion also gives us a realm of concreta which is 
more or less co-extensive with that given by the causal criterion. So those who 
favour the causal account can retain its benefits whilst losing its problems by 
adopting the temporal criterion. 
6.2.5 Other accounts of concreteness 
There are many different accounts of the abstract / concrete distinction and I 
won't be able to discuss them all. I hope I have at least mentioned the most 
discussed and most plausible ones. There are a few others, however, which I 
should mention - those of Dummett, Hale and Teichman. 
The problems with Dummett's account are discussed extensively by Hale23 and 
Teichman.24 Dummett's account doesn't draw a sharp distinction between 
Hale, Abstract Objects. 
2 4 Teichman, R., Abstract Entities (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992) 59ff. 
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abstract and concrete and I am sure that the account needed for discussing 
nihilism must make a decisive distinction. 
Hale's25 own account has received serious criticisms from Lowe26 who claims 
that Hale's version of the distinction falsely classifies some typically abstract 
objects as concrete. 
A third account of the distinction is given by Teichman.27 Teichman's account 
(as well as Hale's and Dummett's) is logico-linguistic in its basis. It starts from 
an analysis of how we use certain terms like 'abstract'. Through this analysis of 
the language or logic of certain terms, an account of the difference between 
abstract and concrete is derrived. These accounts discuss 'abstract terms' rather 
than 'abstract entities'. To whatever extent they do discuss abstract entities, it is 
only in so far as light is shed on their nature by the discussion of abstract terms. 
It seems to me that this is not the best way of going about metaphysical inquiry. 
If we want to know the nature of reality itself, it seems that looking directly at 
reality rather than looking at our representations of it and rules for discussing it, 
would be the most successful route. Arguments against this way of doing 
metaphysics in general are given by Lowe.28 
In particular we are trying to work out what is the criterion for concreteness 
which is relevant to the discussion of metaphysical nihilism: if there could have 
been no concrete entities (or if there necessarily are concrete entities), what are 
Hale, Abstract Objects. 
2 6 Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics 51-3. 
2 7 Teichman, Abstract Entities. 
2 8 Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics 6-8. 
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concrete entities? These language-based approaches will not meet my criterion 
(iii) forjudging accounts of the abstract / concrete distinction. This is because, as 
well as all the metaphysical issues surrounding the nature of abstractness, these 
criteria will bring in other philosophical issues which have no obvious 
connection to the philosophy of modality, particularly concerns about the nature 
of language and meaning. 
All in all the temporal account of concreteness seems preferable to these other 
accounts, at least for discussions of metaphysical nihilism. It is cutting to the 
point by taking into account only metaphysical issues. The temporal criterion is 
primarily an account of what it is for something to be concrete or abstract and 
only secondarily an account of the nature of abstract and concrete terms. With 
these other accounts, the priority is the other way around. 
6.2.6 A new criterion of concreteness and possible world theories 
Well, now we have decided in an objective way which criterion of concreteness is 
suitable to this discussion, let's see whether it solves the problem I raised in 
5.1.3.3 above for the metaphysical nihilist. My argument was that the subtraction 
argument with its failure to satisfy the identity of indiscernibles criterion of 
concreteness was not compatible with any fully worked out, robust account of 
worlds. How does the new criterion fare on this score? If it fails then nihilism 
itself must fail (unless some other accounts of possible worlds, like that suggested 
by Rodriguez-Pereyra, can be fully cashed out and found to be compatible with 
nihilism and powerful enough to do the work we require of an account of possible 
worlds). If it succeeds then that is an indication that nihilism at least appears to be 
compatible with a strong account of modality. The challenge will then be to find a 
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new argument or a new version of the old argument that would lead us to 
nihilism. 
Well, the answer is that nihilism does now appear to be compatible with a robust 
account of worlds. If concrete objects are objects that exist in time then there is no 
problem with those objects having haecceities or essences. (At least there is no 
obvious contradiction as there is in the case of Baldwin and Rodriguez-Pereyra's 
criterion. There are of course philosophers who disagree with the existence of 
haecceities for other reasons but my task at present is just to work out if there is a 
strong and coherent position available to the nihilist.) 
We have established that metaphysical nihilism is compatible with at least one 
plausible account of worlds - the ersatz account. But does ersatzism entail 
nihilism? If the ersatz account is true does metaphysical nihilism have to be true? 
29 
It seems not. Lowe holds an account of possible worlds that conforms to the 
outline I have given of the ersatz account. Yet he denies that metaphysical 
nihilism is correct.30 He claims that possible worlds are maximally consistent 
situations. He also claims that there is no maximally consistent situation, which 
involves the existence of no concrete objects. There are of course consistent 
situations that don't require the existence of concrete objects. But they are not 
maximally consistent. 
This is because he claims that (i) abstract objects are necessary, (ii) abstract 
objects depend for their existence on concrete objects and hence (iii) there is no 
possible world without concrete objects. If abstract objects are necessary there is 
2 9 Lowe, E . J. , A Survey of Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 115-33. 
3 0 Lowe, "Why Is There Anything at All?.", Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics 248-59. 
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no maximally consistent situation according to which they do not exist. I f their 
existence in turn requires the existence of concrete objects then there is no 
maximally consistent situation according to which no concrete objects exist. 
Hence there is no possible world according to which there are no concrete 
objects. (This argument is discussed in more detail in 7.4.1 below.) 
So although the ersatz account of worlds is compatible with metaphysical 
nihilism, the ersatz account does not entail metaphysical nihilism; it is also 
compatible with the denial of metaphysical nihilism. 
That being the case, we can now consider whether we can reconstruct the 
subtraction argument or some other argument for nihilism using our new criterion 
of concreteness (this is the aim of chapter 7 below). However, that will require 
moving our attention from nihilism itself to the subtraction argument. Before we 
finish our exploration of nihilism, and as a preliminary to actually looking at the 
subtraction argument, it is important to look at the motivation for nihilism - why 
would anyone be tempted to be a metaphysical nihilist in the first place? 
6.3 The motivation for nihilism 
So now we have worked out what the metaphysical nihilist's claim is: there is a 
world with no concrete objects, where by concrete we mean existing in time. 
Before trying to reconstruct the subtraction argument in a formal way so that its 
conclusion is this claim, let's look at the sort of reasons one might have for 
believing this claim. What would lead one to believe in metaphysical nihilism? 
What intuitions or other beliefs would lead us to postulate that it is true and so 
needs an argument in its defence? 
Metaphysical Nihilism 
The nihilist could say something like this: 'Of course there could have been 
nothing - the big bang could have been bigger or smaller than it actually was. By 
this we mean that it could have involved more or less energy than it actually did. 
And from here it is a small step to claim that it could have not happened at all.' 
Now if the big bang hadn't happened at all we wouldn't be here to talk about it -
it is a necessary condition for wondering whether or not the big bang was 
necessary that the big bang happened. It is not a necessary condition of such 
wondering that the big bang was necessary. Likewise if the big bang had been 
slightly larger or smaller than it actually was we wouldn't be here to wonder 
about it . 3 1 
Now it's not clear that this argument works. Firstly it could be said that although 
we have reason to believe that the big bang could have been bigger or smaller, to 
assume that it could have not happened at all, seems to beg the question of 
metaphysical nihilism. 
On the other hand our aim here is merely to give intuitive support for nihilism -
to show us that our intuitions support the sort of claim that nihilism makes. In 
this sense, question begging is irrelevant here. We are not trying to argue for 
nihilism in a formal way, just trying to see if we pre-philosophically think it 
might be true and hence something worth developing a proper argument for. 
Secondly it's not obvious that these intuitions do lead to nihilism. If the big bang 
hadn't happened then does that mean there would have been nothing? This seems 
like a question that physicists rather than metaphysicians should answer at least in 
3 1 At least that is what the cosmologists who discuss the anthropic principle claim (see Barrow, J . 
D. and F . J. Tippler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 
Corey, M. A., God and the New Design: The Anthropic Design Argument (Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1993).) 
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part. It depends on issues such as whether space, time and energy 'start' at the big 
bang. These issues are too complicated and tangential to look at here but we need 
to bear in mind that merely stipulating that the big bang could have not occurred 
does not obviously entail that metaphysical nihilism is a possibility. 
If we did accept this argument from the contingency of the big bang to 
metaphysical nihilism, then would we have to claim that arguments from the 
nature of the plurality of worlds to the non-existence of the empty world work 
the wrong way around? This argument is that it's, in a way, obvious that there 
could have been nothing and we need a theory of modality that takes this into 
account. Ersatzism, combined with an appropriate account of concreteness 
should be able to do this. So this question about whether or not there could have 
been nothing should be prior to our account of what a possible world is. But my 
thesis is going in the other direction - it is looking at possible worlds first and 
then secondly at whether or not there are any empty ones. Why is this? Well, the 
rationale was to first of all work out what is it for something to be possible (the 
different accounts of possible worlds seek to answer this question) and then 
whether or not certain given situations (metaphysical nihilism, a necessary 
existent, etc.) are possible. 
How can I reconcile (i) the claim that our investigation into the nature of 
possibility and necessity (using the possible world frameworks) is prior to the 
question of what really is possible or necessary and (ii) the idea that if we have a 
good argument to suggest that there could have been nothing then our theory of 
possible worlds has to take this into account? Well, perhaps we need to abandon 
a very strict foundationalism and adopt a reflective equilibrium approach. On this 
account we could say that all things being equal we need to work out what it is 
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for something to be necessary or possible and then consider the question of what 
really is possible and whether anything really is necessary. I f the arguments we 
come up with here have repercussions for our theories of possible worlds then we 
need to go back to these. This may lead to revisions and perhaps returning to the 
other question again and so on. If we were to try to do philosophy in any other 
way it would be in vain as there is always a degree of uncertainty in these issues. 
This means that we may have a new argument for ersatzism. If we can 
reconstruct the subtraction argument, or indeed any other sound argument for 
metaphysical nihilism, then that would be a reason for accepting what I have 
called an 'ersatz' view of worlds. The argument would run: (i) metaphysical 
nihilism is correct: there could have been nothing (ii) the only fully worked out 
account of worlds that is compatible with metaphysical nihilism is an ersatz 
account, therefore (iii) an ersatz account of worlds must be right. So if we do find 
a sound argument for nihilism, an added benefit of it will be that we have 
clarified some of the questions surrounding the nature of possible worlds. So 
solving one of the problems about the nature of modality (is it necessary that 
something exist?) will enlighten us on the other key question (what is it for 
something to be necessary / possible?) We have already seen this working in 
reverse - what theory of worlds you hold has an effect on whether or not you can 
legitimately be a nihilist. Now we are seeing the converse of this - whether or 
not you are a nihilist can affect the theory of worlds that you ought to hold. 
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7 CAN W E SAVE T H E SUBTRACTION ARGUMENT? 
My aim in this chapter is to try to construct the strongest possible version of the 
subtraction argument for metaphysical nihilism. This means looking back at the 
problems I have found for the nihilist in the last few chapters and adjusting the 
arguments for nihilism so that these criticisms are, as far as possible, avoided. As 
well as this I will be considering the arguments of those philosophers who 
disagree with metaphysical nihilism and seeing how this new subtraction 
argument fares against their criticisms. 
Baldwin1 points out that Lewis, Armstrong, Van Inwagen2 and Lowe all give 
arguments against the possibility of there being nothing. Lewis'3 account of 
worlds sees them as mereological sums. As there is no null sum there is no empty 
world. Armstrong4 sees worlds as maximal states of affairs and claims that the 
state of affairs of there being nothing is not a state of affairs at all. Van Inwagen5 
claims that although the existence of a possible world with no concrete objects 
may be technically possible it is extraordinarily improbable. And Lowe6 claims 
that abstracta exist in every world but depend ontologically on concrete objects 
so each world must contain concrete objects. 
1 Baldwin, "There Might Be Nothing," 231. 
2 Van Inwagen's claim is slightly different from the claims of the other philosophers listed as he 
claims that metaphysical nihilism is strictly possible but highly improbable. 
3 Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds 73ff. 
4 Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility 24-5. 
5 Van Inwagen, "Why Is There Anything at All?." 
6 Lowe, "Why Is There Anything at All?.", Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics 252ff. 
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7.1 More subtraction arguments 
Taking the intuitive considerations raised in the end of the last chapter into 
account, bearing in mind the new criterion of concreteness, and given that the 
only fully worked out account of possible worlds that works with nihilism is 
ersatzism, can we reconstruct a functioning version of the subtraction argument? 
Well, at the end of chapter 4 above we were left with two versions of the 
subtraction argument. The original version that Baldwin offered and Rodriguez-
Pereyra's modified version. Lowe7 claims that i f we adopt the spatio-temporal 
criterion of concreteness then we do not need to make Rodriguez-Pereyra's 
modifications to Baldwin's original argument. (See chapter 4 above for a 
complete account of these arguments.) The point is that Rodriguez-Pereyra's 
modifications are designed to avoid the concreteness of unit sets, spatio-temporal 
points and regions, and parts of concrete objects. If these are concrete then they 
violate the first premise of Baldwin's original argument as it would not be 
possible for there to be a finite domain of concrete objects. Rodriguez-Pereyra 
modifies the argument in various ways to avoid this consequence. But these 
modifications are to some extent ad hoc as they are based on Rodriguez-
Pereyra's desire to save nihilism (see 6.2 above). 
It should be pointed out that although Lowe8 ultimately accepts the same 
criterion of concreteness as I have done, he gives no arguments for why he 
considers that the spatio-temporal criterion is the most appropriate to the 
question of nihilism. So his position is not well supported in this respect. 
7 Lowe, "Metaphysical Nihilism and the Subtraction Argument." 
8 Lowe, "Why Is There Anything at All?," 111-2, Lowe, "Metaphysical Nihilism and the 
Subtraction Argument." 
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Let's reconsider Baldwin's original argument (and where relevant, Rodriguez-
Pereyra's modifications) using this new criterion of concreteness and see if the 
premises are plausible. Baldwin's argument is: 
(Al) There might be a world with a finite domain of 'concrete' objects. 
(A2) These concrete objects are, each of them, things that might not exist. 
(A3) The non-existence of any one of these things does not necessitate the 
existence of any other such thing.9 
7.2 Premise (Al) 
(Al) There might be a world with a finite domain of 'concrete' objects. 
(Al*) There is a possible world W] with a finite domain of concrete* 
objects, xi, xn. 
Premise (Al) is the premise that Rodriguez-Pereyra directed most of his attention 
to. According to Rodriguez-Pereyra, Baldwin's (Al) is false and has to be 
replaced with (Al*). The arguments about this point are discussed in section 4.3 
above and I won't repeat them here. The relevant question for my purposes is to 
work out whether (Al) or something similar is true when combined with the new 
criterion of concreteness that I have been using and an ersatz account of worlds. 
Lowe,1 0 of course, thinks that it is true. This is because he believes that concrete 
objects can be mereologically simple. This means that there could be a finite 
number of parts of concrete objects and so a finite number of concrete objects. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra, on the other hand, claims that spatio-temporal objects can be 
infinitely divided into parts. This means that in any world where there is at least 
9 Baldwin, "There Might Be Nothing," 232. 
1 0 Lowe, "Metaphysical Nihilism and the Subtraction Argument," 65. 
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one spatiotemporally extended object there must be an infinite number of 
concrete objects. 
The defender of metaphysical nihilism has two options. Either accept Lowe's 
account of the parts of concrete objects and so retain Baldwin's (Al) or accept 
Rodriguez-Pereyra's account of the parts of concrete objects and so re-write the 
subtraction argument so that it does not turn on the existence of a finite number 
of concrete objects. Working out the nature of mereological atoms seems like a 
big task that is not directly relevant to my project. What I propose to do rather 
than invoking one side of this argument or the other is to consider what would 
follow if either of them were correct. So I will follow out the consequences of 
both of these positions. (Hopefully this will actually make my argument stronger 
as I will not be relying on any 'hostages to fortune' relating to this question.) 
First of all let's consider the possibility that (in at least one possible world) 
concrete objects are not infinitely divisible (Lowe's position). What does this 
mean for the truth of (Al) with my criticisms taken into account? If Lowe is right 
and there are only a finite number of parts of any given concrete object then it 
looks like (Al) is true - there could be a finite number of concrete objects. What 
about the controversial entities that Rodriguez-Pereyra discussed in his criticisms 
of (Al)? Do they still cause a problem for (Al) when combined with the 
temporal criterion of concreteness? Well, spatio-temporal points do not exist in 
time so they are not concrete by this criterion. Similarly unit sets may contain 
objects that exist in time but that does not seem to entail that the sets themselves 
exist in time. Spatio-temporal regions can be understood in two ways. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra says that they are sets of space-time points. As such they 
would not themselves exist in time. I suggested that they were composed of 
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space-time points rather than being sets of them. If, however, as I have 
suggested, space-time points are not concrete on this criterion, it follows that 
sums of space-time points are also not concrete. 
So, if Lowe is right and concrete objects are not infinitely divisible, then (Al) is 
true when combined with my new criterion of concreteness. 
If Lowe is not right about the number of parts of concrete objects, then we will 
have to adopt a strategy similar to that of Rodriguez-Pereyra. Let's see if 
Rodriguez-Pereyra's revised subtraction argument* works with our new criterion 
of concreteness. The argument is as follows: 
(Al*) There is a possible world wi with a finite domain of concrete* 
objects, xi, x„. 
(A2*) For each of the concrete* objects X i in wi, there is a possible world 
w* where X j does not exist. 
(A3*) The non-existence of any of the Xj that exist in wi does not 
necessitate the existence of any other concrete* object, whether or not these 
exist in wi. That is: for all worlds w and for all the concreta* X j in wi, if X i 
exists in w then if there is a world w* where X i does not exist, then there is 
a world w** where the only existing concreta* are those of w except X j (i.e. 
w** is such that for every concrete* object y, y exists in w** if and only if 
y * X i and y exists in w). 1 1 
(A4*) 1 2 If there is a world with no concrete* objects then that world has no 
concrete objects. 
The first thing to do is to work out what concrete* means in this new context. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra13 defines a concrete* object as one that is concrete, 
memberless and a maximal occupant of a connected region (see 4.3 above). The 
notion of a maximal occupant of a connected region is fairly straightforward and 
1 1 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Metaphysical Nihilism Defended," 172. 
1 2 My numbering for Rodriguez-Pereyra's extra claim. 
1 3 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "There Might Be Nothing," 163. 
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seems to work just as well with my temporal criterion of concreteness as it works 
with Rodriguez-Pereyra's account. 
The concreteness that Rodriguez-Pereyra refers to can just be reinterpreted in the 
way I suggested as temporality. The only issue then is memberlessness. In 
section 5.2.3 above I raised some problems for Rodriguez-Pereyra's use of 
memberlessness. However I pointed out there that whilst these issues are 
problematic for Rodriguez-Pereyra's attempt to reconcile modal realism with 
metaphysical nihilism they are not a problem for his revised subtraction 
argument*. This is because in the former case he is trying to use memberlessness 
to refer to a metaphysically significant category of being. Memberlessness 
however is merely a disjunctive property that doesn't carve reality at the joints. 
In the latter case, however, he is using it in such a way that its disjunctive nature 
is not problematic. This is because it is just a short cut in an argument and the 
argument could be written out longhand making the disjunctive nature of 
memberlessness explicit and it would be just as good an argument. 
So it seems that we can retain Rodriguez-Pereyra's definition of concreteness* 
by replacing his understanding of concreteness with mine. In fact, it is really just 
the fact that concrete* objects are maximal occupants of space-time regions that 
is relevant to this discussion. The memberlessness clause of Rodriguez-Pereyra's 
definition of concreteness* could be left out for our purposes. This is because it 
is designed to avoid making unit sets concrete, but on my criterion of 
concreteness unit sets are not concrete anyway as they do not exist in space and 
time. 
So now we know what concreteness* means with my new criterion of 
concreteness, the next question is whether (Al*) is true when combined with this 
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new definition of concreteness*. Could there be a world with a finite number of 
concrete* objects with this revised notion of concreteness? It seems that there 
could. We have already seen that with this revised notion of concreteness the 
only kind of entity that threatens to make (Al) false is the parts of concrete 
objects. The clause in the definition of concreteness* about maximal occupancy 
of a connected region means that even if parts of concrete objects are concrete 
they are not concrete*. 
So, given our new criterion of concreteness, either (Al) or (Al*) is true. If 
spatio-temporally extended concrete objects are infinitely divisible, as 
Rodriguez-Pereyra believes, then (Al*) is true. If concrete objects are not 
infinitely divisible, as Lowe believes, then (Al) is true. The first premise of the 
subtraction argument seems to be on a fairly strong footing. 
7.3 Premise (A2) 
(A2) These concrete objects are, each of them, things which might not 
exist. 
(A2*) For each of the concrete* objects in wj, there is a possible world 
w* where xi does not exist}4 
Premise (A2) seems to be relatively uncontroversial. Surely any physical concrete 
object is contingent - it could have not existed and so there is some possible 
world at which it does not exist. But of course the ontological argument attempts 
to establish that there is a necessary concrete being. So we need to consider this 
1 4 1 am including A2* to retain my agnosticism about the infinite divisibility of concrete objects. 
Everything I say below is equally true of A2 and A2* but I will usually just refer to A2 for 
simplicity. 
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claim and see how (A2) and (A2*) combined with our new criterion of 
concreteness and ersatzism about possible worlds stand up to it. 
Baldwin defends this premise with his argument against a necessary concrete 
being (B1)-(B3). Here is Baldwin's original version of that argument. 
(Bl) It is a mark of concrete objects that they do not satisfy the Identity of 
Indiscernibles. So the identity of a concrete object is not determined by the 
intrinsic properties, which determine what kind of thing it is. 
(B2) In the case of any being whose existence is necessary, the fact that its 
existence is necessary is determined by the kind of thing it is, and thus by 
its intrinsic properties. 
(B3) For any being whose existence is necessary, the intrinsic properties, 
which determine its existence, also determine its identity.15 
Baldwin is trying to show that being concrete is incompatible with being 
necessary. The identity of a concrete object is not determined by its intrinsic 
properties whereas the identity of a necessary object is determined by its intrinsic 
properties. Since no object can both have its identity determined by its intrinsic 
properties and not have its identity determined by its intrinsic properties, nothing 
can be both concrete and necessary. 
Let's see if we can re-write this argument using the spatio-temporal criterion of 
identity and assess the plausibility of the new premises. 
(CI) It is a mark of concrete objects that they exist in time. So the identity of a 
concrete object is not determined by the intrinsic properties, which determine 
what kind of thing it is. 
(C2) In the case of any being whose existence is necessary, the fact that its 
existence is necessary is determined by the kind of thing it is, and thus by its 
intrinsic properties. 
1 5 Baldwin, "There Might Be Nothing," 234. 
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(C3) For any being whose existence is necessary the intrinsic properties, which 
determine its existence, also determine its identity. 
Its immediately obvious that Baldwin's (Bl) is far more plausible than (CI). This 
is because Baldwin's criterion of concreteness ties in with the criteria of identity 
for concrete objects. I f two concrete objects can share all the same intrinsic 
properties and nonetheless be two separate objects, then it must be something 
other than their intrinsic properties that determines their identity. 
This shows that Baldwin's use of failure to satisfy the identity of indiscernibles 
as his criterion of concreteness does have repercussions for the plausibility of 
nihilism. Baldwin does not give an argument for this criterion of concreteness 
and yet here we have an example of it exerting an influence on his argument. 
This emphasises my point that in a discussion of nihilism it is crucial to give a 
full and well backed up account of concreteness (as I hope I have done in chapter 
6 above). 
(Bl) works because, according to Baldwin's criteria of concreteness, two concrete 
objects could share all their intrinsic properties and yet be two different objects. In 
(CI), we have, at best, shown that two concrete objects (indeed all concrete 
objects) share one property - being temporally located. So there is no reason for 
this to cause a conflict with (C2). (C2) says that necessary objects have their 
identity determined by the kind of things they are. 
Of course this is another example of the loose discussions of kinds of objects that 
I discuss in 2.2 above. It is assumed that when we talk about kinds of objects we 
are referring to some sort of well thought out category theory within which the 
use of the phrase 'of a kind' is well defined. However, here as in the case 
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discussed in 2.2 this is not true. The phrase 'the kind of thing it is' is being used 
ambiguously. Does it mean there are two kinds, abstract and concrete? Or are they 
just two of a larger hierarchy of kinds including spatially located objects, 
universals, etc? Questions like 'what kind of thing is this object?' are not simply 
answered by 'concrete' or 'abstract'. For example, a Cartesian mind might be 
concrete and not spatially located whereas a table is concrete and spatially 
located. A person might be concrete and a thinking autonomous being whereas a 
planet is concrete and not a thinking autonomous being. These other properties 
also contribute to what kind of thing an object is. So there is no obvious conflict 
between an object being concrete (existing in time) and its being necessary, as the 
kind of object that is a necessary being is much more complex than simply being 
concrete or abstract. So its identity could be determined by the kind of thing it is 
but not determined by the fact that it exists in time or is concrete. 
Whatever are the answers to these questions one thing is clear. Baldwin's (Bl) is 
relatively uncontroversial compared to (CI). However, we have seen that (CI) 
uses the criterion of concreteness which is relevant to the discussion in hand 
whereas (Bl) does not. The question now is whether or not premise (A2) can be 
saved. 
As we have not been able to produce a version of Baldwin's (B1)-(B3) that is at 
all convincing, perhaps we can try to write a new argument based on the spirit 
rather than the letter of Baldwin's ideas. The basic claim that Baldwin is trying to 
put across is that concreteness and necessary existence are incompatible. Any 
object that has one cannot have the other. Can we express this thought using our 
new understanding of concreteness? 
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Well, we would have to show that existing in time is incompatible with existing 
necessarily. Why should this be the case? Well, if something exists necessarily 
and it exists in time then it must either exist for some portion of time or else for 
all of time. If it existed only for some portion of time it seems likely that it would 
exist at the beginning of time (or the beginning of the universe, if that is not the 
same thing). My reason for saying this is that if something exists necessarily it is 
hard to imagine it popping into existence at some 'middle' point in the time line. 
If something exists necessarily then it would probably have some sort of non-
contingent cause. Either it would have the same cause in every world (in which 
case the cause would also be a necessary being and it would have a cause, etc.) or 
it would have a different cause in every world. I f it had a different cause in every 
world then it's hard to see why there wouldn't be a world where it doesn't have a 
cause at all and so it's hard to see why there isn't a world where it doesn't exist. 
So if a necessary object exists in time then it seems as though it must have existed 
at the beginning of time. 
The next question is whether it continues to exist or ceases existing. If something 
exists necessarily it seems as though there must be something that implies that it 
must exist. So it seems strange for it to stop existing. So it seems that if something 
exists necessarily and exists in time, it probably exists throughout all of time. 
But this hasn't given us any reason to believe that existing in time and being 
concrete are incompatible properties. We could perhaps argue that anything that 
exists throughout all time is not temporal i.e. that nothing could exist throughout 
all time, but I can't see any reasons for believing this. 
So it seems that we haven't succeeded in making a case for the incompatibility of 
concreteness and necessary existence, given my new criterion of concreteness. So 
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at the moment (A2) is unsupported. Perhaps it would be a good time to look at the 
arguments offered by others against (A2) i.e. the arguments for the existence of a 
necessary being. The modal ontological arguments argue for the compatibility of 
necessary existence and concreteness. 
7.3.1 The modal ontological arguments 
We are all familiar with the traditional ontological arguments, which seek to 
derive an absurdity from the idea of God's not existing. Why would these 
arguments be of interest in a discussion of metaphysical nihilism? Well, the 
ontological argument, as well as arguing for the existence of a God, also provides 
an argument against nihilism. This is because the God of the ontological argument 
is a necessary being. A necessary being exists in every possible world, so if there 
was one, then nihilism would be false. There would be no world with no objects, 
as there would be no world without this one particular object. If the modal 
ontological arguments lead us to deny the conclusion of the subtraction argument 
and the subtraction argument is valid, then the supporter of the modal ontological 
arguments must also deny at least one of the premises of the subtraction 
argument. The ontological arguments offer a denial of premise (A2) of the 
subtraction argument. This is because they argue that not everything concrete is 
contingent - there is at least one necessary being. 
In the traditional forms of this argument, this necessary being was benevolent, 
omniscient, omnipotent, etc. However, all that is required for our purposes in 
discussing nihilism is that it is a necessary being. Hence any problems for the 
ontological argument, which stem from these other divine characteristics, like the 
problem of evil, are of no concern to the proponent of the modal ontological 
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arguments. Any other attributes of that being are irrelevant for our purposes but 
may be a concern for philosophers of religion. 
The traditional ontological argument is plagued by the criticism that it 
illegitimately treats existence as a predicate.16 Van Inwagen17 claims that we can 
construct an argument similar in structure to the ontological argument that does 
not treat existence as a predicate. This argument, he claims, is also flawed but it is 
worth looking at as it shows us that treating existence as a predicate is not the real 
problem in the traditional ontological argument. 
Van Inwagen admits that existence is not a predicate but he does claim that 
necessary existence is a predicate. This is not to say that it is instantiated or even 
that it could be instantiated, but just that it can legitimately be considered as an 
attribute, which some objects may18 possess. 
Van Inwagen's19 argument runs as follows: 
(VI) A perfect being has all perfections. 
(V2) Necessary existence is a perfection. 
(V3) Therefore a perfect being has necessary existence. 
(V4) Whatever has necessary existence exists. 
(V5) Therefore, a perfect being exists. 
1 6 Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Kemp Smith, N. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1950) 
B626. 
1 7 Van Inwagen, P., Metaphysics (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), Van Inwagen, "Why 
Is There Anything at All?" 
1 8 By using the term 'may' here I don't want to invoke any alethic properties. What I mean is that 
'if we were to assert that something exists necessarily, then we would be making a predication.' 
Of course this might be a predication which is always false. 
1 9 Van Inwagen, Metaphysics 79ff. 
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The problem with this argument can be seen when we consider Van Inwagen's 
parallel argument for the existence of a negmount. A negmount is a golden 
mountain. 
(V6) A negmount has all negmontanic properties. 
(V7) Necessary existence is a negmontanic property. 
(V8) Therefore a negmount has necessary existence. 
(V9) Whatever has necessary existence exists. 
(V10) Therefore a negmount exists. 
But of course there are no negmounts. So where did the argument go wrong? Van 
Inwagen shows us that we can divide this argument into two and then we will see 
the problems. We now have two arguments. One of which starts with the premise 
that 'anything which is a negmount has all negmontanic properties' and concludes 
that anything, which is a negmount, exists. This argument is trivial and does not 
claim the existence of anything. The second argument starts with the premise that 
there is a negmount that has all negmontanic properties and concludes that a 
negmount exists. This version is also trivial and moves from one existence claim 
to another about the same object. So the first premise of the original argument -
that a negmount has all negmontanic properties - can be interpreted in two 
different ways. The first interpretation makes no existence claims. However it 
does not lead to an existence claim either. The second interpretation does yield an 
existence claim but it also assumes an existence claim. So neither version can 
argue non-circularly for the existence of a negmount. Similarly with the modal 
onto logical argument, we cannot produce one successful argument that starts off 
without an existence assumption and concludes with an existence claim. 
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Van Inwagen attempts to get over this problem by constructing the minimum 
modal ontological argument. This runs a follows: 
Consider the two properties, necessity (that is, necessary existence or 
existence in all possible worlds) and entity or concrescence (the property of 
being a being or concrete object). These two properties are compatible - it is 
not absolutely or metaphysically or intrinsically impossible for something to 
have both of them. Therefore, there is some thing that has both of them; that 
is there is a necessary being. 
The reasoning is that if a necessary being could exist then it exists in some 
possible world. But as it is necessary, if it exists in one world, it exists in all 
worlds - that is what we mean by necessary existence. If it exists in all worlds, 
then it exists in the actual world. So it exists at this world. 
Williams21 claims that metaphysics can be divided into two distinct tasks -
analytic ontology and speculative ontology. Analytic ontology is the 
investigation into what kinds of things there could be. It aims to delineate the 
categories of metaphysical entities.22 It does not, however, discuss the actual 
existence of these entities or whether or not these categories are empty. This is 
the aim of speculative ontology: to determine what objects and what kinds of 
objects actually exist. I mention this distinction here because the minimum modal 
ontological argument presents a unique case where the two parts of this 
2 0 Van Inwagen, "Why Is There Anything at All?," 97. 
2 1 Williams, D. C , The Principles of Empirical Realism (Springfield, 111.: Chares C . Thomas, 
1966). Quoted in Hoffman, J. and G. Rosenkrantz, Substance among Other Categories (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 7. 
2 2 It is tempting to align this distinction with the continental / analytic distinction. It is sometimes 
said that continental philosophy is more 'speculative' than analytic. But I suggest this is a different 
sense of 'speculative'. To highlight the difference between the analytic/continental distinction and 
the analytic/speculative distinction we may want to look at them in the following way. The 
analytic/continental distinction, in so far as it is a well-defined distinction, is a methodological 
one. It is about how we do philosophy in general. The analytic/speculative one is a distinctly 
metaphysical distinction and is characterised by content rather than method. Either a continental or 
analytic philosopher can make use of the analytic / speculative distinction and can engage in either 
analytic or speculative metaphysics. 
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distinction collapse into one. There is one ontological category - necessary 
existents - where the answer to the analytical question determines wholly the 
answer to the speculative question. This is because the category of necessary 
existents, if it is a legitimate category of entities at all, must contain at least one 
actually existing object. If something could possess necessary existence then 
something, in this the actual world, does possess necessary existence. 
23 
Van Inwagen has argued that this argument is valid and that any other version 
of the ontological argument will have less plausible premises. So if any version 
of the ontological argument is sound then the minimum modal ontological 
argument is and if the minimum modal ontological argument is not sound then 
no version of the ontological argument is. 
But obviously Van Inwagen's argument assumes that necessity and concreteness 
are compatible properties. What reason could we have to believe this? Van 
Inwagen claims that the only argument that can show us this is a version of the 
cosmological argument. 
Every fact has an explanation; 
If a property F has, as a matter of contingent fact, a non-empty extension, 
then any explanation of this fact must somehow involve beings (concrete 
things) that do not have F; 
Contingency (the property of being a contingent being) has, as a matter of 
contingent fact, a non-empty extension. 
It obviously follows from these three premises that if there are, as a matter 
of contingent fact, contingent beings, there are also non-contingent beings -
that is, necessary beings.24 
However, as Van Inwagen admits, this argument is flawed as its first premise (a 
variation on the principle of sufficient reason) is surely false. So the ontological 
2 3 Van Inwagen, P., "Ontological Arguments," Nous 11 (1977). 
2 4 Van Inwagen, "Why Is There Anything at AH?," 97. 
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argument works only on the condition that this cosmological argument works but 
this cosmological argument is based on a highly implausible premise, so the 
ontological argument fails. 
This means that premise (A2) of the subtraction argument is relatively plausible. 
The only argument whose conclusion is the denial of (A2) is not sound. So 
although (A2) has not much in its defence, it has even less against it and we can 
accept it. 
7.4 Premise (A3) 
(A3) The non-existence of any one of these things does not necessitate the 
existence of any other such thing. 
(A3*) The non-existence of any of the Xj that exist in wi does not necessitate 
the existence of any other concrete* object, whether or not these exist in wj. 
That is: for all worlds w and for all the concreta* x, in w/, if exists in w 
then if there is a world w* where x, does not exist, then there is a world w** 
where the only existing concreta* are those of w except x, (i.e. w** is such 
that for every concrete* object y, y exists in w** if and only i f y * x{ and y 
exists in w). 
Baldwin's defence of (A3) seems to be agnostic on the question of the criterion of 
concreteness. If any temporal object were not to exist, there would be no need for 
some other temporal object to exist.25 For this reason his defence works just as 
well with our new criterion as it did with his own criterion. 
If we had used spatial existence as our criterion of concreteness then we might have worried 
about the world where only a single spatial object exits. If relationism is right then there might be 
problems about that object's being spatial. However with temporality as our criterion, all that is 
required is the possibility of change or events (even if the relationist account is right) for an object 
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(A3) is centrally about the notion of ontological independence. This is a fact 
glimpsed by Baldwin when he says: 
The third premise of the subtraction argument (A3) can be regarded as 
expressing an implication of the conception of concrete objects as traditional 
'substances' - things whose existence is independent of the existence of 
other things.26 
7.4.1 Lowe's argument against metaphysical nihilism 
It is surprising then that Lowe,27 who accepts something like this traditional 
notion of substance, disagrees with Baldwin on the question of nihilism. 
Moreover it is premise (A3) that he takes issue with. 
I have no quarrel with premises (Al) and (A2) of Baldwin's version of the 
subtraction argument and am prepared to accept that the argument is valid... 
Hence, my opposition to the argument must focus on premise (A3). 2 8 
The key to their disagreement is that Baldwin is asserting the independence of 
concrete objects and citing that independence as evidence that they might fail to 
exist without affecting the question of whether or not a world exists. Lowe admits 
the independence of concrete objects but claims that abstract objects are 
dependent on concrete objects. This highlights a flaw in Baldwin's argument -
Baldwin thought that because concrete objects exist independently, their existence 
or non-existence makes no difference to the existence or non-existence of 
anything else. However this would only be true if concrete objects both depended 
on nothing else for their existence and had nothing else depend on them for their 
existence. Perhaps Baldwin thought that the second part of this conjunction was 
to be concrete. An example that illustrates this is found in Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics 
116-8. 
2 6 Baldwin, "There Might Be Nothing," 235. 
2 7 Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics 136ff. 
2 8 Lowe, "Metaphysical Nihilism and the Subtraction Argument," 65. 
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trivial - that nothing (non-concrete) depended for its existence on concrete 
substances. Abstract entities like numbers and sets are often thought to be 
ontologically independent entities. But Lowe disagrees with this. 
Lowe's29 argument runs as follows: (i) metaphysical nihilism is false, (ii) (Al) 
and (A2) are true, (iii) (Al) and (A2) and (A3) lead to metaphysical nihilism. 
Therefore, (A3) must be false. Lowe's arguments in support of (ii) I have detailed 
in chapter 4 above. It should be noted that he is using the same criterion of 
concreteness as I am so his arguments don't need to be re-interpreted as 
Baldwin's and Rodriguez-Pereyra's do. His reasons for accepting (iii) - that the 
30 
subtraction argument is valid are those given by Baldwin originally. (Although 
it must be noted that Lowe31 says that he is dubious about the transitivity of the 
accessibility relation between worlds. If this is not correct then Wnii may not be 
accessible from this world although it may be accessible from a world accessible 
from this world. This would mean that the subtraction argument fails. The 
question of the correct modal logic is too large and tangential to look into in this 
thesis so I will just note that the answer to this question may have a bearing on 
what I am discussing.) So we now need to look at his argument for (i) - his 
argument that metaphysical nihilism is false, which is an argument against 
Baldwin's premise (A3). 
Lowe's argument against nihilism is summed up in the following quote: 
Baldwin's arguments may need to be re-phrased so as to avoid Paseau's problem in the way that 
Rodriguez-Pereyra rephrased his argument. I don't think any serious changes would need to be 
made in order to do this. 
3 1 Lowe, "Metaphysical Nihilism and the Subtraction Argument," 65. 
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... argue first that at least some abstract objects exist in all possible worlds 
(for instance the natural numbers), and next that abstract objects always 
depend for their existence upon concrete objects. From this conclude that at 
least some concrete objects exist in all possible worlds (but not necessarily 
the same concrete objects in all worlds, and so not necessarily any 
'necessary being').32 
Let's look at this argument in more detail. The first thing to notice here is that the 
conclusion of this argument is different from that of the modal ontological 
arguments that we looked at earlier. In the modal ontological arguments the 
conclusion is that there exists a necessary concrete object. That means that there is 
one concrete object, which exists in every possible world. The conclusion of 
Lowe's argument, in contrast, is that it is necessary that there exist a concrete 
object. This means that every world contains at least one concrete object but it 
may not be the same object that exists in every world. 
I will now look at each premise of Lowe's argument and the criticisms advanced 
by Rodriguez-Pereyra33 and Baldwin34 against Lowe's argument. Both sets of 
criticisms attack the premises rather than the form of the argument and 
Rodriguez-Pereyra agrees that the argument is valid. 
In order to make it clear exactly which claims are being discussed I will now lay 
out the bare structure of Lowe's argument: 
(LI) At least some abstract objects exist in all possible worlds. 
(L2) Abstract objects always depend for their existence upon concrete objects. 
Hence, at least some concrete objects exist in all possible worlds. 
3 2 Lowe, "Why Is There Anything at AH?," 113. 
3 3 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Lowe's Argument against Nihilism.", Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Metaphysical 
Nihilism Defended." 
3 4 Baldwin, "There Might Be Nothing." 
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Lowe argues for (LI) on the basis that mathematical truths are necessary truths 
and depend for their truth on the existence of certain mathematical objects. He 
argues for (L2) on the basis that the existence of only abstract objects (specifically 
universals and sets) leads to a contradiction. If both of these claims are true then 
the conclusion follows. 
7.4.1.1 Lowe's first premise (LI) 
Lowe's first premise then is that at least some abstract objects exist in all possible 
worlds. His argument for this position is based around the natural numbers. He 
tries to imagine a world in which the natural numbers do not exist.35 He says that 
in such a world we would have no option but to be fictionalists about 
mathematics. We would have to accept that so-called mathematical 'truths' are 
not truths at all but are just useful falsehoods. Lowe dismisses fictionalism 
claiming that the question we should be asking is: given our assumption that the 
natural numbers do exist in this world, can we make sense of them not existing in 
other worlds? He also points out that the most objectionable aspect of fictionalism 
is the thought that mathematical truths might be contingent. Surely if 2+2=4 then 
that is necessarily true. If it is false then it is surely necessarily false. So on the 
assumption that the natural numbers exist in this world, the most sensible belief to 
hold is that they exist in every world. The natural numbers do not exist in time 
and so they are abstract. So some abstract objects exist in every world. 
The question of mathematical fictionalism is too large an issue to engage in 
here.36 Suffice to say that if embracing fictionalism is required to refute Lowe's 
3 5 Lowe, "Why Is There Anything at All?," 118. 
3 6 A fuller discussion of this debate can be found in Field, H., Realism, Mathematics and Modality 
(New York: Blackwell, 1989), Wright, C , "Why Numbers Can Believably Be: A Reply to Hartry 
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argument then it is quite a persuasive argument as fictionalism is quite an extreme 
position. Even if fictionalism is true, it may still be the case that there are abstract 
objects in every possible world. For example, the fictions referred to by the 
fictionalist - they surely don't exist in time. As such they are abstract. This is 
enough to support Lowe's premise (LI) whether or not we accept fictionalism. 
7.4.1.1.1 Rodriguez-Pereyra's attack on (LI) 
Rodriguez-Pereyra attacks Lowe's defence of premise (LI). He suggests two 
interpretations of Lowe's claim that mathematical truths are necessarily true and 
claims that neither can be used to justify Lowe's premise. 
The first interpretation is that mathematical truths are necessarily true in the sense 
that there is no possible world where they are false. However, this leaves open the 
possibility that there is a world where there are no mathematical truths. In this 
world it is not the case that 2+2=4 is false, rather there is no fact of the matter. 
Lowe needs to rule out this sort of world as it would make his first premise false. 
This is a funny interpretation of 'necessarily'. It seems to me closer to what we 
usually mean by 'essentially'. If we want to maintain that mathematical claims 
exist in some worlds and not in others but are true in all those that they exist in 
then we would say that they are essentially true rather than necessarily true. 
The second interpretation that Rodriguez-Pereyra offers is that 
.. .there is no possible world in which there are no mathematical truths.38 
Field," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 42 (1988), Wright, C . and B. Hale, "Nominalism and 
the Contingency of Abstract Objects," Journal of Philosophy (1992). 
3 7 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Lowe's Argument against Nihilism," 339-40. 
3 8 Ibid.: 339. 
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This interpretation corresponds with our normal understanding of the term 
'necessarily' and is strong enough to give Lowe the result that he requires. 
However Rodriguez-Pereyra argues that this is question begging if used in 
Lowe's argument. This is because the claim that Lowe is trying to argue for is the 
claim that necessarily there are abstract objects. He argues for this by claiming 
that there are mathematical truths necessarily. The problem is that mathematical 
truths are abstract objects - they are true propositions. 
If Lowe were to say that the mathematical truth-bearers were not propositions 
would this help? Rodriguez-Pereyra claims that it would not. This is because 
Lowe would still have to claim that some other kind of objects are mathematical 
truth-bearers. 
So Rodriguez-Pereyra has found a dilemma for (LI). If these objects 
(mathematical truths) are abstract then he is assuming (LI) in his attempt to prove 
(LI). If these objects are concrete then he is assuming the conclusion of the 
argument that (LI) is supposed to support. So he will be unable to argue for his 
first premise without assuming the conclusion of the anti-nihilist argument that 
this is a premise of. This is because he would be assuming that concrete objects 
necessarily exist. This would also be question begging. So Rodriguez-Pereyra 
concludes that the only interpretation of Lowe's claim, which is strong enough to 
support his first premise, is question begging. 
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7.4.1.1.2 Lowe's response 
In his latest paper on the subject, Lowe3 9 replies to Rodriguez-Pereyra's 
criticisms. He sums up the limits of his agreement with Rodriguez-Pereyra on the 
subject saying: 
As Rodriguez-Pereyra correctly says, I believe that (1) [Lowe's first 
premise] is true because (a) I reject mathematical fictionalism and hold that 
mathematical truths exist and are made true by facts involving the existence 
of abstract mathematical objects and (b) I believe that mathematical truths 
are necessary truths.40 
Lowe replies to Rodriguez-Pereyra's claim that (b) must be question-begging in 
order to be sufficient for Lowe's argument by claiming that Rodriguez-Pereyra 
has confused the idea of a mathematical truth-bearer. As an example of this he 
quotes Rodriguez-Pereyra saying 
... the truth-bearers of ... mathematical truths are mathematical 
propositions.41 
Mathematical truths, Lowe claims, are truth-bearers - they do not have truth-
bearers as Rodriguez-Pereyra seems to think. He also claims that the details of 
whether these truth-bearers are propositions or something else are irrelevant to his 
anti-nihilist argument. He does acknowledge that if they were used in his anti-
nihilist argument then it would be question-begging but claims that this is not the 
case. He claims that he only needs to say that mathematical truths obtain in every 
possible world. He does not have to claim that some particular truth-bearers exist 
in every possible world. Here he is using the distinction between something being 
true at a world and some truth-bearer existing in a world. Rodriguez-Pereyra had 
3 9 Lowe, "Metaphysical Nihilism and the Subtraction Argument." 
4 0 Ibid.: 71. 
4 1 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Lowe's Argument against Nihilism," 339. Quoted in Lowe, "Metaphysical 
Nihilism and the Subtraction Argument," 72. 
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assumed that in order for mathematical claims to be true at every world, it must be 
the case that some truth-bearers for those claims exist in every world. But Lowe is 
claiming that this is not the case and we only need to assert that mathematical 
claims are true at every world, not that their truth-bearers exist in every world. 
Even if we thought that contingent entities, such as particular ('token') 
sentences or statements, were the only possible truth-bearers, and hence that 
not every possible world is a world in which truth-bearers exist, we should 
not want to say that truths do not obtain in every possible world.. . 4 2 
7.4.1.1.3 Rodriguez-Pereyra's next attack 
Rodriguez-Pereyra43 replies to Lowe's points. According to Lowe's reply all that 
Lowe needs to assume is that mathematical truths obtain necessarily, not that 
mathematical propositions exist necessarily. This is not circular in the way that 
Rodriguez-Pereyra had alleged. 
However he is not fully satisfied by Lowe's distinction between a truth obtaining 
at a world and the proposition that expresses that truth existing in a world. He 
asks 
How can a truth obtain without a truth bearer obtaining? And what is it for a 
truth bearer to obtain if not to exist? What is it that has the property of being 
true when a truth obtains but no truth bearer does?44 
7.4.1.1.4 The Problem: Rodriguez-Pereyra's suppressed anti-ersatz 
premise 
Let's see how we can deal with these questions. All along I have been looking at 
two issues within the metaphysics of modality. I have been looking at the 
4 2 Lowe, "Metaphysical Nihilism and the Subtraction Argument," 72. 
4 3 Rodriguez-Pereyra, G., "Metaphysical Nihilism Defended: Reply to Lowe and Paseau," Analysis 
62 (2002 forthcoming). 
'"ibid.: 180. 
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competing accounts of possible worlds and also at the issues surrounding 
metaphysical nihilism. I have been arguing that the answers we give to each of 
these questions affects the answers we give to the other one. I think that this 
connection may shed some light on the difference between Rodriguez-Pereyra and 
Lowe on this issue too. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra45 is a (modified) Lewisian realist - so he denies what I have 
called the ersatz view. Lowe 4 6 is an ersatz theorist. This means that Rodriguez-
Pereyra thinks that possible worlds are, something like, real universes that can 
contain abstract and concrete objects. Lowe on the other hand thinks that possible 
worlds are merely maximally consistent situations. Lowe thinks that possible 
worlds are the sorts of things according to which something could be the case. For 
Lowe, all the possible worlds exist in this world. Rodriguez-Pereyra thinks that 
they are the sorts of things that objects can exist in. 
I think that this difference on the nature of worlds is responsible for the 
disagreement about whether truths can obtain in a world where the proposition 
that expresses them does not exist. For Rodriguez-Pereyra, as a non-ersatzer, if a 
certain fact obtains at a world then the proposition that expresses that fact must 
exist in that world. For Lowe, as an ersatz theorist, a fact may obtain at a world 
although there may be no facts or propositions existing in that world. All that he 
means when he says that a truth obtains at a world is that it is true (in this world) 
that in that world, so and so is the case. For Lowe it may be the case that there is a 
world where the proposition 'no propositions exist' is true. Of course there is no 
4 5 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Modal Realism and Metaphysical Nihilism". 
4 6 Lowe, A Survey of Metaphysics 81-2 and 128ff. 
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proposition in that world that expresses this fact but it is a truth about that world 
which is true in this one actual world. To use Lowe's own analogy, there might be 
a novel that describes a world in which there are no novels. There is nothing 
contradictory about this. 
7.4.1.1.5 Conclusion 
So that is why they disagree but which one is right? Well, I have shown in chapter 
5 above that Rodriguez-Pereyra's attempts to reconcile nihilism with anything 
other than ersatzism are far from complete. At the moment the only fully worked 
out theory of possible worlds that is compatible with nihilism is ersatzism. This 
attack on Lowe is based on a suppressed anti-ersatz premise - that if something is 
true at a world then the proposition that expresses that truth must exist in that 
world. This belief in turn rests on Rodriguez-Pereyra's acceptance that worlds are 
the sort of things that objects exist in. But, for an ersatzer, a proposition may be 
true at a world even if it does not exist in that world. So 'there are no abstract and 
no concrete objects' could be true at a world although that proposition itself 
would not exist in that world. This is because ersatz worlds are not real physical 
worlds, they are representations of ways the world could have been. A proposition 
or state of affairs can represent a world at which there are no propositions or 
states of affairs, just as a picture can represent a room where there are no pictures. 
Lowe is therefore arguing for a consistent position - the ersatz view of worlds is 
compatible with the denial of metaphysical nihilism (see section 6.2.6 above) -
whereas Rodriguez-Pereyra wants to defend nihilism using anti-ersatz ideas, even 
though the ersatz account is the only fully worked-out theory of possible worlds 
that we know to be compatible with nihilism. 
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So we have no good reason to doubt Lowe's first premise. It is compatible with 
his other beliefs. Rodriguez-Pereyra's criticisms of it, which are motivated by his 
belief in nihilism, turn on ideas, which appear to be incompatible with that 
nihilism. 
7.4.1.2 Lowe's second premise (L2) 
Lowe's second premise, that abstract objects are ontologically dependent on 
concrete objects is the really controversial piece of his argument. The argument 
proceeds in the form of a reductio. The reductio assumption is that there could be 
abstract objects in a world with no concrete objects. Lowe shows that this 
supposition leads to an absurdity and so we should abandon it. 
The first step in the argument is to assume that the only possible abstract objects 
are universals and sets. Lowe assures us that 
From this initial contention it would follow that all 'other' abstract objects, 
such as propositions, possible worlds, and numbers ... are themselves either 
universals or sets.47 
The natural numbers are usually believed to be sets (abstract particulars) but 
Lowe claims that they are universals. As both of these kinds of entity are being 
discussed, the argument from here on works equally well whichever of these two 
views one holds. 
Lowe then assumes 
... an 'Aristotelian' or 'immanent' realist account of universals48 
according to which universals exist if and only if there are particulars which 
instantiate them. 
4 7 Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics 252-3. 
4 8 Lowe, "Why Is There Anything at All?," 116. 
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Once we have this assumption we can start to think about the empty world. 
Imagine a world in which only abstract objects exist. Rodriguez-Pereyra49 
suggests calling this w a - the a standing for abstract - so I will follow this useful 
convention. If the only abstract objects are universals and sets, as we have 
assumed, then the only universals that can exist in this world are those that have 
abstract particulars (sets) as their instantiations. Sets, however, can only exist in 
worlds where their members exist.50 In the world with only universals and sets, 
where the universals depend for their existence on the sets, the sets cannot then in 
turn rely on the very same universals to be their members. But, there are no other 
members available for sets. 
One way out might be this: we usually think that even in an empty world we can 
generate an infinite number of sets. This involves starting with the null set and 
then invoking the set containing the null set, and so on. This is where Lowe's 
second very controversial claim comes in. He claims that the null set is 
... as good an example as we can get of a purely fictional entity.. . 5 1 
His argument is based on the fact that the identity of a set is determined by its 
members. So the set with no members, he claims is not a set at all. If there is no 
empty set then there are no other pure sets. (It is clear now why Lowe must hold 
that the natural numbers are universals rather than sets. Those philosophers and 
mathematicians who believe that numbers are sets, inevitably believe that they are 
4 9 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Metaphysical Nihilism Defended," 174. 
5 0 This is true in an actualist ontology like Lowe's. A modal realist in the Lewisian tradition could 
claim that there is a set of me and my counterparts, for example, or perhaps a set containing 
various possible worlds. However if Lewis's ontology is correct then we know that nihilism is 
incorrect as it is incompatible with Lewis' compositionalism. Lowe's assumption of actualism is 
permissible as I have shown that the only fully worked out theory of possible worlds a nihilist can 
hold is ersatzism which is a form of actualism. 
5 1 Lowe, "Why Is There Anything at All?," 116. 
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pure sets. Lowe's arguments against the empty set and pure sets in general, if they 
hold, hold in all possible worlds including this one.) If there are no pure sets, there 
must only be impure sets. But impure sets by definition must have as their 
elements non-sets. But, by hypothesis, w a is a world that contains nothing but sets 
and universals. The universals depend for their existence on the sets so the sets 
cannot depend for theirs on the universals. But sets do depend on their members. 
So we have a problem. There are no suitable members available for these sets. 
The only option is to deny our reductio assumption that there are only abstract 
objects (universals and sets) in w a and accept that there must be some concrete 
objects in that world. Hence there cannot be a world with only abstract objects -
there must be at least one concrete object in any world. 
So Lowe has argued that in any world in which there are abstract objects, there 
must be at least one concrete object. He has earlier argued, in support of his first 
premise, that there are abstract objects in every world and so there must be at least 
one concrete object in every world (see 7.4.1.1 above). 
52 
Lowe considers one possible objection to this view. His argument is based on 
the idea that the natural numbers exist necessarily and depend for their existence 
on the existence of at least one concrete object. But how can we get all the 
infinitely many natural numbers from just one concrete object or even any finite 
number of objects? This is particularly pressing as Lowe's account of numbers as 
universals requires that each number is a different universal and his Aristotelian 
realism about universals requires that each of these must have an instantiation. 
Lowe thinks that this is not a serious problem. He points out that if one accepts 
5 2 Ibid.: 117. 
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the existence of both particular objects and the unit sets of those objects then we 
only need one concrete object to yield an infinite number of sets. These sets are 
abstract particulars and so can instantiate universals. The numbers are some of the 
universals that are instantiated by these sets. So although we cannot get an infinite 
number of universals from just one concrete object, we can get an infinite number 
of abstract particular objects from that one concrete object. We can then get an 
infinite number of universals from that infinite number of abstract particulars. 
If we are not willing to accept the existence of unit sets as separate objects over 
and above their members then another method of deriving all the natural numbers 
is available once we have two or more particulars. The set containing both of 
these is then our third particular and so on. 
7.4.1.2.1 Rodriguez-Pereyra's attack on (12) 
53 
Rodriguez-Pereyra also attacks this second premise of Lowe's argument. More 
specifically he rejects Lowe's claim that a world with only sets and universals, as 
described by Lowe, is impossible. Rodriguez-Pereyra claims that it is not 
obviously problematic to say that the universals depend on the sets and the very 
same sets depend on those universals. Moreover Rodriguez-Pereyra uses Lowe's 
own distinctions to argue against Lowe's claim. Rodriguez-Pereyra distinguishes 
between three types of dependence, which are all present in Lowe's work. He 
then argues that only one of these types would lead to the vicious circle of 
problematic mutual dependence whereas the other two are non-vicious mutual 
dependencies. Furthermore he argues that sets and numbers are only mutually 
Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Lowe's Argument against Nihilism.", Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Metaphysical 
Nihilism Defended." 
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dependent in the two non-vicious ways and not in the problematic way. So 
Rodriguez-Pereyra denies Lowe's claim that: 
... in such a world the sets depend for their existence upon the universals 
and the universals depend for their existence upon the sets, creating a 
vicious circle, which deprives both universals and sets of the possibility of 
existence.54 
The first form of dependence is what Lowe5 5 calls weak existential dependence. 
(Dl) x depends for its existence upon y =df Necessarily, x exists only if y 
exists.56 
Numbers and sets do weakly existentially depend on each other but Rodriguez-
Pereyra claims that this sort of dependence is not sufficient to cause a problem for 
w a. This is because there certainly are relatively unproblematic cases of mutual 
weak existential dependence. For example Socrates and Socrates' life are both 
weakly existentially dependent on each other. Necessarily, Socrates exists only i f 
his life exists and necessarily, Socrates' life exists only if Socrates exists. The 
natural numbers are also all mutually weakly existentially dependent on each 
other - this is a fact that Lowe made use of in his argument above (see 7.4.1.2 
above). So if these examples of weak existential dependence are non-problematic, 
then the mutual weak existential dependence of numbers and sets should not 
cause a problem. 
Generic dependence is defined by Lowe as: 
(Dig) x depends for its existence upon objects of type T =df Necessarily, x 
exists only if something y exists such that y is of type T. 5 7 
5 4 Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics 254. Quoted in Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Lowe's Argument 
against Nihilism," 336. 
5 5 Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics 137, 53. Quoted in Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Lowe's Argument 
against Nihilism," 336. 
5 6 Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics 137. 
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Do sets and numbers / universals mutually depend in this way? Is it a problem for 
w a i f they do? Rodriguez-Pereyra points out that, in Lowe's ontology, numbers 
generically depend on sets. This is because numbers are universals, and a given 
universal cannot exist without its instances, and those instances are sets. Sets in 
turn generically depend on numbers. This is because a set necessarily instantiates 
a universal (specifically, a number) so if sets exist then numbers exist too i.e. 
necessarily some set, x, exists only if something y exists such that y is a number. 
So, yes, numbers and sets are mutually generically dependent but Rodriguez-
Pereyra argues that this is not a problem for w a in the way that Lowe requires. An 
example of harmless mutual generic dependence is that between universals and 
particulars (the case we are discussing is one instance of this). This is 
countenanced by Lowe himself, amongst many others. The mutual generic 
dependence of sets and numbers is also widely accepted. This cannot be the 
problem that leads to the impossibility of w a as Rodriguez-Pereyra says: 
... if this sort of mutual dependence between sets and numbers does not 
make impossible other possible worlds in which sets and numbers exist, it 
surely cannot make impossible the world in which only sets and numbers 
exist.59 
It must then be the third type of mutual dependence, which causes the problem for 
wa. Strong existential dependence or identity dependence is defined by Lowe as: 
(Dl**) x depends for its existence upon y =df Necessarily60, the identity of 
x depends on the identity of y. 6 1 
"Ibid. 141. 
5 8 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Lowe's Argument against Nihilism," 337. 
5 9 Ibid. 
6 0 Lowe (p. 147) mentions that the word 'necessarily' is superfluous here as identity dependence is 
always necessary. 
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or as Rodriguez-Pereyra says 
... which thing of its kind y is fixes, or metaphysically determines, which 
thing of its kind x is. 6 2 
This is a much stronger claim than the other two and although Lowe accepts 
mutual generic and mutual weak existential dependence, he claims that mutual 
identity dependence cannot work. This is because of the key role that criteria of 
identity play in Lowe's ontology. If identity criteria were viciously circular then 
they would not be able to fulfil the explanatory role that Lowe demands of them. 
Cases of mutual identity dependence would be viciously circular as the identity 
conditions for some objects would be given in terms of some other objects whose 
identity criteria are in turn given in terms of the first objects. 
Lowe needs this problematic form of mutual dependence in order to demonstrate 
the problem with wa. However, Rodriguez-Pereyra says that this sort of 
dependence is not exhibited by the sets and numbers in w a. He admits that sets 
are identity dependent on their members (the universals of w a) but denies that this 
is an instance of mutual identity dependence. The universals of w a are not in turn 
dependent for their identity on the sets in wa. Lowe claims that universals are not 
even weakly existentially dependent on their instances and so they cannot be 
strongly existentially dependent.63 The identity of numbers is given by their place 
in the number series. 
Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics 147. 
6 2 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Lowe's Argument against Nihilism," 338. 
6 3 It might be thought that this claim conflicts with the earlier claim that numbers and sets do 
weakly existentially depend on each other. After all, according to Lowe's view, numbers are 
universals and sets are their instances. I assume that the distinction is that qua numbers and sets, 
there is a weak existential dependence, whereas qua universals and instances, there is not. This is 
why a number, x, and a set containing x members fulfil the criterion for weak existential 
dependence whereas the universal, x, and its instance, say a set containing x objects, do not 
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...what fixes the identity of {7} is the identity of 7 - though the identity of 
{7} does not fix that of 7.6 4 
So in this section we have seen Rodriguez-Pereyra's arguments against Lowe's 
premise (L2). These arguments are based on Lowe's three types of dependence 
relation. Lowe's arguments for (L2) are based on the claim that a world with only 
abstract objects, specifically numbers (a kind of universal) and sets (particulars), 
would involve a circular kind of mutual dependence between these objects. We 
saw that two of Lowe's types of mutual dependence (weak existential dependence 
and generic dependence) do hold between such objects but these lead to no such 
problem. It is only if the third type of mutual dependence (strong existential 
dependence or identity dependence) were to hold that Lowe's reductio would 
work. However, Rodriguez-Pereyra has argued that this third type of mutual 
dependence does not hold in this case. 
This means that there is no problem with the existence of w a. Hence Lowe's anti-
nihilist argument fails and nihilism seems more plausible again. 
7.4.1.2.2 Lowe's response. 
But that is not the end of the matter. Lowe6 5 has replied to Rodriguez-Pereyra's 
criticisms and Rodriguez-Pereyra66 has replied to that reply. Lowe disagrees with 
Rodriguez-Pereyra's claim that 
weakly existentially depend on each other. So whilst it cannot be said generally that all universals 
and their instances will weakly existentially depend on each other, it is true that some universals 
(numbers) and some of their instances (sets) do weakly existentially depend on each other. 
6 4 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Lowe's Argument against Nihilism," 338. 
6 5 Lowe, "Metaphysical Nihilism and the Subtraction Argument." 
6 6 Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Metaphysical Nihilism Defended." 
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... because such a mutual dependence [generic dependence] is 
unproblematic in other worlds in which sets and universals exist, we should 
therefore suppose it to be unproblematic in the putative world in which only 
sets and universals exist.67 
Rodriguez-Pereyra had pointed out that most philosophers accept that universals 
and sets co-exist in all uncontroversial worlds and so sees no reason to suspect the 
situation is different in w a. But Lowe thinks that w a is relevantly different to the 
other worlds. The relevant difference is that in w a there are no other entities apart 
from universals and sets (except perhaps entities like propositions which can be 
reduced to universals or sets). To quote Lowe's example: 
One might as well argue that because there are, unproblematically, worlds in 
which every brother or sister (sibling) necessarily has a brother or sister, it is 
unproblematic to suppose that there is a world in which only brothers and 
sisters exist.68 
His point here is that while it is all right for sets and universals to be mutually 
generically dependent in worlds where other entities also exist, it may be 
problematic if only these two kinds of entities exist. So the mutual dependence 
required to make w a possible is not acceptable in w a although it would be in other 
worlds. 
However Lowe also rebuts Rodriguez-Pereyra's criticism at a much more 
fundamental level. He says that his initial point was not based on sets and 
universals being mutually dependent in the same way. Lowe accepts Rodriguez-
Pereyra's claim that in w a sets are strongly existentially dependent on universals 
but the universals are only generically dependent on the sets. Thus there is no 
mutual strong existential dependence and so no problem of circularity arising 
from mutual strong existential dependence. However that does not mean there is 
6 7 Lowe, "Metaphysical Nihilism and the Subtraction Argument," 68. 
6 8 Ibid. 
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not a circularity arising from mutual dependence where the dependence is strong 
existential dependence in one direction and generic dependence in the other. 
Lowe gives an example of a world which would be impossible in the same way as 
he claims w a is impossible, namely that it contains only two kinds of entities such 
that the tokens of one kind of entity (sets) are strongly existentially dependent on 
the tokens of the second kind (universals) while the very existence of the second 
kind of entity (universals) is generically dependent on the existence of some 
tokens of the first kind (sets). In Lowe's example there are two kinds of entities: 
composite objects (which he calls 'holons') and their component parts (which he 
calls 'partons'). The holons are necessarily composed of partons but not 
necessarily composed of those particular partons. The identity of the partons is 
dependent on the specific holons that they are part of. This world is impossible 
according to Lowe. We can't give non-circular existence and identity conditions 
for the holons. A condition for the existence of any holon, h is that the partons of 
which it is composed exist. But 
... a necessary condition of the existence of any given parton, say pi, is that 
the holon h of which it is a part should exist.69 
Similarly, two holons are identical just in case they share a parton but 
... what determines whether the same parton, pi, can belong both to holon hi 
and holon h2 is the identity or non-identity of hi with h 2 . 7 0 
The key is Lowe's claim that, in general, if there are no non-circular existence and 
identity conditions for kinds of objects in a given world then those kinds of 
objects cannot exist. In order to clarify this he points out the different ontological 
w I b i d . : 69. 
7 0 Ibid. 
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status of universals and substances. Universals, according to the Aristotelian 
account, are not ontologically independent. They exist only if some instances of 
them exist. Lowe uses the phrase 'ontological priority' to describe this situation -
instances of a universal have ontological priority over the universal of which they 
are instances. Substances, on the other hand, are by definition independent and 
exist regardless of the existence of other entities. Substances have ontological 
priority over everything else. The sort of mutual dependence that universals and 
sets have could be countenanced in an otherwise empty world if universals were 
independent as substances are i.e. if universals had ontological priority over sets. 
However, for an Aristotelian, like Lowe, universals do not have sufficient 
ontological priority to avoid these problems. So Lowe's argument holds. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra71 replies by asking us what is so problematic in having circular 
existence and identity conditions. He claims that in a realist metaphysics there 
may be such anomalies. He even denies there would be a problem if two types of 
entity were mutually strongly dependent. 
It seems that Lowe might accept this claim for some entities. He says: 
... individual substances - given, as I believe, that they are not 
ontologically subordinate to entities of any other category - are items for 
which we cannot quite generally supply non-circular existence- and 
identity-conditions.72 
What seems to be important here is that Lowe specifies that circularity can be 
acceptable for objects which are not ontologically subordinate to any other 
objects. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Metaphysical Nihilism Defended," 175-6. 
7 2 Lowe, "Metaphysical Nihilism and the Subtraction Argument," 71. 
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7.4.1.2.3 The issue 
So to sum up the arguments here: Lowe is running a reductio on the claim that 
there could be just universals and sets in a world. The argument is that in such a 
world an impossible kind of mutual dependence would exist between the 
universals and sets. Rodriguez-Pereyra replies by distinguishing three kinds of 
dependence in Lowe's work. He then points out that whilst two of these kinds of 
mutual dependence hold between universals and sets only the third kind, which 
does not hold between universals and sets, causes the problems that Lowe refers 
to. Lowe accepts this and points out that this kind of dependence would be 
unproblematic between universals and sets in any world other than the empty 
world but is impossible in the otherwise empty world. Furthermore, he claims that 
the mutual dependence he referred to was not the same kind of dependence in 
each direction - it is strong existential dependence in one direction and generic 
dependence in another direction. Finally Lowe argues that in fact this kind of 
dependence could in principle hold in the empty world between two kinds of 
objects but not between universals as construed by the Aristotelian account and 
sets. 
This notion of ontological priority seems to be making an important contribution 
to this argument. Lowe's key move is the claim that in any given ontology, it may 
be impossible to give non-circular identity and existence conditions for the kind 
of entity with over-riding ontological priority. Why should this be the case? 
Rodriguez-Pereyra claims that it may be all right for certain entities to have non-
circular identity and existence criteria and Lowe seems to be agreeing with this. 
The important question is what these certain entities are and why is it all right for 
them to have non-circular identity and existence criteria. In Lowe's ontology 
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substances have ontological priority over everything else and so it is substances 
which can legitimately lack non-circular existence and identity conditions. For 
Platonists about universals, universals may have ontological priority. But what is 
ontological priority and how is it linked to circularity of existence and identity 
conditions? 
Ontological priority seems to be closely linked to independence. This is indicated 
by Lowe when he says that universals do not have ontological priority over their 
instances according to the Aristotelian understanding of universals but would 
have if a Platonist account of universals was correct. This ontological priority or 
relative independence also explains why certain fundamental entities have to have 
circular existence and identity conditions. 
One implication of all this, which I am happy to accept, is that individual 
substances - given, as I believe, that they are not ontologically subordinate 
to entities of any other category - are items for which we cannot quite 
generally supply non-circular existence- and identity-conditions.73 
It seems to be this fundamental, independent nature of substances that leads to the 
lack of non-circular identity and existence criteria for them. In a hierarchical 
metaphysics where each category of entity is grounded in or can be reduced to a 
higher level category, there must be some most fundamental level in order to 
avoid an infinite regress.74 According to Lowe only one kind of object can have 
this feature - the most fundamental kind of object - substances in Lowe's 
ontology. This is indicated by Lowe: 
There are some conflicting metaphors in this sentence. You might well ask how can something 
be reduced to a higher level? Well I think these are just metaphors and although they conflict with 
each other they are both consistent with current usage. The key is that in Lowe's category theory 
the most fundamental kind of category (entities) is represented as being the highest level. The 
conflict stems from this but I think it is superficial and that the point remains clear. 
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A clear consequence of the substantial constituents approach ... is its 
commitment to the existence of ungrounded entities at the base of the 
hierarchy of composition ... Some thing or things ... must simply persist, 
without more ado, and in this all higher-level material persistence must 
75 
ultimately be grounded. 
Of course in anti-nihilist arguments independence is the key notion. In denying 
premise three of the subtraction argument the anti-nihilist is denying the absolute 
independence of concrete objects or asserting the dependence of worlds on the 
objects in those worlds. 
This fact may lead us to think again about the nature of possible worlds and how 
questions about the nature of possible worlds are related to questions about 
metaphysical nihilism. If a denial of premise (A3) of the subtraction argument 
means asserting that worlds are dependent on the objects in the worlds, what view 
of worlds are we talking about? The obvious choice would be the compositionalist 
view of worlds. This is because for the compositionalist it is true that worlds are 
dependent on the objects in those worlds as they are composed of those objects. 
However the ersatz view of worlds may also be consistent with the denial of 
nihilism (see 6.2.6 above). This is because if Lowe's arguments are right then 
there is no maximally consistent situation according to which there are no 
concrete objects. This is exactly what Lowe's argument is designed to show - that 
the non-existence of concrete objects (or more specifically, the existence of only 
abstract objects) is inconsistent. So working out whether ersatzism or 
compositionalism is right won't solve this problem for us. 
Let's consider again the form of Lowe's argument in defence of his premise (L2). 
We have noted above that it is a reductio on the claim that a world could exist 
7 5 Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics 120. 
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with only universals and sets. However, as with all reductios there are other 
claims that are involved in deriving the absurdity and we should consider all of 
these before deciding which one to reject. So let's look at the other premises in 
Lowe's defence of (L2). 
(Reductio premise) There is a world with only abstract objects. 
(L4) The only abstract objects are sets and universals (all others can be reduced to 
one of these). 
(L5) Aristotelian realism about universals: a universal exists at a world only if at 
least one instantiation of that universal exists at that world. 
(L6) There is no such thing as the empty set. 
All of these claims are involved in deriving the absurdity that leads Lowe to deny 
that there is a world with only abstract objects. So it is open to the nihilist to deny 
any of these other claims rather than the reductio claim. The most controversial of 
these claims is surely the denial of the null set. Of course Lowe wants to maintain 
standard arithmetic, but he also wants to deny the metaphysical claim that there is 
some object which is the null set. This is discussed further in 7.4.2 below. 
Another option would be to deny Aristotelian realism about universals. A lot has 
been written on this debate and I can't do justice to a discussion of it here but we 
should acknowledge that philosophers who favour a Platonist conception of 
universals will be able to deny Lowe's anti-nihilist conclusion. L4 falls out of 
Lowe's category theory. He claims that entities can be divided into universals and 
particulars.76 All universals are abstract. Within the category of particulars, there 
is a further subdivision into abstract particulars and concrete particulars. Sets are 
7 6 Ibid. 180ffand220ff. 
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the only example of abstract particulars that Lowe accepts. Even if we did accept 
other abstract entities that are not reducible to sets and universals, we could 
probably reconstruct something similar to L4 and so the argument would still 
work. So in the broader discussion of Lowe's argument in the next section, we 
should remember that the defence of the second premise rests on these additional 
premises as well as his reductio premise. 
7.4.2 Objections to Lowe's argument 
It should be clear now how Lowe's argument denies premise (A3) of the 
subtraction argument. (A2) asserts the contingency of any given concrete object -
Lowe agrees with this (hence both the metaphysical nihilists and Lowe deny the 
existence of a necessary being). (A3) says that the existence of concrete objects at 
all is contingent. Lowe denies this. This is summed up by Rodriguez-Pereyra 
when he says: 
What Lowe does argue for is that it is necessary that there are concrete 
entities, but these might be contingent ones.77 
One objection to Lowe's argument is that he is being inconsistent in his appeal to 
our intuitive mathematical beliefs. The argument would be that in premise one, 
when he asserts that mathematical objects exist necessarily he is arguing that our 
intuitions about mathematics and numbers are generally right. In the second 
premise, however, he is arguing that numbers (and all abstract objects) depend for 
their existence on concrete objects, which is a less commonly held view and 
might be seen as counter-intuitive. Lowe is then thought to be invoking intuitive 
support for a counter-intuitive position. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Lowe's Argument against Nihilism," 335. 
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However this criticism doesn't seem well founded. Metaphysical inquiry does 
need to take into account our prior intuitions but it is much more than merely 
formalising the most commonly held intuitions we hold about metaphysical 
questions. In a thorough and objective investigation into metaphysics we have to 
be prepared to acknowledge that some of our intuitions will be rejected. This fact 
is obvious once we consider that as individuals we often hold conflicting 
intuitions, especially on more obscure questions and that any two or more people 
are likely to have some conflicting intuitions, which they cannot agree on. This is 
the very reason why we need to do philosophy in a systematic and formal way; to 
work out which intuitions we have good reason to keep and which should be 
rejected in the light of more robust argument. Intuition is not a unified doctrine 
which we must either embrace or reject completely, it is one of the many tools we 
have available and can be used in whatever way we can justify using it. 
Secondly, Lowe's argument is not based on appeals to intuition. I suppose that 
some of the arguments against fictionalism may be seen as intuitive but that is 
surely a benefit of those arguments rather than a drawback. 
Another version of this problem is picked up by Baldwin78 who also criticises 
Lowe's points on the basis that they force us to reject some key mathematical 
intuitions. Specifically it is Lowe's denial of the existence of the empty set which 
Baldwin takes issue with. Baldwin claims that this denial is in conflict with 
Lowe's Aristotelian account of numbers as universals. 
...on the Aristotelian theory of number, the existence of the number 0 
demands that there be at least one O-membered set, i.e. the null set. But, for 
Lowe, there is no such set: so his arithmetic is not that familiar theory to 
7 8 Baldwin, "There Might Be Nothing," 236-7. 
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whose intuitive necessity he appeals, but a radical revision of it, which 
makes no reference to the number 0. 7 9 
Baldwin's version of this problem is more serious than the one I mentioned 
above. This is because it appeals not to philosophical intuitions but to more 
strongly held mathematical intuitions about basic arithmetic. While it might be 
reasonable to reject some of our intuitions about the more obscure points of modal 
metaphysics, surely there is something wrong if we must re-write the 
fundamentals of our arithmetic. 
Lowe8 0 does not accept Baldwin's charge that he is forced to adopt an 
unconventional version of arithmetic. Lowe wants to deny that there is any object, 
which is the number 0. He believes we can still maintain all the truths of 
mathematics. It is not our arithmetical intuitions which are being abandoned, it is 
some of our philosophical intuitions about arithmetic. These are far less central to 
our knowledge. As such the arguments I invoked above will justify the rejection 
of these intuitions. 
... it seems to me that our intuitions about the necessity of arithmetical 
truths in no way hinge upon uncritical acceptance of the existence of 'the 
number 0'. It is not as though no sense can otherwise be made of such 
arithmetical propositions as '1-1=0'. On the contrary, we typically explain 
this to a child as meaning 'One take away one leaves nothing' - and the 
thought that 'nothing' denotes a special kind of something is one fit only for 
the humorous works of a Lewis Carroll.81 
So what does Lowe think the null set is? We can start by saying what he doesn't 
think it is. Lowe does not want to identify numbers with sets. So the null set is not 
identical with the number 0. This is because Lowe thinks that numbers are 
7 9 Ibid.: 237. 
Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics 254n. 
8 1 Ibid. 
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universals whereas sets are particulars. In fact Lowe thinks that null set isn't 
anything - it doesn't exist. His argument is that the identity of a set is determined 
by the identity of its elements and the null set has no elements so has no 
identity.82 We have already seen that, in Lowe's ontology, only substances can 
exist without non-circular identity conditions so there must be no null set. 
Of course the nature of the empty set is something I have already discussed (see 
5.2.3 above). I dismissed Rodriguez-Pereyra's claims that memberlessness is a 
genuine ontological feature shared by the empty set and non-sets. Lowe raises a 
similar issue to Rodriguez-Pereyra but draws a different conclusion: 
Many things have no members: what makes just one of these qualify as 'the 
empty set'? Indeed, what distinctive properties does 'the empty set' have: 
how would we recognize it if we came across it? How do we know, for 
instance, that Mars or Napoleon is not 'the empty set'? Presumably, 
because neither of these is a set. But why isn't either of them a set? The 
obvious answer is: because neither of them has any members, in the set-
theoretic sense of 'member'. But of course, 'the empty set' is supposed not 
to have any members either, by definition: so what makes it a 'set'?83 
Lewis also sees this similarity: 
... the null set's behaviour is not, after all, so very peculiar ...lacking 
members is not so queer, all individuals do i t . 8 4 
So while Rodriguez-Pereyra sees this alleged similarity between the empty set 
and non-sets and attributes some common property to them, Lowe sees the same 
alleged similarity and denies the existence of the null set. Can my rejection of 
Rodriguez-Pereyra's point get us anywhere on the discussion of this issue? My 
point is that if there is an empty set then there is no metaphysically significant 
8 2 Ibid. 
8 3 Ibid. 
8 4 Lewis, D„ Parts of Classes (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) 11. 
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property called 'memberlessness' which is shared by this set and all the non-sets 
that exist. I focus on the lack of similarity between the null set and the other 
memberless objects whereas Rodriguez-Pereyra and Lowe focus on the 
similarities. Rodriguez-Pereyra sees this similarity as one that is metaphysically 
useful which I deny. Lowe sees it as a sign of superficial significance. He not only 
denies that the similarity is real but denies that the null set is real. 
On the face of it this seems quite controversial. However, I have already 
discussed the claim that in an actualist ontology, no set can exist in a world where 
its members don't exist. This is a fairly plausible thesis and I think that the non-
existence of the null set can be inferred from it. The argument is that, as there is 
no possible world in which the members of the null set exist, there must be no 
world where the null set exists. Of course those who want to claim that the null 
set (and hence all the pure sets) exists will deny or modify this claim but it is at 
least interesting to note that they have to do this. If they merely modify it by 
adding 'except for the null set' then this is ad hoc. If they deny it then they may 
be committed to some controversial metaphysics. All in all, the claim that the null 
set does not exist is not nearly as controversial as it at first seems. 
The null set has become a very important issue here. We have seen that 
acceptance or rejection of Lowe's reductio to support his second premise may 
turn on whether or not we accept the existence of the null set. In (5.1.4 above) we 
saw that many people want to draw an analogy between accepting the existence of 
the null set and accepting the existence of the empty world. 
However there is another tack that this argument can take. We have seen that 
Lowe's rejection of the null set is a key part of his argument for rejecting the 
empty world. If we think about other philosophers who deny the existence of the 
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null set, then the obvious candidate is Lewis. But Lewis also denies the existence 
of the empty world, suggesting that 
We needn't be ontologically serious about the null set.85 
So although I have argued that there is not necessarily a direct link between 
rejecting these two 'empty' objects, perhaps it is worth considering why there is a 
correlation between those who reject the two. 
The first thing to say is that not everyone who denies metaphysical nihilism 
denies the existence of the null set. Armstrong86 is the obvious example. Secondly 
Lewis' rejection of the empty world is a direct result of his claim that all that 
exists are spatio-temporally related objects. Lowe on the other hand is an ersatzer 
and so could be either a nihilist or an anti-nihilist. The question of the null-set 
actually does some work in his rejection of nihilism, as we have seen above, but it 
alone does not lead to his rejection of nihilism. So the rejection of the null set, 
alone, is not sufficient to yield anti-nihilism. Lowe needs several other premises 
in order to argue against nihilism. So in both cases the rejection of the null set is 
to some extent independent of the rejection of the empty world and vice versa. Of 
course, given that both Lowe and Lewis are very systematic philosophers there 
are links between their rejections of the null set and their other beliefs but there is 
certainly no necessary connection between denying the empty set and denying the 
empty world. 
Another objection to Lowe is available. Perhaps when we say that numbers or 
other abstracta are necessary, we mean that if anything else exists then numbers 
8 5 Ibid. 13. 
8 6 Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility 11,137. 
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exist. If we admit that Lowe has shown us that a world with only abstract objects 
is impossible that does not mean that a world with no objects at all is impossible. 
It may be that no universals or sets can exist without some concrete object also 
existing but perhaps there could be a world where none of these exists? This is the 
question of absolute nihilism (see 6.1 above). What would a world without 
abstract objects be like? Well, it would probably be a maximally consistent 
proposition or state of affairs. (This world is incompatible with compositionalism 
so we need only discuss ersatzism in this context.) So if this is a consistent state 
of affairs then it is a possible world. 
Lowe would probably reply to this by using his arguments against mathematical 
fictionalism. The objectionable part of mathematical fictionalism, according to 
Lowe (and indeed most opponents of fictionalism) is the claim that mathematical 
truths are contingent. Absolute nihilism makes mathematics contingent and so is 
undesirable. 
7.5 Premise A4* 
87 
(A4*r If there is a world with no concrete* objects then that world has no 
concrete objects. 
Earlier in this chapter, I said that in order to avoid getting into the tangential 
question of whether or not concrete objects are infinitely divisible, I would run 
two parallel arguments. I've been running a version of Baldwin's original 
argument (A1)-(A3) which we need if, as Lowe suggests, concrete objects do not 
have an infinite number of parts. I've also been running a version of Rodriguez-
Pereyra's improved argument (A1*)-(A3*) which we need if, as Rodriguez-
8 7 My numbering for Rodriguez-Pereyra's extra claim. 
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Pereyra suggests, concrete objects do have an infinite number of parts. Both 
arguments seem to have similar fates: the problems pointed out by Lowe and 
defended by myself against Rodriguez-Pereyra's criticisms are not affected by 
this question of the divisibility of concrete objects. However, if Rodriguez-
Pereyra is right about divisibility, then the premises (Al*) - (A3*) given so far, 
are not sufficient to yield nihilism. A fourth claim, which I am calling (A4*), is 
required. The arguments that Rodriguez-Pereyra gave for this claim originally 
seem to work just as well given my new criterion of concreteness and seem to be 
compatible with an appropriate account of worlds. 
The conclusion of (Al*) - (A3*) is that there is a world, w nji, without concrete* 
objects. But concrete* objects are not concrete objects. Concrete* objects are 
concrete, memberless and maximal occupants of connected regions. So is Wnii 
genuinely an empty world - a world with no concrete objects? Yes it is. In w,ui 
there are no concrete, memberless, maximal occupants of spatio-temporal regions 
i.e. no concrete* objects. This means that there are no maximal occupants of 
spatio-temporal regions (as any occupant of a spatio-temporal region will be 
concrete and memberless). (This actually seems more plausible with my spatio-
temporal criterion of concreteness than with Rodriguez-Pereyra's criterion.) I f 
there are no maximal occupants of spatio-temporal regions in a world then there 
are no occupants of spatio-temporal regions in that world. So if in w„ii there are no 
concrete* objects then it seems as though there must be no concrete objects in 
w n i i . So w„ii is an empty world. 
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7.6 One more challenge to nihilism 
go 
A final strategy for attacking nihilism is suggested by Van Inwagen. Having 
failed to find a convincing modal ontological argument to defeat the nihilist he 
develops his probability argument. The aim of this argument is not to show that 
metaphysical nihilism is impossible. Rather he aims only to show that it is 
incredibly unlikely. In fact he wants to show that it's as unlikely as anything can 
be. The argument runs: 
(VI) There are some beings; 
(V2) If there is more than one possible world, there are infinitely many; 
(V3) There is at most one possible world in which there are no beings; 
(V4) For any two possible worlds, the probability of their being actual is 
equal.89 
If these premises are true then even if nihilism is true - there is an empty possible 
world - then it still would have been more or less impossible for that world to be 
actual. This is because there are an infinite number of possible worlds and the 
probability of any given world being actual is the same as that for any other world 
being actual (from (V4)). As there are an infinite number of worlds where 
something exists and at most one where nothing exists, the probability of the one 
where nothing exists being actual is either zero or infinitely small. If the 
probability of something being actual is infinitely small then there is a sense in 
which it is impossible. 
If, contra to (V2), there is just one possible world, then nihilism is false as there is 
no world where there are no concrete beings. 
8 8 Van Inwagen, "Why Is There Anything at All?.", Van Inwagen, P., Ontology, Identity and 
Modality: Essays in Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 57-71. 
8 9 Van Inwagen, "Why Is There Anything at All?," 99. (My numbering.) 
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The first two premises seem quite plausible. (VI) is indisputable. (V2) seems 
likely - if we are going to have to invoke any possible worlds it seems as though 
any finite number will not suffice, so there must be an infinite number of worlds. 
(V3) is the claim that all possible worlds with no beings (or I suppose with no 
concrete beings) are the same world. One could object to this view by claiming 
that there are indiscernible possible worlds i.e. if each possibility was represented 
not just by one world but by several or indeed infinitely many exactly identical 
worlds. There doesn't seem to be any reason to assume this. Lewis90 says he is 
agnostic about it and Divers91 argues that considerations about economy should 
lead Lewis to deny the existence of indiscernible worlds. On the ersatz view 
where worlds are abstract objects in this world, it also seems that there won't be 
any replica worlds. 
Lowe attacks this third premise claiming that if there is one world with no 
concrete objects, then there may be more than one world with no concrete objects. 
He points out that (V3) is only true on the assumption that all (independent) 
w Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds 87. 
9 1 Divers, "On the Prohibitive Cost of Indiscernible Concrete Possible Worlds." John Divers 
argues that Lewis has over-looked the importance of quantitative economy. Lewis claims he is 
agnostic about the existence of duplicates of worlds, but Divers claims this results from his 
underestimation of the importance of quantitative economy. Divers agrees with Lewis that 
qualitative economy is more important than quantitative but claims that quantitative economy has 
a role none the less. This role he sums up as follows "Q: When but only when competing theories 
have the same qualitative cost, the theory which has the lowest quantitative cost should be rated 
cheapest for the purpose of judging the credibility (cost / benefit value) of the theories." (p. 388) 
That is, quantitative economy can be taken into account when you have two theories with equal 
explanatory power and otherwise equal ontological cost. The two positions in question are a 
genuine modal realism that posits exactly one possible world for each way this world could have 
been and any other genuine modal realism that posits more than one possible world for any or all 
ways this world could have been. They both posit the same kinds of entities and have the same 
explanatory power but the second option has multiple copies of some entities. According to Q, we 
can legitimately take into account the greater quantitative cost of the second and hence choose the 
first. Hence, Lewis need sit on the fence no longer, he can admit that there is only one world 
corresponding to each way the world could have been. 
9 2 Lowe, "Why Is There Anything at All?," 114-5. 
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abstract objects are necessary objects. However, this may not be the case. It may 
be that there are two different worlds which contain different objects, none of 
which are concrete. Of course Lowe doesn't even believe that there is one world 
with no concrete objects, so he certainly doesn't believe that there is more than 
one. What he does believe is that if there is one world with no concrete objects 
then it is not obvious that there is only one. 
(V4) is the most controversial premise of Van Inwagen's argument but it is still 
plausible. It seems implausible to assume that any world is more likely to be 
actual than any other world. 
So most of the premises of Van Inwagen's argument seem plausible but I think 
that it is not sufficient to defeat nihilism.94 According to Van Inwagen, the world 
we do live in, lets call it a, is just as unlikely to be actual as the empty world. But 
a is actual. My argument is that we could replace (V3) with the claim that 
(V3') there is at most one world at which P, 
where P is a complete specification of the actual way that things are. This would 
be just as plausible as (V3), and (VI), (V2) and (V4) would retain as much 
plausibility as they had in the original. However the conclusion of this new 
argument is that a's being actual is as unlikely as anything could be. Hence the 
likelihood of a's being actual is the same as the likelihood of the empty world's 
being actual. As a is actual it shows that nihilism is not as problematic as Van 
Inwagen had intended. 
9 3 There are outlines of arguments against this claim in Ibid.: 113-4. For further discussions of this 
issue see Nozick, R., Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1981), Parfit, D., "Why Anything? Why This?," London Review of Books 20 (1998). 
9 4 An argument similar to this is given in Lowe, "Why Is There Anything at All?," 113-4. 
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Given that Van Inwagen's argument was supposed to show that the improbability 
of the empty world's being actual rendered metaphysical nihilism all but 
impossible, the fact that this world is equally improbable shows that nihilism, if it 
is a possibility at all, is no more unlikely than the reality we see around us. 
So Van Inwagen's argument, if it works at all, shows us that the empty world was 
no more nor less likely to be actual than this world. If this was meant to convince 
us of the null world's near-impossibility, then it has not succeeded. Even if we 
accept the premises and conclusion of Van Inwagen's argument, it only shows us 
how very unlikely the actuality of the null world is. It does not show us that the 
null world's actuality is impossible. 
7.7 Conclusion 
So where does the subtraction argument, and with it, nihilism, stand at the end of 
this attempt to revise it? My aim in this chapter, remember, is to re-write the 
subtraction argument updating it to take into account the objections I have made 
to the previous versions. Specifically, to argue for it using only premises that are 
compatible with an ersatz view of worlds as an ersatz view is the only fully 
worked-out account of worlds that is compatible with nihilism. Secondly, to use 
an appropriate criterion of concreteness - namely the spatio-temporal criterion. So 
the question is 'can a satisfactory subtraction argument be constructed that takes 
into account these changes?' I also decided to run this argument without deciding 
the question about the infinite divisibility of concrete objects. So I have two 
parallel arguments, one assuming that concrete objects are infinitely divisible and 
the other assuming that they are not. This should make mine a stronger argument 
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as there are fewer ways for it to be wrong. And it means that it will not be rejected 
by philosophers who believe one rather than the other. 
The first premise ((Al) or (Al *)) 9 5 seems to hold. 
The second premise ((A2) or (A2*)) is less secure. Even in the original (A2) (or 
(A2*)) was the weakest premise. This is because it is not one hundred percent 
guaranteed by Baldwin's argument. We saw above that with my modified 
criterion of concreteness, the argument for (A2) is even weaker. However I think 
we can still accept (A2). This is because although the argument for it is not 
completely convincing, the argument against it, the ontological argument, is even 
less so. The problems with the ontological argument are well known and Van 
Inwagen (see 7.3.1 above) has pointed out its reliance on the similarly 
unconvincing cosmological argument and the principle of sufficient reason. I 
think it is therefore safe to accept premise (A2) on the basis that it is more 
plausible and better supported than its denial. 
(A3), then, is the crucial premise. This was always the case. I have shown that 
Rodriguez-Pereyra's defence of nihilism and (A3) against Lowe's anti-nihilist 
arguments rests on his denial of an ersatz premise, despite the fact that the only 
fully worked out account of worlds that is compatible with nihilism is an ersatz 
account. On the other hand, Lowe's anti-nihilist argument seems to hold. Every 
world contains at least one concrete object where by a 'concrete object' we mean 
one that exists in time. Lowe's denial of the existence of the null set is not as 
In what follows I refer to (Al ) , (A2) and (A3) sometimes without also mentioning (Al*) , (A2*) 
and (A3*). This is just for ease of reading and writing. All the claims I make about (Al ) , (A2) and 
(A3) are equally plausible for (Al*) , (A2*) and (A3*). 
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implausible as it originally seems to be. But we must remember that Lowe's 




We've reached the end of our discussion of the two key questions in modal 
metaphysics. Where have we got to? Is nihilism right or wrong? What have we 
learnt along the way about possible worlds, nihilism and the metaphysics of 
modality in general? 
I have three aims in this conclusion. Firstly, I will summarise the state of the 
debate as I see it at the end of this discussion and give my headline results (see 
8.1 below). Secondly I will recap the main subsidiary arguments I made along 
the way, these are my intermediary conclusions (see 8.2 below). Any philosopher 
who disagrees in some way with my final conclusions will hopefully still accept 
many of the intermediary conclusions. Finally, I will suggest what directions 
future debates on nihilism might take and how my results should be incorporated 
into further work. 
8.1 Where are we now? (Main results.) 
My final position endorses anti-nihilism. Lowe's arguments against the nihilist 
are still standing despite Rodriguez-Pereyra's attack. In fact, Lowe's position is 
now more solid as I have given arguments to support using the temporal criterion 
of concreteness. 
Lowe's arguments are directed against the third premise of the subtraction 
argument ((A3) or (A3*)) but they also work against nihilism in general. But 
Lowe's arguments are resting on two pillars and if either of these were to be 
attacked the whole facade would come tumbling down. These pillars are his 
Aristotelian realism about universals and, most controversially, his denial of the 
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existence of the empty set. I have suggested that although Lowe's denial of the 
empty set is controversial, it follows directly from a conjunction of actualism and 
a plausible thesis about the existence of sets. What would happen if one of 
Lowe's pillars is attacked or destroyed? Would it be possible to construct another 
anti-nihilist argument or are these claims all essential to anti-nihilism? Or would 
it open the way to constructing a new, stronger argument for nihilism? 
So if the subtraction argument is in trouble, what of nihilism? It may be possible 
to construct another argument for nihilism, or to capture the intuition behind the 
subtraction argument and express it formally in a different way. The intuition 
behind the subtraction argument is the claim that because each individual 
concrete object could have not existed, all concrete objects could have not 
existed. It is worth noting that the subtraction argument is a conclusion-led 
argument. Its supporters supported nihilism and so found an argument to support 
it, as opposed to a premise-led argument where the premises were held anyway 
and an argument discovered that leads to a new conclusion. This is interesting 
because it shows us some of the motivation and intuitions behind the subtraction 
argument. It is there to support nihilism, which Baldwin and Rodriguez-Pereyra 
see as a plausible position that lacks formal support. So in a way the basic 
intuition behind the subtraction argument is the idea that nihilism is correct. 
However, I have argued (see 5.1 above) that nihilism is not as intuitively plausible 
as it first appears to be. Previously it might have appeared that Lowe's arguments, 
for example, are steeped in metaphysical doctrine - that accepting them meant 
buying into a grand metaphysical scheme - whereas nihilism was 'simple' 
ontologically and the sort of position that can be accepted, or even assumed, with 
limited repercussions for the rest of philosophy. I hope that I have shown that this 
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is not the case. Nihilism has huge metaphysical implications and determines the 
answers to some of the biggest questions in modal metaphysics for those 
philosophers who accept it. Specifically it rules out any sort of compositionalism 
about possible worlds. Nihilism, as defended by Rodriguez-Pereyra and Baldwin 
also rules out the existence of haecceities which in turn limits both the range of 
ersatz theories available and the sort of modal claims that are true. Finally, some 
of the intuitive plausibility of nihilism is based on its rejection of a concrete 
necessary being. But I have shown that Baldwin's argument for this claim is 
based on his inappropriate criterion of concreteness and all the ontological 
baggage it brings with it. With my criterion of concreteness, nihilism is on far less 
solid ground against the attack from the ontological argument. 
In discussing whether or not there could be nothing, Nozick says that 
... someone who proposes a non-strange answer shows he didn't understand 
the question.1 
If this is true then I have helped the nihilist out. I have shown that nihilism is not 
as uncontroversial as it might first appear, it is in fact a much stranger thesis than 
the nihilists had thought. 
8.2 How did we get here? (Subsidiary results.) 
As well as my main conclusions there are several interim conclusions which I 
have argued for during the thesis. Here are the main subsidiary results: (the 
numbers in brackets are the chapters where these claims are defended) 
• Spinozism (the claim that things could not have been different) is false. (1) 
1 Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 16. 
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If Melia's attack on Lewis' parsimony is viable at all, then Melia's 
argument is only effective against the argument from the quantitative / 
qualitative distinction, not against the argument that the price is right. (2) 
An explanation of what 'of a kind' means may be implicit in Lewis' 
ontology. (2) 
We shouldn't make unreflective use of principles of ontological economy 
in the study of ontology itself. (2) 
The kind of evidence required for asserting the existence of something is 
not just determined by the kind of object involved but also by the kind of 
evidence that object can be expected to produce. (2) 
Linguistic ersatzism, in its reductionist form, cannot tackle my question (ii), 
the nihilism question, in an objective way. (3) 
The attempt by the reductionist linguistic ersatzer to reduce possibilities to 
language is an attempt to reduce in the wrong direction. (3) 
Rosen's version of modal fictionalism begs the question of metaphysical 
nihilism. (3) 
Given that the problematic intrinsic / relational distinction forms part of 
Baldwin and Rodriguez-Pereyra's account of concreteness, they need to 
give an account of intrinsicness and reasons for accepting that particular 
account. (4) 
Even if 'having xi as its only member' is an intrinsic property of {xi} it 
doesn't follow that 'being the only member of {x i} ' is an intrinsic property 
of xi. (4) 
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Space-time regions are not sets of space-time points (as Rodriguez-Pereyra 
claims) but are sums of space-time points. (4) 
Theories of possible worlds can be categorised as compositionalist, 
containerist and ersatz. (5) 
This way of categorising theories of possible worlds is more relevant to 
discussions of metaphysical nihilism than either the possibilism / actualism 
dichotomy or the Lewisian / ersatz dichotomy. (5) 
Nihilism is incompatible with the compositionalist account of worlds. (5) 
The subtraction argument involves tacit acceptance of the container view of 
worlds. (5) 
The container view (in conjunction with metaphysical nihilism) requires 
absolutism about space and time. (5) 
Metaphysical nihilism is prima facie compatible with the ersatz view of 
worlds. (5) 
The subtraction argument in all its published forms is incompatible with 
most ersatz views and compatible only with those ersatz views that do not 
produce a very robust account of modality. (5) 
By changing the criterion of concreteness used in the subtraction argument 
it is possible to develop an argument for nihilism that allows for a more 
robust ersatz account of worlds. (5) 
If worlds are sets, it seems hard to explain their structure. (5) 
A sum* is not a genuine class of entity or ontological category. (5) 
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Rodriguez-Pereyra's characterisation of modal realism as the claim that 
'other worlds exist and are of a kind with the actual world' may actually be 
accepted by the opponents of Lewisian modal realism. (5) 
Given that Rodriguez-Pereyra's account of worlds is so different from that 
of Lewis, it is not obvious that we can make these large changes without 
affecting the power and usefulness of the theory. (5) 
Rodriguez-Pereyra's account of worlds is extremely unparsimonious. (5) 
Metaphysical nihilism is not a common sense view, agnostic between 
accounts of possible worlds, or a basic hypothesis, which we should hold 
on to until persuaded otherwise. (5) 
A commitment to the non-existence of a given kind of entity is just as 
serious as a commitment to their existence. (5) 
Neither Lowe, Baldwin nor Rodriguez-Pereyra give any reasons for using 
the criteria of concreteness they do use. (6,7) 
Given that metaphysical nihilism is an issue about the nature of concrete 
objects, any thorough discussion of it should specify why a given account 
of concreteness is being used. (6) 
To avoid circularity, the appropriate criterion of concreteness should be 
chosen without assuming either metaphysical nihilism or its denial. (6) 
The proponents of metaphysical nihilism have been using an inappropriate 
criterion of concreteness. (6) 




Issues about metaphysics are prior to issues about philosophy of language. 
(3,6) 
The temporal criterion of concreteness is right for discussions of 
metaphysical nihilism. (6) 
Metaphysical nihilism, the temporal account of concreteness and an ersatz 
account of worlds are prima facie compatible. (6) 
The denial of metaphysical nihilism is also prima facie compatible with the 
conjunction of the temporal account of concreteness and an ersatz account 
of worlds. (6) 
Premise (A2) of the subtraction argument is far less plausible when taken in 
conjunction with the temporal criterion of concreteness than with Baldwin 
and Rodriguez-Pereyra's criteria. This shows Baldwin's undefended 
criterion of concreteness is doing some work in his argument. (7) 
(A2) is nonetheless more plausible than its denial. (7) 
The only fully worked out theory of possible worlds that is compatible with 
nihilism is ersatzism. Yet Rodriguez-Pereyra defends nihilism by attacking 
Lowe's first premise using a suppressed anti-ersatz premise. (7) 
Rejecting (or accepting) the existence of the empty world is not equivalent 
to rejecting (or accepting) the existence of the empty set. (7) 
If we accept that no set can exist in a world where its members don't exist 
(on an actualist ontology) then denying the existence of the null set seems 
quite plausible. (7) 
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• Van Inwagen's probability argument shows that the empty world is no 
more nor less likely than the actual world. (7) 
« If we use the appropriate criterion of concreteness and account of worlds, 
Lowe's anti-nihilist arguments are ultimately more persuasive than those of 
the nihilists. (7) 
• The proponents of metaphysical nihilism have not given sufficient support 
to their position. The reason for this is that, in their published works, they 
(especially Baldwin) sought to consider the second of my two questions (is 
there an empty possible world?) without sufficient consideration of my first 
question (what are possible worlds?)2 (1,4,5,7) 
• That these two questions need to be considered not singly but as two inter-
related issues. (1,3,5,7) 
• Neither of these two questions is primary or foundational, some sort of 
reflective equilibrium between them is desirable. (3,5,6,7) 
8.3 Where to go from here? 
If someone wants to defend nihilism, then either (i) they will need to come up 
with an argument against Lowe that is compatible with ersatzism or (ii) they will 
have to develop a whole new account of possible worlds, possibly along the lines 
suggested by Rodriguez-Pereyra and show that it is compatible with nihilism and 
can do everything that we expect from an account of worlds and doesn't have any 
other problematic consequences. They should also use the temporal criterion of 
2 This issue is discussed by Rodriguez-Pereyra in his (unpublished) Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Modal 
Realism and Metaphysical Nihilism" but is not discussed by Baldwin. 
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concreteness (unless they can give sound reasons why some other criterion is 
relevant). 
If, on the other hand, we want to further defend the anti-nihilist position, there 
are two main areas I think need to be looked into. The first is to examine the 
consequences of Rodriguez-Pereyra's new account of worlds. We need to look at 
how this sketch of a theory of worlds could be cashed out so as to do everything 
that we expect from an account of possible worlds and examine whether or not it 
is compatible with nihilism once it has been fully worked out. 
The other area for debate is the metaphysics of the empty set. As it stands 
Lowe's anti-nihilist argument rests on his controversial rejection of the empty 
set. Could an anti-nihilist argument be developed without this assumption? Can 
further arguments be given in support of this assumption or against this 
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